MOBILIZATION IN POST-SOCIALIST SPACES: BETWEEN IMPERATIVES OF MODERNIZATION AND THREATS OF DEMODERNIZATION

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BETWEEN IMPERATIVES OF MODERNIZATION AND THREATS OF DE-MODERNIZATION

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“The time is out of joint”
Hamlet (1.5.188)

In the Fall of 2014 Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute's Department of Sociology held a conference whose overachieving theme was centenary of the World War I beginning. This academic event proved to be something more than a pure exercise in scholarly imagination trapped in the ivory tower of the university. In a tragic Shakespearean fashion, the year of 2014 was not the time of mere remembering of bygone age of bloodshed and ferocious animosity. It witnessed the Russian occupation of Crimea as well as the beginning of protracted armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
The WWI formal ending was followed by the unparalleled in recorded human history outbursts of global turbulence, violence and depression. Instead of lasting peace, it inaugurated new stage of the Second Thirty Years’ War.

In a similar fashion, the year of 2018 was lesser of the World War I centenary and more of the continuation of what might become Third Thirty Years’ War. As the four-year period (2014-2018) is drawing to its close, Crimea remains occupied while information about armed clashes in eastern Ukraine has lost the status of tragic news and become a routine part of everyday life.

As it happens different aspects of mobilization in a society—societal, political and military—become a pressing issue for both academic commentators and policy practitioners. These mobilizations are taking place globally in all three worlds: in the nations of the core, semi-periphery and periphery. Alas, given geographical location and general *problematique* of the Ideology and Politics Journal, it is quite natural that this special issue focuses on the processes of mobilization(s) and their impact on modernization / de-modernization in the post-Leninist context.

For the first generation of the students of modernization, the mobilization was at the heart of “progressive” social changes. Carl Deutsch in his classical article “Social Mobilization and Political Development” (Deutsch, 1961) linked this process to military history of post-revolutionary

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1 Alexander Etkind and Mikhail Minakov have come up with an excellent reinvention and unpacking of the notion of de-modernization which has given a strong impetus to our own treatment of the phenomenon in question (Etkind & Minakov, 2018).

2 More detailed account of Leninism and Leninist regimes can be found in pioneering work of Ken Jowitt (Jowitt, 1993), (Кутюев, 2016).
France and German “total mobilization” of 1914-1918. He also employed the notion of a military draft / mobilization to the armed forces as the metaphor for the social mobilization. He succinctly defined the mobilization as “the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior” (Deutsch, 1961: 494).

American sociologist Daniel Chirot once remarked that too many contemporary societies don’t have access to benefits of modernity, thus it makes little sense to discuss the transition to something beyond modern social order (Chirot, 2000). After the “Leninist extinction” the modernization is the order of the day for the nations of Eastern Europe and post-Soviet space (Jowitt, 1993). For theoreticians of modernization in 1950s the answer was self-evident—mobilization was their shibboleth and simultaneously synonymous with progressive and modernizing social changes (Кутюєв, 2016). Yet, in the age of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2004; Eisenstadt & Schluchter, 1998) and development defined as freedom (Sen, 1999) the question naturally and necessarily arises: what type of modernity/modernities we are talking about? Now purely mobilizational and Eurocentric treatment of modernity appears conceptually obsolete and politically harmful.

Ukrainian sociologist Yuriy Saveliev has recently inaugurated new discourse on modernity—embodied in a barrage of his publications—stressing the inclusion as a critically important indicator of this social formation (Савельєв, 2017; Савельєв, 2018). This inclusive reading of modernity poses new challenges for researchers and policy-makers. It is
suggested that modernity and more specific—politics of modernization and
development—are to be perceived in terms of inclusion and enhancing human capabilities. How does this approach fit into traditional/habitual modes of modernization revolving around building centralized coercive authority transforming its subordinates into homogeneous and easily mobilized—in a military sense as well—members of a “national” community?

Top down approach to modernization has long appeared obsolete in the West and is rather being associated with de-modernizing practices and institutions. Moreover, American sociologist Peter Evans warned us about the danger of institutional mono-cropping which he defines as “the imposition of blueprints based on idealized versions of Anglo-American institutions, the applicability of which is presumed to transcend national circumstances and cultures” (Evans, 2004: 30). Nevertheless, the EU and international institutions are often promoting these very mono-cropping practices. Such an approach contributes to resuscitating antiquated Eurocentrism, which in turn is intrinsically linked to understanding modernization of the Rest as a series of mobilizations emanating from the political center/nation state.

Overcoming straightforward definitions of modernity with their emphasis on its coercive dimension and making a transition to the conceptual framework of modernity/modernities sensitive to the democratic practices is no easy task. It is worth remembering that “full democracy” is still a distant ideal with only 5% of the global population enjoying its benefits (Economist, 2018). We should not be forgetting that Alain Touraine offered one of the most penetrating critical interpretation of modernity
viewing it as a perpetual clash of Reason and Subjectivity, in other words the conflict between discipline and liberty (Touraine, 1995). Thus, we cannot simply pontificate about the virtues of mobilization of all sorts without explaining what role the *demos* plays in these processes. In this vein, it is worth noting that this issue is going to print after the expiration of one-month imposition of the martial law in 10 out of 23 regions of Ukraine (26 November - 26 December 2018). It is more than a mere coincidence that the martial law had been introduced just before the start of presidential campaign in Ukraine. For many observers this was a move aimed at mobilizing incumbent president’s electorate and had little to do with increasing Ukraine’s military prowess vis-à-vis Russia.

The articles selected for this issue represent a vast array of social sciences disciplines and subjects. They aim at dissecting the intricate connections among military mobilization, youth attitudes towards patriotism, women’s participation in politics, issues of inequality, civil society and its role in conflict resolution and historical aspects of nationalist mobilization in the milieu of former combatants after the defeat of Ukraine's struggles for independence in 1921.

Serhiy Choliy focuses on development of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe. Author traces the evolution of civil-military relations in a region and elaborates the typology of recruitment to armed forces. This typology includes feudal approach to the formation of armed forces, military draft (mostly the 18th century), universal and personal military conscription (mid-19th century), and volunteer armed forces (the end of the 20th century). After the Cold War, Ukrainian military development was in tune with
European tendencies. The policies of disarmament and conversion were thoroughly implemented between 1991 and February 2014. In 2013 the universal draft was supposed to be abolished. Since that time, the armed forces were to be based on contract service.

Yet 2014 brought about the dramatic reversals in military policies of Ukraine. This change was caused by the beginning of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine and direct involvement of Russian regular troops into armed clashes. That dramatic turnabout of the circumstances forced Ukraine to reintroduced mandatory draft into armed forces. This transformation heralded the beginning of a new civil-military relations paradigm. In the new setting the threat of a large-scale war in Europe becomes a reality, thus mandatory draft into armed forces is a necessity. The author somewhat optimistically views Ukrainian evolution as being exemplary for the European nations.

Maxim Yenin’s article deals with the interplay of ideological forms and patriotic values among Ukrainian youth. His account is sophisticated theoretically and extremely rich empirically. It is based on the analysis of the moderated focus group discussions conducted by the author himself in 2017-2018. Drawing upon heavily criticized and somewhat flawed, yet perhaps still instrumentally useful distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism Maxim Yenin is arguing in favor of the former in a peculiar context of the post-Leninist transformations. Ukraine’s national statehood is facing the challenge to its very existence. At the same time, Ukraine as a political and societal community is being tasked with modernizing its economy and embarking on the road towards political development. This set of tasks and challenges was rightly defined by transitologists of 1990s as “rebuilding ship
at sea” (Elster, Offe & Preuss, 1998). Being often conflicting and sometimes mutually exclusive, these “goals of the post-Leninist development” require that state managers act swiftly in the environment characterized by uncertainty and limited information. Thus, resorting to inculcation of the patriotic values in the populace might be one of the few the survival tactics available to and pursued by the post-Leninist “power elite.” Ukrainian post-2014 experience has shown that nationalist (in Benedict Anderson’s sense) or patriotic mobilization is a double-edge sword, facilitating the rise of volunteer movement, while providing an impetus for the far-right mobilization and even more so—violence.

Yenin’s analysis in a very nuanced and detailed manner touches upon these complexities and ambiguities of the post-Leninist transformations. He rightly argues for the presence of autonomous agency in Ukrainian youth. They are capable of critical perception of the patriotic values championed by the state officialdom. The 18-year old female respondent paradigmatically captures the mood of the youth:

“We should make a distinction between notions of the country and the state. If you ask me: Are you a patriot of your country? I would respond: Yes, I am, because I love my country. At the same time, I hate the state. I can’t watch calmly what the authorities are doing to people, resources, and the country.”

While post-socialist nations under the protective umbrella of the EU and NATO can somehow claim that they focus on “post-modern/post-
material” needs, countries like Ukraine are caught between rock and hard place. They have to fight for their very survival as political communities and sovereign nation states. This situation projects a set of societal needs and actions of a different order. Currently Ukraine has extremely limited options in terms of the political development strategies available. It takes Ukraine from the 2018—the time of multiple modernities and post-materialist values—to the world of 1968 when Samuel Huntington’s seminal volume “Political Order in Changing Societies” came out (Huntington, 1968). This is the world where societal and political actors are expected to behave in a manner of Shakespearean duke of Gloucester (future King Richard III), being able to

“...smile, and murder whiles I smile, /
...play the orator as well as Nestor,
Deceive more slyly than Ulysses could,
And, like a Sinon, take another Troy.
Add colors to the chameleon,
Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
And set the murderous Machiavel to school” (Henry VI, 3: 3: 2).

Maxim Yenin’s study reveals what Ukrainian youth—the target audience of the government’s mobilization initiatives—think about abstract

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3 For the severe limitations of the “strategy” of excessive reliance on external institutions at the expense of the domestic / local infrastructural capacity / power employed by some new EU member-states see extremely insightful paper by Venelin Ganev (Ganev, 2005).
entities (e.g. patriotism) and down-to-earth matters (army draft which is an element of a broader societal drive towards mobilization).

Ukrainian youth considers the patriotism in terms of fulfilling their civic duties. It does not necessarily presuppose the willingness to take part in a military draft. Yenin’s data from focus group discussions show that the youth are rather indifferent to all ideological forms of patriotism (both civic and ethnic ones). The service in Ukraine’s armed forces is all but attractive and prestigious. The youth is convinced that mandatory service in armed forces fails to equip the personnel with skills relevant to real-life warfare. Thus, the military service has to become a matter of a free choice, while the army should become a contract-based force. This view is reinforced by the strong belief that the quality of training in the Ukrainian armed forces is low, with exemplary forces being the US and Israel ones. Being a professional military is the least desirable career track for Ukrainian youth since it does not increase their life chances afterwards. This view is buttressed by the deeply rooted conviction that the social security net for those who saw action is lacking. Last but definitely not least, the sizable portion of youth think in terms of Russian proverb “one man’s problem is another man’s opportunity” (кому война, кому мать родна), viewing the ruling political and business establishment as clinical manipulators who make use of war as a pretext for personal advancement and enrichment. The youth segment of Ukrainian demos appears to be critically minded and skeptical towards old-fashioned authoritarian, top-down techniques of mobilization, leaning towards liberal values and practices. Yet, the acute question remains to be addressed: How the nation—and nations still retain their status as major
Durkheimian social facts of today’s political landscape—staves off external aggression while making a viable drive towards European modernity?

This brings us to the shibboleth of champions of liberal democracy and freedoms—civil society. Andrii Baginskiy’s article “Mobilization of Civil Society in the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine: Ideological Limits and Resources of Peacebuilding” strives to frame the conflict in Donbas in terms of the civil society evolution in Ukraine. The author employs Charles Tilly’s concepts of mobilization as the mode of collective action aimed at amassing resources required for the advancement of group's goals (Tilly 1990). This approach is intertwined with the notion of hybridity. Hybridity explains the multifaceted nature of various social forms and life-worlds as well as hybrid orders, which combine different practices of governance and social regulations. Local social orders and practices are being juxtaposed with the ostensible “modernity.” Hybrid forms drawing upon local practices and outlooks are contradictory and elusive. Baginskiy is doing a useful service to conflict studies by placing them in a broader framework of modernity and avoiding binary oppositions “traditional / local / hybrid versus modern / global / uniform.” These locally embedded forms are capable of both resisting peace building and promoting it. The author also employs the concept of the ethos of conflict developed by Daniel Bar-Tal and his co-authors (Bar-Tal et al., 2012) and applies it to Ukraine. Maidan events of 2013-2014 gave a strong impetus to the rise of the ethos of conflict in Ukraine. Baginskiy traces the evolution of the ethos of conflict to early 2000s. Kyiv and Donbas political elites clashed over issues of identity, nation building and historical memory. National and regional power establishments in Ukraine after first
Maidan employed conflicting mode of interaction glorifying nationalist movement and Soviet/internationalist past respectively. Existing cleavages were reinforced by the Russia’s involvement—at first via indirect propaganda warfare, then with a direct military involvement into Ukrainian affairs.

Drawing upon interviews with leading civil society activists the author finds a glimpse of hope for Ukraine in their actions. At the same time, civil society initiatives can succeed only if there is an effective state with a strong capacity capable of laying down institutional prerequisites of peace. Peace building also requires classical Renan’s virtues of a given community willingness to stay together and ability to both remember and forget the past.

Denys Kiryukhin’s article “Inequality and its Perception” is a cogent interpretation of the place of inequality in contemporary world. The paper’s topicality has soared while this issue was being prepared for publication due to yellow vests movement in France. This movement’s prime motif is the discontent, someone could even argue the disgust, with inequality in French society.

All the buzzwords of the recent decades of social sciences scholarship—globalization, liberalization, neoliberalism, etc. - are put to productive use by the author. Moreover, he skillfully frames the value of equality in terms of the modernity and its aspirations. The article’s presuppositions are buttressed by countless publication both in academic press and media outlets outlining the societal ills of inequality.

Employing data from World Values Survey, Kiryukhin indicates dramatic decrease in support of income inequality in post-Leninist nations.
1990s was an epoch heralding the message of competition and thus inequality as a natural state of affairs for societies shaking off the chains of state socialism and escaping to freedom. Polls conducted in 2010-2014—in the aftermath of capitalist transition inspired by market Bolshevism of 1990s—showed much more negative attitudes to inequality.

The author is critically drawing upon the theory advanced by Vladimir Gimpelson and Daniel Treisman that there is a gulf between actual and perceived inequality (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). He enriches their approach by Göran Therborn’s ideas, pointing out that ideologies operate with three sets of binary oppositions: “what is versus what is not,” “good versus bad” and “possible versus impossible.” Thus, the phenomenon of inequality should be perceived on terms of its legitimacy and illegitimacy. The evaluation of existing inequalities as illegitimate often fuels social protest and channels its energy into political action. The rise of right-wing militancy and anti-EU sentiments epitomized by Brexit vote all but underline the importance of inequality and its implications for societal cohesion.

Trump’s tax cut counterrevolution (officially titled as “The Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018” has also brought the debate about causes and effects of inequality into academic and media limelight. The article juxtaposes Therborn’s notions of existential, vital and resource inequalities. The former is linked to identity politics—e.g. dignity and recognition—while the latter two forms of inequality point out in a direction of resources allocation and life chances of individuals. It was Nobel laureate Amartya Sen who noted in his classics “Development as Freedom” that life
expectancy of African Americans living in Philadelphia is closer to Third World country levels than to that of white middle class members living just in a different neighborhood of the same city (Sen 1999). Thus, inequality does has the power to kill, as Therborn himself puts it. At the same time fighting existential inequality—as important as it—has an effect upon “superstructure,” while leaving the economic “basis” less affected.

Chairman Mao once famously remarked that the women are holding up half the sky meaning that females are in charge of at least half of human affairs. It is impossible to tackle issues of inclusive political development without addressing and assessing whether these processes are gender balanced. Eka Darbaidze in her article “Increasing Women’s Political Participation in Georgia” offers a very detailed and penetrating account of the female participation in political decision-making bodies. According to the recent Gender Gap Index 2018 Georgia’s performance in this respect is rather mediocre—it’s ranked just below world’s average (Report, 2018).

The author offers an overview of the major schools of thought explaining the (under)representation of females in political institutions. She herself subscribed to the newly emerging strand of thought that could be defined as political autonomy argument. In the nutshell, this approach stresses the importance of electoral rules to determining political outcomes. The importance of gender quotas is also stressed. The article provides the wealth of information based on the in-depth interviews with male and female politicians as well as analysis of Georgian legislative framework for electoral processes. The author’s formula for leveling up the political playing field is the introduction of gender quotas for female representation. It
appears to be a feasible option given that public opinion in Georgia is in favor of better representation of females in political decision-making.

Igor Sribniak addresses the national(ist) mobilization of prisoners of war held in Polish camp Strzałkowo during 1921-1922. After the defeat of the supporters of Ukrainian independence cause, some servicemen belonging to different Ukrainian armed formations were interned in Poland. Given that the armed struggles for Ukraine’s independence lasted for several years and ended in defeat, the disillusionment was widely spread among interned combatants. Nationalist activists organized cultural and athletic activities for the camp’s Ukrainian community and effectively managed to engage majority of PoWs to their initiatives. Activists were publishing newspapers; they also set up painting studio, choir and different sports activists. Voluntary associations played a crucial part in the camp’s everyday life. PoWs were participating in the humanitarian relief society tasked with collecting and redistributing funds as well as holding festivities and cultural events. The author concludes that Strzałkowo camp was an instance of successful mobilization of Ukrainian PoWs by nationalist activists during period of profound crisis. This tactic facilitated the preservation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic military organization even after its demise and was instrumental in helping former Ukrainian soldiers to adapt to new circumstances in interwar Poland.

In all articles of this issue one entity although is not entirely absent yet remains quite inconspicuous - the state. It is quite intriguing given the issue’s focus on mobilization. Needless to say mobilization of any type is hardly imaginable without the state. This semi-absence deserves our close
attention and thorough explanation. This under-emphasis on the state could be attributed the legacy of the single party rule within Leninist regimes. Under Leninism, the party occupied “commanding heights” in political realm both institutionally and symbolically. The party subjugated the state—its military institutions in particular—to a number of controlling techniques raging from censure to purges. Perhaps no less important is that the state-centrists research program in social sciences—let alone its developmental state version—has not yet taken root in post-Soviet academic communities⁴.

The articles selected for this special issue of the Ideology and Politics Journal offer a smorgasbord of ideas to unpack different dimensions of mobilization and their implications for the modernization / de-modernization of the post-Leninist “real societies.”⁵ Perhaps, it is worth summing up the major findings of this issue with a useful truism about the contradictory nature of social changes, tectonic social changes in particular. Changes meant to bring about modernization are no exception. We should also keep in mind that no societal and political change is irreversible. Nascent institutions of new aspirants to modernity are fragile and prone to become prey of de-modernization processes. After brief intermission of optimism caused by the integration of the Central European nations—formerly belonging to the socialist camp—into the EU and NATO we are now witnessing the backslide of liberal democracy and rise of xenophobia against the backdrop of corruption, resurgence of the chiefs in political domain (Derluguian, Earle & Reno 2016: 62-86) and governmental ineptitude. All these

⁴ For more detailed account of the developmental state, see (Kyrgyz, 2016).
⁵ Our usage of the term “real societies” is informed by Jeff Alexander’s discussion of real civil societies (see: Alexander, 1998).
developments—or rather tendencies towards underdevelopment and decay—make the intellectual grappling with the notion of modernity and its meanings inescapable. Is modernity just a contingent outcome of hundreds of years of cutthroat completion among militarized states? In this case the essence of modernity is its mastery over techniques of domination. The institution which was the most successful at amassing the monopoly over violence and accumulating power turned out to be the nation state. Obviously, we are talking here about Charles Tilly’s account of the state-making as organized crime and war-making (Tilly, 1985: 169ff). If we subscribe to this realist / cynical reading of the state, we have to admit that mobilization, often coercive and violent, is the essence of modernity. There is an alternative reading of “unfinished project of modernity” (Jürgen Habermas) as a formation whose differentia specifica is in its emancipatory potential. In this case, we have to accept that liberties, development of human capabilities and inclusion are criteria of this historical system. This dispute is not over, and no single journal issue can bring it to its close.

Perhaps the nature of the present tumultuous state of affairs in the region with regard to imperatives of mobilization and their potential to enhance and/or derail modernization, thus transforming promise of modernities into practices of de-modernization, could be best captured with Sophocles’ words uttered in his “Antigone”:

“I cannot say
Of any condition of human life “This is fixed,
This is clearly good, or bad.” Fate raises up,
And Fate casts down the happy and unhappy alike:

No man can foretell his Fate” (Sophocles “Antigone,” 900–905).

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THE STATE IDEOLOGIES OF ARMY RECRUITMENT IN (EASTERN) EUROPE

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Abstract. This article is devoted to investigation of evolution of army recruitment processes in Europe. This evolution is a periodical change of trends and ideological models in relations of state and society. The usage of population, the same as influence of military service on society are more or less intensive during different historical periods. The author emphasizes on development of recruitment technologies during last decades in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. This region is still using specific forms of recruitment – universal conscription – technology, already outdated in the most countries of the world. The Eastern Europe is an exception in world development processes that presupposes future emergence of new recruitment paradigm in the region.

Key words: military service, civil-military relations, Eastern Europe, conscription.

The full version of this article is available in Ukrainian.
IDEOLOGICAL FORMS AND VALUE MODIFICATIONS OF PATRIOTISM OF UKRAINIAN YOUTH (BASED ON ANALYSIS OF MODERATED GROUP DISCUSSIONS)

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Abstract. The article deals with the main ideological forms and features of the mobilization practices of patriotism. Values modification of patriotism in the minds of Ukrainian youth, its motivation and demotivation factors to be involved in military mobilization and relation to the military service are identified in this article. It is based on the empirical data of sociological study which was conducted by the author with representatives of Ukrainian youth (October 2017 - January 2018) within the framework of the international research project "One Million Voices - 2" and the grant project of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine: "Improving the ways of human capital development as an increasing factor of mobilization potential of Ukraine".

Key words: patriotism, ethnic and civil patriotism, historical memory, ideological forms of patriotism, mobilization practices of patriotism, youth.
The full version of this paper is available in Ukrainian.
MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE: IDEOLOGICAL LIMITS AND RESOURCES OF PEACE-BUILDING.

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Abstract. The study of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine needs to expand the heuristic boundaries and overcome one-sided approaches. In this article, an attempt is made to see the confrontation in the Donbas in the context of the development of civil society in Ukraine, considering the establishment of peace as an important goal of the end of the conflict. The study suggests that mobilizing civil society can become a factor in overcoming the contradictions in the Ukrainian society. To understand the causes of the conflict, the concept of «conflict ethos» is used, in particular with regard to events on the Maidan 2013-2014. Polarization of society is also considered within the earlier period of the 2000s. The perspectives of the peace movement in Ukraine are outlined according to the views of its activists, which was researched through a survey conducted.
Keywords: peace, civil society, mobilization, conflict, Ukraine.

The full version of this article is available in Ukrainian.
INEQUALITY AND ITS PECEPTION

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Abstract. The growth of economic and social inequality, which is observed nowadays in equal measure in both post-Soviet and states with developed market economies and liberal democracy, is connected to a paradoxical political situation. The priority in the political agenda is the fight against "existential inequality" (G. Therborn), while economic inequality is increasingly perceived as one of the greatest threats to modern societies and the global world as a whole. In this the paper, the "Gimpelson-Treisman hypothesis", which concerns the discrepancy between actual and perceived inequalities, Ukrainian society as an example is analyzed. It is demonstrated that an improved hypothesis allows us to propose an explanation of this paradox based on Ukrainian society, namely, why in a situation of growing social inequality we are not witnessing a “left” political turn, but rather a "right-wing populist" one.
Keywords: inequality, post-Soviet states, Ukraine, liberalism, democracy.

The full version of this article is available in Russian.
INCREASING WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GEORGIA

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Abstract. The imbalance of representation of men and women in Georgian politics diminishes the problems affecting women in society, making them less prominent and more difficult for the authorities to address. Women account for more than a half of Georgia’s population, while the overall number of women involved in politics in Georgia has little increased at legislative elections, going from 7% of MPs in 2008 to 16% presently. However, it has yet to reach the standard the UN recognizes: 30% minimum, there has been progress, but at the international level, Georgia has regressed.

In the process of democratic state-building of Georgia partnership between women and men in the social and political decisions is extremely important. The political process and their participation in policy formation are fundamental characteristic of the subject, and its lack of social vulnerability of the primary product. Although the role of women in public life in Georgia recently increased significantly, unfortunately participation of women in politics still remains low. The reason is much more complex than it seems at first glance. Women’s role in politics is hindered by the political, social, cultural and psychological reasons: the country’s political culture, popular stereotypes, less access to financial resources, lack of coverage by media of women’s public and political activities, non-existing women’s consolidation in women’s movement hinders the
formation women’s movements. Political, institutional and economic issues limit women’s engagement in decision-making process and political life more generally. For example, changing gender roles have affected how men and women deal with new realities, relating to burdens and opportunities for participation of both genders. A political division within society also creates barriers, in addition to a lack of consistent political will, institutional capacity, and coordination among key stakeholders. When it comes to women’s political participation, first of all we should be viewed and perceived as the representative bodies of women in the recruitment process, also country’s electoral system needs to be changed so that it could increase women’s representation. Georgia’s political parties are dominated by men, and they are characterized by a low level of internal democracy, the party of the mechanisms of promotion are often vague, which makes it advancement of women in the party even more challenging. The contemporary world has long agreed that women’s participation in politics is one of the most important preconditions for democratic development of any Country. Without participation of women, it will be impossible to develop equal and fair policies tailored to interests of all groups. It is very difficult to achieve women’s equal political participation by allowing equal representation to run its natural course. Therefore, to accelerate the process and eliminate the inequality created over the centuries, it is necessary to intervene at the legislative level. Georgia has ranked among the countries with the lowest female representation in decision-making and senior positions for more than two decades. The voluntary financial incentives for political parties that were introduced in 2011 in order to generate an increase of women candidates in election party lists have proven ineffective, as none of the dominant political parties has ever used it and it did not affect the number of women in politics. One of the most effective ways to
increase women’s political participation is a temporary special measure known as a gender quota. If aligned correctly with the electoral system, gender quota can be very effective for fast-tracking women’s participation in politics. Currently, Georgian society’s demand for the greater involvement of women in politics is high: 70% of the population thinks the number of women in Parliament should be at least 30%. Given the failure of financial incentives, both local civil society and international organizations recommend mandatory party quotas to promote gender equality in politics. These policies must be designed to reach a critical mass of women in politics (at least 30%) to allow women the opportunity to have an impact on the decision-making process.

Gender quota is not the only way to eliminate the inequality; it is a mechanism that ensures women’s representation in elected bodies in a few period of time. However, in addition to gender quota it is also important to widen women’s movements, continue submission of recommendations about women’s issues on the State Level and most importantly, conduct a large educational campaign for raising public awareness, in order to create a public demand to ensure gender equality in Georgia.

**Key words:** women in politics, gender quota, women’s participation in politics, political involvement.
Introduction

Ensuring equal participation of men and women in decision making process is one of the main challenges of a democratic state. This requirement is related to compliance with gender fairness and equality principles and aims to eliminate current gender-unequal attitude towards women. The above issue is problematic for Georgia as well, since, according to global gender gap index 2017, Georgia occupies the 114th position among 144 countries by women’s political participation and women’s representation in parliament (Global Gender Map, 2017). According to Inter-Parliamentary Union data as of April 2017 Georgia occupies the 124th position among 193 countries with 24 women in the parliament (IPU 2017). If we observe the women’s representation growth rate in Georgia we will see that women’s representation in Georgian parliament grew merely by 5 % in 22 years. If the above rate persists, Georgia will probably reach the average point currently established throughout the world, i.e. 22%, within 44 years, while the objectives set by UN – 30% women’s representation without extraordinary efforts will remain unachieved (Rusetskaya 2015).

The large-scale program of reforms envisaged during 2017-2020 under Association Agreement signed between Georgia and European Union obliges the Georgian government to increase political strength of women and their representation for the next parliamentary elections, among others (4th meeting of EU-Georgia Association Council). The main objective of the research is to study current political representation of women in Georgia, to what extent women’s political participation growth is supported by the
current election system; whether the majority voting system enables the women to be presented as election candidates or not; how efficient is the so-called financial incentive norm established for the political parties for local self-government and parliamentary elections and how well the above incentive norm regulates women positioning in top ten of party lists.

Study methodology
Present work is based on qualitative studies, namely in-depth interviews and content analysis of documents. In particular, using semi-structured questionnaires, 8 interviews were held with current and former female MPs of Georgian Parliament, as well as 8 male MPs; in addition, 5 interviews were held with non-governmental organizations working on gender issues. Following the interviews the transcripts were processed and analyzed. Interview transcripts were processed and coded according to selected topics. Georgian legislation (including political documents such as Election Code of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens etc.), National Statistics Office data, party lists and election programs provided by electoral subjects for parliamentary elections, official document of Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia, reports on studies implemented in Georgia by local and international organizations were also studied and analyzed. The main hypothesis of the study is that within the current mixed election system in the country, women’s political representation growth cannot be reached in a natural course. Financial incentive norm established for political parties and of a non-mandatory character is similarly ineffective. Intraparty democracy is underdeveloped and recruiting party members is often person
based. Men dominate the political arena, consequently the organization and political activities of political parties are of masculine model (Shvedova N. A. 1994). Gender stereotypes existing in Georgian political parties and male domination in governing bodies of the parties are a hindering barrier for women’s political activity.

**Theoretical Framework**

When analyzing women’s political participation three theoretical schools of thought can be distinguished: socio-economic school, cultural and ideological school and political school. The first two attempt to explain changes in percentage ratio of women’s representation in the legislative body. The argument of the socioeconomic schools is usually based on the opinion that socio-economic conditions of a state, including level of education, women’s participation in labor power and gross domestic product, influence the number of women in the legislative body. Developed countries have higher women’s representation at the legislative level. Although some studies reveal positive correlation between social-economic development and women’s legislative development, there are also studies that exclude any relation between them. While culture and ideology influences women’s representation in some countries, it is less likely to have similar impact on women’s representation in the rest of the countries (Adams 2011). This is exactly why the theory of the above school is less expected to ensure universal explanation of the discrepancies across the countries. Social-economic argument fails to give clarity on why in many developing countries women’s representation on a legislative level is higher than in some most developed countries (Yoon 2004, 456). Though no consensus has been
reached, the opinion of the political school has gained biggest support among researchers.

Cultural and ideological school: this school believes the culture and ideology of a country, particularly the factors such as egalitarianism, religion, national public opinion, and perception of gender roles, cultural heritage and gaps between generations affect the proportion of women in legislation. Researchers analyzing socio-economic causes have also assumed that in states where Protestantism is a dominant religion men have higher representation at the legislative level, while in Islamic countries we see low level of women’s representation at the national level (Adams 2011). Research in this school seems to focus on national attitudes towards gender equality matters as the reason for women’s participation in legislatures. Studies have revealed positive association between these two variables where “Egalitarian attitude towards women leaders influences the proportion of women actually elected to the office” (Inglehart and Norris 2001). However, there are some disparities which question the gender attitudes explanation, in the United States of America, for example, where there is a positive attitude towards women’s political participation, but still the number of women in congress is limited. This casts doubt to whether national attitude is the main reason for high representation of women in legislature or vice versa (Bergh 2009). The facts that only western countries were selected for the research should also be noted and hence the results cannot be generalized for non-western countries. Researches state that cultural norms and current stereotypes on gender roles impact influx of women and their placement in head positions. Patriarchal culture is one of the main barriers to female political representation (Yoon 2004, 459).
Political school: current political school of thought on female political representation includes a variety of theories that deal with internal political conflict, types of electoral systems, political parties, gender quotas etc. Among opinions on female political representation the so called political school is one of the most widespread and popular though it attempts to clarify the interstate variations in women’s representation. One of the most common explanations for disparities in women’s representation is the type of electoral system of a particular country. Many researchers share the idea that multimember proportional representation systems in which the number of seats is proportional to the amount of its support among voters are more favorable to women than singlemember majority or plurality systems where the winner takes it all. (Adams 2011).

Another differentiating argument which certain number of researches considers in studying women’s political representation is party systems, i.e. whether the system is party oriented or alternately candidate oriented. According to this argument with candidate oriented systems participation in elections is based on personal characteristics of the candidate, for which women may be considered as less attractive candidates, while in candidate oriented systems we find higher level of female representation (Thames and Williams 2010, 1581).

One of the final arguments used by political school of thought in relation to female political participation is application of gender quotas. Voluntary party quotas are often applied in proportional representation systems, while reserved or special seat quotas are more often used in plurality/majority systems (Bauer 2012). All studies on gender quotas reveal positive association between the use of quotas and women’s representation.
in national legislatures. (Bauer 2012). For the purposes of our study we used Matland and Montgomery theoretical framework which identifies relation between electoral system and women’s representation in elected bodies. He expressed an opinion that a certain political development margin must be established so that women are able to effectively use the institution of electoral systems for protection of their rights (Matland and Montgomery, 2003). Georgia too has significant variations between proportional and majority systems in terms of women representation as proportional system allows better opportunities of participation for women, however parties demonstrate less support for women and usually position them at the bottom of the party list or a less successful positions. Therefore a coherent proportional representation system is crucial for achieving gender balance while in case of majority election system the candidate having good reputation in his/her community/society, good contacts and access to resources is selected – in most cases male candidates, who are considered to be more competitive candidates, therefore this increases the probability of them being elected (Matland 1998; Kohl 2010).

Electoral System and Female Representation

First steps towards empowerment of women and their political involvement were made in post-Soviet Georgia back in 1998 (Georgia, history of election, 2011). In 1994 Georgia joined The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) undertaking to implement all relevant measures to eliminate current discrimination against women in political and social life. During president Shevardnadze’s rule, as per his ordinance “National Committee for Improving Women’s Conditions” was
established and later on as per the president’s decision a State Commission on Elaboration of the State Policy for Women’s Advancement was established. In 1997-2004 the first Action Plan for Improving Women’s Conditions was developed, however it was never actually implemented (Sabedashvili 2010). A bit later, in 2010 Law of Georgia on Gender Equality was adopted which defined the duties of central and local authorities for ensuring gender equality. Developing legal mechanisms for enjoyment of equal rights and freedoms, ensuring inadmissibility of discrimination in all spheres of public life and eradication of discrimination was identified as the legitimate purpose of the law. Following 2003 rose revolution the new government targeted even broader approaches towards gender matters which served as basis for initiating promotion of gender problematic, political involvement and empowerment of women. Gender imbalance is certainly most notable in political government, which clearly suffers from the impact of masculinity and is characterized by gender stereotypes and patriarchal viewpoints. Although according to constitution, legislative acts and norms women are equalized to men, their full inclusion in political sphere is unfortunately not ensured appropriately. Although over two hundred parties are registered throughout the country, there are only single political movements or unions which are headed by women. Women are underrepresented in the parliament as well. The analysis of programs of political Parties reveals that these programs of the parties are completely gender-neutral, as the promises in them are equally important for men and women. Parties formally declare support towards women inclusion as well as gender equality, but have made no significant steps to demonstrate this support. The attitude of political parties towards gender equality and
women's rights or political advancement is still incoherent and inconsistent (Bagratia and Badagashvili 2011).

Although the number of women has insignificantly increased during the last parliamentary elections, women representation in the legislative body still remains very low, similar to the previous convocation of parliament. The situation is particularly grave in local self-governances where the number of women is as low as 13%. According to Central Election Commission (CEC) total of 227 (13.4%) women and 1781 men (86.6%) were elected following the first round of election in the capital and 64 municipalities of Georgia. However, the number of women elected during 2017 local self-governance exceeds the general rate of 2014 local self-governance elections (11.6) only by 1.8% (Central Election Commission). The results of the last local self-governance elections showed that among 64 directly elected mayors only one is a woman and not a single woman among 9 governors.

Political parties represent main subjects of political relations in a democratic society. Their role is of ultimate importance in establishing social justice and gender equality as well as protection of woman's rights. Women's representation in a political party is an indicator of internal democratic development of the political organization and democratic maturity of the society. They remain to be the key instruments for advancement of women in politics as they play a leading role in candidate recruitment and nomination process (Caul, 1999). Consequently it is actually impossible to imagine the growth of number of women in representative bodies of the country without the support of political parties and relevant steps taken by them in this regard. Parties and their internal policies play significant role
on the route to candidacy from the point of desire to be nominated as a
candidate, which is influenced by procedures incorporated in the charters of
the parties and attitudes towards women’s involvement in politics within the
party. In the beginning of the given process the number of men and women
wishing to nominate their candidacy is almost equal, but when it comes to
number of the legislative body members, the number of women significantly
decreases (Matland, 2003).

As we have already noted there is a so called systemic relation
between the election system and women’s representation in Georgia.
Georgia has a mixed electoral system which implies election to the national
legislative body by proportional representation system, i.e. party list and by
majority system. Regulation of the election system may become one of the
tools to support or hindering gender balanced political composition at
various levels (Matland, 2005). Starting from 1991 after restoration of
independence of Georgia when mixed electoral system was established in
the country within the given election system more women have been elected
to the parliament and local self-governance bodies by proportional
representation system as compared to the majority election system.

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of 2014 local self-governance elections (11.6%) only by 1.8% (Central
Election Commission, 2014). Following the 2017 local self-governance
elections women made 19.59% of the candidates elected through
proportional representation system, and only 8% of the candidates elected
through majority election system. In fact, women earned twice more mandates by proportional representation system.

As for 2016 parliamentary election results, women won 16% of total mandates (24 mandate) in the elections. Gender analysis of the results reveals that women stood at 17% of the total number among majority candidates and 37% in party-list proportional representation (Central Election Commission, 2016). Following the elections 23.38% of women MPs were elected to the legislative body by proportional representation and 4.35% of women MPs were elected in 48 districts after the second round of majority election.

**Gender Quotas as Tools for Increasing Female Representation**

Taking additional temporary measures to boost inclusion of women in politics is considered to be one of the basic and effective mechanisms and gender quota is a widespread method among them. Scientific works on gender quotas emphasize that quotas are of utmost importance in supporting gender equality. (Dahlerup, 2006). Today many countries employ quotas as mechanisms for ensuring active involvement of women in politics.

Gender quotas represent temporary and compulsory measures applied by multiple countries and political organizations for securing growing role of women in political and governmental processes. They aim to overcome the current situation of isolation of women from politics and include women in political processes. For active women involvement they held responsible the structures controlling recruitment processes in politics, therefore the quotas may be defined by state legislation, i.e. be compulsory, or be allocated
through intra-party regulations, voluntarily, which is widespread enough throughout European democracies. Quotas are used for both elective and appointed positions. Legislative quotas and reserved seats may vary in quantity, for example the 30% quota, a “critical mass” concept allowing women to influence state policy. There are 40% as well as 50% quotas in European countries like France, Germany and Norway. Gender quota is effective not only in Western developed democratic countries, but in parts of the world where democracy and consolidated, poliarchic democracy, in particular, is probably difficult to imagine. For example Rwanda, Ecuador, South African Republic and Mozambique have allocated 40 and 50% quotas for women (IDEA 2017). It is important for countries to match the quotation form with the electoral system depending on types and influences of gender quotas so that their application proves to be efficient. It is crucial to consider country context and public sentiments in this regard (Gerald R, 2017).

Political party leaders, including women politicians in Georgia have varied attitude towards gender quotas. The attitudes are same within general public. There may be several reasons for this. The fact that the advocates of quotas were not able to convince the society in merits of the women representation tool for various reasons, including shortage of resources/time, may be one of them. It should also be considered that in a country where the majority of the population lives in poverty and women represent the poorest part of the society, political representation of women is perceived among the problems of women having higher social-economic positions.

In regards with the attitudes of the politicians, the arguments of the quota opponents mostly refer to artificiality of the quotas and that their introduction is a gross interference in the life of political parties, bringing
many less qualified women in politics. Women politicians believe more women are needed in politics, but are reluctant to support special measures as they deem it offensive to be included in the party lists merely for their gender and not the qualifications and are less engaged in this regard. Indeed, though women politicians in many post-soviet countries realize the need for women inclusion, they avoid taking the initiative in this direction (Galligan and Clavero 2003).

Georgia has mixed electoral system with both proportional representation as well as majority system. Multiple studies reveal that majority electoral system provides less chances for women to come in politics. Experts working in this direction for many years believe that incoherent election system is one of the hindering factors in the integration process. Representatives of governmental and civil sectors actively involved in this matter think that electoral system needs to be modernized (Bagratia and Badagashvili, 2011). For years opposition parties believed that due to majority electoral system only the candidates of the ruling political powers had the advantage and insisted on complete abolition of majoritarian system and conduction of parliamentary elections by proportional representation system only. Following the constitutional reforms which will become effective by 2024 in its finalized form majority electoral system will be abolished for the parliamentary elections and solely the proportional representation system will be used (IFES, 2017).

Qualified election subjects’ lists registered in Central Election Commission in 2016 evidence that the further we go from top positions, where not only the chances for women, but the chances for winning an MP mandate generally decreases, the number of women increases. Due to pitfall
of the incentive norm, namely the absence of obligation to position women in top ten of the list, women representation fails to grow in proportion to funding. Women can often be seen on 8th, 9th or 10th positions which deprives them of the chances to win, particularly during local self-governance elections, when the number of Municipal Assembly members totals to 15 and participant parties can only win maximum 5 seats.

Before parliamentary elections of 2016 almost every party declared in its program it recognized need for inclusion of women in politics. However, political inclusion and empowerment of women was not actually a priority for them. This was once again demonstrated in legislature, as well as immediately prior to the elections, when only a few women found place in active politics. Specifically, „Georgian Dream“ presented only 4 women majoritarian candidates and 6 in the top twenty of the party list. Complete party list of „Georgian Dream“ included only 18 women out of 155 candidates. „Free Democrats“ and „Republican Party“ presented themselves much better in this regard complying with 30% quota requirement. Each of them nominated 9 women majoritarian candidates and 7 in the top twenty of the party list, sadly, though these parties were not able to reach the 5% threshold and get any seats. „Burchuladze–The Sate for the People“ presented 8 women majoritarian candidates, however, did not include any women in the top 20 of the party candidates list.

Current election code of Georgia is a gender neutral document as it does not consider relevant mandatory mechanisms for supporting gender equality and political involvement of women. Person (candidate) based systems for developing party candidate lists/candidate nomination, as well as totally vague and non-transparent mechanisms for women promotion
within the parties, still constitute serious challenges for the country which are hindering obstacles to women promotion and their representation growth in legislature in Georgia.

**Georgian Legislation on Gender Quotas**

As it has been demonstrated throughout the past decade many states of the world apply various gender quota systems to fast track women’s political involvement or eliminate gender imbalance. Gender quota is a temporary tool for reaching gender balance which was previously effectively used by Scandinavian countries and now by African countries. It was after introduction of the 30% quota that Rwandan parliament started its transformation and today 63.8% of Lower Chamber of the legislative body of this country is constituted by women (IDEA, 2017). However, even Scandinavian countries did not abruptly shift to quota system and implemented number of preparation activities preliminarily.

Discussion on gender quota was initiated back in 2003 in the Georgian parliament. Only 67 MPs participated in voting following the discussions of the initiative in August 2003 and consequently the initiative did not pass. Similarly the legislative initiative triggered by 32 thousand voters remained unaddressed.

Neither constitution, nor the electoral code obliges the political parties to comply with the gender balance requirements in party candidates lists submitted for legislative body elections today. The composition of the candidates’ lists is regulated by parties and electoral blocks. When compiling party lists, complying with the gender balance is incentive based and not mandatory, as it will result in additional funding as per Organic Law of
Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens. Consequent to huge efforts of various international and local non-governmental organizations and with expectations of positive transformation, amendments were made to the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens (ISFED, 2012). In 2011 the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens was amended to provide financial incentives to those political parties that voluntarily include candidates of different sex in their party lists. Initially the law provided 10% additional funding if the party list was composed of at least 20% women candidates. This law now provides a 30% increase in the supplement from the state budget if the party list includes at least 30% women distributed within every ten candidates (Organic Law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens, Article 30 (71). The law became effective immediately upon announcing the 2014 local self-governance elections results. However, this mechanism failed to be efficient and the parties that took advantage of the opportunity did not get any seats in the parliament at all but only received additional funding. The results of the parliamentary elections and local self-governance elections in particular, demonstrate that the above incentive had no impact on improvement of gender statistics in our country.

It was due to the relevance of the issue that in 2015 two initiatives related to the gender quota were submitted to the Georgian parliament. One of them was initiated by local women’s NGOs who were part of Task-Force on Women’s Political Participation. The above legislative initiative envisaged 50% quota in the proportional representation system, i.e. maximum 38 women out of total 150 MPs in Georgian parliament, which equals to total of 25% of the MPs. Amendments were to be made to Electoral Code of Georgia. The composition of the party list was to be regulated by political
parties and electoral blocks so that every second candidate had was to be a woman. Unless 50% balance with every second opposite sex members was compiled, the party list would be reverted to the party for correction.

Unlike the above initiative the second project was authored by the member of the Gender Equality Council of the eighth convocation of Georgian parliament and former Member of Parliament Nana Keinishvili. The above draft bill did not stipulate mandatory legal mechanisms for ensuring women’s representation growth. According to the draft incentive norms were to be developed at the legislative level to support solving gender inequality. According to the draft bill every third and sixth candidate among the first six candidates of the lists submitted by parties for proportional representation elections were to be an opposite sex. Article 30, Clause 71 of the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens was to be formulated as follows: The party receiving funding will receive additional support in the volume of 40% of the basic funding, provided that every second candidate of the first, second and following 10s are of opposite sex. Sadly, none of the projects was supported by the Human Rights Commission and both projects failed to pass at the commission hearing level.

Despite strong opposition the gender quota supporters faced, Task-Force on Women’s Political Participation once again submitted bill on gender quotas in September 2017, which was signed by 37 455 supporters this time. The above bill envisaged amendments to Electoral Code of Georgia and Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens. Parties and electoral blocks would have been obliged to comply with gender equality principles and compile their lists so as to have every second candidate of an opposite sex and if, for any reasons, the elected candidate’s authority was terminated, the seat of
the given MP was to be transferred to the following candidate of the same sex from the list. The bill on mandatory gender quotas was not supported at the first hearing at the plenary meeting of the parliament on March 23, 2018 and regrettably the project failed once again.

Upon studies, researches and generalization of results of recent legislative and local elections held in Georgia, the following flaws and challenges were revealed, once again emphasizing that:

- **Female political representation growth cannot be achieved in natural course.** Specifically, after 2017 elections number of women, compared to previous local self-governance elections, insignificantly increased, namely by 1.5% and constituted 13.46% growth. The same can be said about 2016 parliamentary elections when women’s political representation increases only by 2 %;

- **2017 local self-governance elections once again demonstrated that majority representation system does not support women’s involvement growth rate.** Since the number of women elected by majority system is 8%, which as compared to the proportional representation system is significantly low. The same refers to legislative elections where female representation in proportional representation system is 23.38%, while in majority system only 4.35%;

- **The absence of incentive and stimulating norm for women’s political participation, specifically absence of mandatory positioning of women in top ten of the lists, accounts for failure to ensure the growth of number of women in proportion to funding.** We often see women on 8th, 9th and 10th positions, which deprives
them of the chances to win, particularly during local self-governance elections, when the number of "Sakrebulo" (representative body) members totals to 15 and participant parties can only win 5 seats;

- Gender bonus (The voluntary financial incentives) received by the parties in case on compliance with financial incentive norm is not used for women’s political empowerment. Out of 18 political parties receiving budget funding 15 parties receive gender bonus today. However, following the analysis of recent elections we can deduce that number of women at both, local and legislative levels is still very low.

Conclusions

Woefully, women’s political involvement rate is still a challenge in Georgia. In addition, the paucity of initiatives taken by the government and lack of will to support women empowerment on behalf of the political parties remains a problem. Consequently, little involvement of women at decision-making level negatively impacts the process of advocating gender sensitive issues and results in no support to implementation of gender balanced policy. It is crucial that the government develops various mechanism in this regard and is consistent in supporting women through incentive programs and initiatives and most importantly sustain career advancement of women in political parties’ structures and their active involvement in representative bodies of the country. Political parties need to recognize their role and responsibility in regards with gender equality promotion within both, their internal structures as well as elected bodies. They must strengthen internal
democracy, transparency, accountability and legitimacy. The number of women in the parliament of Georgia today cannot create the „critical mass“ which is significant in decision making process. Therefore it is necessary to overcome reluctance of women in political and social spheres which is caused by disadvantageous economic conditions, on the one hand, and patriarchal norms still remaining in the country, on the other.

It is doubtless, that the incentive norm developed for the parties during the recent years in order to encourage them to increase women representation in their party lists in return for the financial bonus did not work in Georgia and the gender imbalance in Georgian legislature has not been overcome until today. For this reason the struggle of Georgian women for gaining political representation is still relevant and continues. Recent studies have revealed that readiness of Georgian population to see much more women in politics is high and the society supports introduction of gender quotas. Public disposition is important for Georgia as a democratic state and therefore it is essential for politicians to develop relevant legislative base so as to significantly increase women representation in representative bodies of the country, where the will of Georgian population is shaped.

Considering current reality we envisage introduction of mandatory gender quotas within the electoral system as the only solution to eliminate the imbalance. In addition the order of distributing candidates of opposite sexes within the party lists has to be stipulated and efficient sanctions for incompliance with the quotas introduced.
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NATIONAL, PATRIOTIC, SPORT AND SANITARY MOBILIZATION OF THE INTERNED UNR ARMY’S SOLDIERS AT STRZAŁKOWO (POLAND) IN 1922–1924.: FORMS AND METHODS

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Resume. The article exposes forms and methods of the mobilization initiatives among Ukrainian interned soldiers of UNR Army at Strzałkowo camp where unity and inspiration of moral spirit were believed to be the essential tasks of this campaign. It became possible thanks to the activity of Ukrainian cultural and art groups together with publishing communities as well as the organization of weight trainings and sport athletics inside and outside of the camp. Soldiers’ national, patriotic, sport and sanitary mobilization provided UNR Army the opportunity to preserve military organization and regular personnel and, furthermore, create a positive vision on Dnieper Ukrainians among the representatives of Polish society. Subsequently, such conditions facilitated soldiers’ social and psychological adaptation in Poland.
**Key words:** mobilization, interned Ukrainian soldiers, camp, sport, Strzałkowo, Poland.

The full version of this article is available in Ukrainian.