

**CALCULATED VERSUS IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVES:
THE LOGIC OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL COALITION FORMATION IN
UKRAINE**

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Abstract. *This article proceeds from the assertion that the neopatrimonial essence of the Ukrainian state not only transforms the institutional status and actual function of coalitions, but also the process of coalition formation both at the national and regional levels. Therefore, the subject of this study is the formation and function of parliamentary and regional council alliances in Ukraine and the logic behind them. To define what factors (pragmatic strategies, ideological proximity, or informal “patronal politics”) determine the process of forming coalitions in Ukraine, this article puts forward the first empirical test of classical theories of coalition formation within Ukrainian research discourse. The empirical study is based on materials from the 3rd-8th convocations of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2018) and all acting regional councils of the southeastern regions.*

Based on the results of their empirical tests, the authors of the article argue that, at the national level, "minimal-winning" or "minimal-winning-with one securing faction" coalitions are typically formed, whereas regional councils are prone to forming broader models of coalitions. In terms of ideological proximity, this article suggests that the formation of coalitions based on party antagonisms across the ideological scale is common at both the national and regional level. The results of the analysis on regional councils also demonstrates that their predominantly patronal-subordinate role and function in relation to presidential administrations can be clearly traced. Furthermore, despite the election results and different possible coalition configurations available, the "party of power" regularly captures the biggest share of real power and, ultimately, becomes the key coalition player, whereas regional councils de facto acquire the function of "offices" whose only job it is to confirm the decisions of regional administrations.

Key words: *coalitions, factions, coalition formation theories, patronal politics, Ukrainian parties, parliamentarism.*

The parliamentary majority of the 8th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada that was formed on the basis of the results of the 2014 parliamentary elections has demonstrated instability in its third year. Accordingly, it has rather aptly been described as the "Schrödinger coalition"¹—i.e., to an external observer, it is both alive and dead. After three parties ("Liashko's Radical Party," "Samopomich," and "Batkivshchyna") left the coalition "European Ukraine," its "half-life" began and did not lead to re-election. Parliament now continues its work under the control of a spontaneous parliamentary majority, instead of "European Ukraine."

As in most parliamentary-presidential republics, coalitions play a key political and institutional role in policymaking. However, in the context of the Ukrainian neopatrimonial state, not only are the institutional status and actual functions of coalitions changing, but also the process of forming coalitions both at the national and regional levels. Thus, this article focuses on the logic of the formation of parliamentary alliances in Ukraine and aims to methodologically analyze the principles of coalition formation in Ukraine through the lens of classical theories of coalitions.

The following article is divided into two sections. In the first section, the basic theories of coalitions and an analysis of their potential empirical purchase are presented. The second section examines the institutional

¹ See, for example: "How the Ukrainians studied the new term - the Schrodinger coalition" <https://politeka.net/news/346820-kak-ukraintsy-izuchali-novyj-termin-koalitsiya-shredingera/>

peculiarities of coalitions in Ukraine. In particular, the latter section examines coalitions in the Verkhovna Rada of the 3rd-8th convocations (1998-2018) and acting regional councils. This section addresses the following key questions:

- What determines the process of coalition formation in Ukraine? Calculation (pragmatic strategies) or values (ideological proximity)?
- What is the influence and significance of the presidential patronage network for the coalition formation process? Is it possible to form an anti-presidential (anti-gubernatorial) coalition in Ukraine?
- Is the format of regional coalitions determined by the configuration of the parliamentary coalition?

Classical coalition formation theories: size vs. ideological proximity

The formation of party coalitions first became an object of political analysis in the 1950s. In his 1951 work *Political Parties*, French political scientist Maurice Duverger examined party unions from the point of view of classical or "old" institutionalism.² Noting that multiparty regimes without coalitions exist only as exceptions, Duverger singled out the peculiarities of the party and electoral system as the driving forces for coalition associations (electoral, parliamentary, or governmental).

The theory of political coalitions was further developed, on the one hand, by the establishment of the American paradigms of rational choice and game theory, and, on the other hand, by the development of analytical and

² Duverger, 1951.

value-focused approaches by representatives of the European school of political science.³ Both traditions tried to create universal theories that would explain the logic of the formation of coalitions based on the motives of political actors.⁴ Coalition participants are guided by different motives and goals, a variable that underlies the distinction between these two classical theories of coalitions.

1. Power maximization theories proceed from an assumption of actors' rational, pragmatic, and calculated goals of seeking to obtain maximum possible power and, accordingly, political dividends. The key factor in this group of theories is the size of the coalition: the more coalition participants there are, the more necessary it becomes to "share" power. The basic conceptual models in this theoretical group are presented below.

1) *Minimal winning coalition* (Riker, 1962). The formation of political coalitions can be considered similar to the process of playing chess or poker, wherein players apply rational strategies in order to maximize their own profit. According to Riker, parties try to choose configurations of coalitions that meet the threshold criterion of minimum size, since this approach offers a maximum share of profits among participants. Thus, the minimal-winning coalition is the one that fails (loses majority) when at least one of its participants leaves the coalition.

2) *Minimal size coalition* (Gamson, 1962). Gamson's proposed concept is a logical conclusion based on the theory of the minimal-winning coalition.

³ See: Riker, 1962; Gamson, 1962; Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1990.

⁴ The possible configurations of coalitions based on the classical coalition formation approaches were profoundly summarized by A. Lijphart. See: Lijphart, 2012.

In a situation where it is possible to form several minimal-winning coalitions, rational political players choose the configuration that is closest to the minimum required for a majority (50% + 1).

3) *Coalition with the smallest number of parties* (Leiserson, 1966). This theory is also known as the "bargaining proposition." Leiserson proceeds from a simple principle: the fewer the parties, the easier it is to agree on the creation of a coalition and to maintain its stability in the long run. Thus, the most optimal coalition is the one which includes the fewest number of parties.

2. Policy-based theories focus on the value priorities of the coalition's participants. Ideological proximity as the grounds for party unification serves as the main analytical factor in these theories, which assume participants are interested in forming particular coalition strategies and introducing particular kinds of policy. To this group of theories can be referred the following models of coalitions:

1) *Minimal connected winning coalition* (Axelrod, 1970). Axelrod proposed a model in which parties are located on an ideological scale. A party's location on that scale determines whether it becomes a member of a given coalition or not. The parties that are closest to each other on this scale are potential coalition partners, so long as they are "bound" to each other by a similar vision of the political course.

2) *Minimal range coalition* (Swaan, 1973). Swaan's theory argues that the policy a coalition would implement is represented by a point on an ideological scale, and this point is roughly in the middle of the gap between the positions of the coalition's extreme parties. Following this, the most

advantageous strategy for interested parties is to create a coalition with the absolute minimum amount of ideological distance between its members.

3) *Policy-viable coalition* (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). The spatial model of Laver and Shepsle starts with the idea of a structurally introduced equilibrium. Since every minister in the government represents the interests of a party, he or she tends to pursue a "dictatorial" policy, despite the positions of coalition partners. As a result, the government comes to an agreement on certain policy areas that suit most of the coalition's members, or, an "equilibrium" pool of parties.

Several contemporary theories of coalition formation have emerged as an attempt to improve upon their classical predecessors. Here we find it worthwhile to highlight a few of these newer theories:

- *Actor-oriented coalition formation theories* include B. Peleg's theory of the dominant player (Peleg, 1980), as well as A. Van Deemen's theory of the dominant player within the minimal-size coalition (Van Deemen, 1991). These theories often include mathematical formulas that aim to calculate the "dominance" of a political player in the coalition--see, for example, the indexes of Shapley and Shubik, Banzhaf, and Tomiyama⁵.
- *Multi-dimensional coalition formation theories* are those such as Schofield's solution theory (Schofield, 1993), Grofman's proto-coalition formation theory (Grofman, 1982), the competitive solution theory of R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook and M. Winer (McKelvey et. al, 1978), and De Vries's maximal satisfaction solution theory (De Vries, 1999).

⁵ Shapley & Shubik, 1954; Banzhaf, 1965; Tomiyama, 1985.

- *Institutional theories of coalition formation* include the theory of institutional constraints on cabinet formation, as set out by Ström, Budge and Laver (Ström et. al, 1994), as well as Tsebelis's veto player theory (Tsebelis, 1990).

The research on coalition formation in Ukraine, it should be noted, is mostly theoretically and analytically oriented. Ukrainian scholars, for instance, predominantly analyze the constitutional and legal status of coalitions,⁶ the institutional and party aspect of coalitions,⁷ and the ways in which stable coalition governments are formed.⁸

Coalitions in Ukraine: formal and legal uncertainty

Now we consider the formal and legal aspects of coalition regulation in Ukraine. The legal regulation of coalitions and opposition institutions in Ukraine was introduced between 2006-2010. Within the framework of constitutional reform and in accordance with amendments to the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,⁹ the 2006 and 2010 versions of this law stipulated norms for the regulation of coalitions (Chapter 12) and parliamentary opposition (Chapter 13).

However, following amendments to the Regulations, these chapters were completely removed from the document. At present, the legal status of coalitions in Ukraine are defined in rather general terms by the Constitution,

⁶ Dreval, 2009; Kulchytska, 2009; Matsuk, 2014.

⁷ Baranovsky, 2008; Yakymenko, 2015; Panchak-Byaloblotska, 2016.

⁸ Lopata, 2013; Sovgyrya, 2014; Penkovska, 2015.

⁹ The Law of Ukraine "On the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"

decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and separate articles of the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (in particular, regarding the formation of parliamentary factions).

Article 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine¹⁰ defines the procedure for creating a coalition in parliament. According to this article, a coalition is an association of parliamentary factions based on the harmonization of political positions and formed on the basis of Verkhovna Rada elections results. A coalition should include a majority of deputies from the constitutional composition of the Ukrainian parliament. However, a parliamentary faction, if it independently has the majority of deputies from the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada, may also obtain the rights of a parliamentary faction coalition. A parliamentary coalition is formed within one month from the opening day of the first session of the Verkhovna Rada, or, within a month of the day the previous coalition ceases to act (during the legal parliamentary term).

Regarding the actual function of coalitions, the Constitution only states that a coalition can make proposals to the President of Ukraine regarding candidates for the office of Prime Minister of Ukraine, as well as proposals for candidates for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Article 90 of the Constitution allows the president to terminate the powers of the Verkhovna Rada early, in the event that a coalition is not formed within a month, or, in the event that no composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has been formed within sixty days after the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The decision of the Constitutional Court in 2008¹¹ resolved the issue of how to treat a "coalition of parliamentary factions." The Constitutional Court emphasized the decisive role of deputy factions in the formation of a coalition: only deputies who are members of parliamentary factions may be part of the coalition. However, in 2010, the Constitutional Court stated¹² that it is possible for non-factional deputies to be members of a coalition. In this decision, the formation of a coalition was recognized as a prerequisite for parliament's legal authority, and grounds for the termination of the coalition's activity were noted (i.e., when it has a minority from the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine after the parliamentary elections).

At the same time, the specific mechanism of formation, organizational provision of work, detailed functions, and legal status of parliamentary coalitions are not clearly regulated by current legislation in Ukraine. In accordance with the existing legal norms, parliamentary coalitions are considered solely from the narrow point of view of government formation and are not regarded as key actors or policymakers in the political process.

A similar situation is found regarding the definition and legal status of coalitions at the level of regional, district and local councils. The law lacks any conception of a "coalition of the regional/district/local council." However, Article 26 of the Law of Ukraine, "On Local Self-Government,"¹³ states that village, town and city councils may decide on "uniting into

¹¹ Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated September 17, 2008 No. 16-rp / 2008

¹² Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated April 6, 2010 No. 11-rp / 2010

¹³ Law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government"

association or joining associations and other forms of voluntary associations of local self-government bodies and the leaving them." Regional and district councils have similar powers (Article 43).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that coalitions at the regional level have certain peculiarities:

- they are, one way or another, "politically dependent" on the process of formation of coalitions in the Verkhovna Rada;
- they are epiphenomenal in nature, as they are mainly created to solve specific issues (i.e., party factions are temporarily united in order to have enough votes for a specific decision or for the election period).

Typically, formal coalitions at the regional level are created through the signing of an agreement on the creation of a coalition of deputies' factions. Regional coalition can also be created through the signing of an agreement on the formation of a multi-factional coalition, the peculiarities of which are determined in accordance with the rules of a specific council.

Principles of parliamentary coalition formation in Ukraine

The uncertain formal and legal status of coalitions as an institution in Ukraine leads to a methodological problem—namely, it creates complexity in determining the composition of a coalition majority. Although the notion of "coalition of parliamentary factions" (that is, "factions," and not a simple majority of deputies) is stated in the Constitution, the formal legal approach to analyzing coalitions is not relevant in the Ukrainian context: it is not enough to investigate signatures on coalition agreements; instead, it is

necessary to trace the real voting patterns of deputies who de facto enter coalitions.

On the one hand, this gives researchers a methodological advantage and allows for the tracking of the dynamics, "the life of a coalition," whose state changes with each session of the Verkhovna Rada. On the other hand, such an approach is extremely labor-intensive (since it is necessary to analyze tens of thousands of votes), and, moreover, may lead to erroneous conclusions, because not all voting gives an idea of the actual composition of the coalition.

One solution to this methodological problem was provided, for example, by analysts of the "CHESNO" civic movement. They developed an "index of opposition"¹⁴ that shows the percentage of votes "against" or "abstained" from the total number of votes of a deputy/faction. However, the percentage values obtained are extremely low for all actors, since oppositionists often choose the option "did not vote" or "absent" rather than "against." Opposition members also periodically vote in synch with the party of power on populist or economic issues.

Therefore, in our opinion, it is more logical to propose a reverse approach to fix the percentage of votes "for," interpreting it as a "coalition index" or "index of solidarity with the authorities." However, this also does not solve the technical problem of the analysis of tens of thousands of units of data arrays, nor the meaningful problem of various "weights" of vote issues. To vote with the majority for an ordinary issue does not mean

¹⁴ See: Indices of opposition in the regional councils 2016, <http://www.chesno.org/infographics/256/>

becoming part of a coalition. Thus, in our study, we reproduced the chronology of Ukrainian coalitions of the 3rd-8th convocations of the Verkhovna Rada of (1998-2018) and analyzed "key voting," which we take to include votes on budget approval and on approval of the prime minister/government. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1 (compiled on the basis of data on named votes taken from the website of the Verkhovna Rada; see Appendix).

We applied classic theories of coalition formation to the analysis of 32 "key voting" cases (20 budget votes and 12 government votes) and asked several questions of the data. What is the most typical factor in the formation of parliamentary coalitions in Ukraine? In terms of calculation, which associations are more typical across these 20 years of Ukrainian parliamentarism: the minimal-winning coalitions, broad (or super-size) coalitions, or something intermediate? In terms of values, how does the ideological distance between the parties affect the choice of potential partners?

The size of the winning coalitions of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2018) are presented in Figure 1 (see Appendix).

Our analysis has shown that the average of the size of the 32 coalition is 266 deputies, or, 59% of the constitutional composition. At the same time, 53% of coalitions are of the minimal-winning sort. It should be noted that the "faction" or "parliamentary group" itself is not the atomic unit for analysis: "non-factional" deputies are almost always co-opted into the coalition, and the factions themselves often do not give 100% mobilization

to the vote (although this problem of coalition is "fought" by means of "button pushing").

But it is worth noting that the size of the coalition is not a guarantee of its stability and duration. For example, the 2005 budget was adopted by a record number of votes (339), and, a few months later, another coalition in the parliament of the same convocation was formed and voted for the appointment of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (373). Despite such great support, Yulia Tymoshenko's first government lasted a little more than six months, while Tymoshenko's second government worked for more than two years, even though it became possible due to 226 deputies' votes.

Attention should be paid to the fact that a "broad coalition under the prime minister" was formed more often than "under the budget." Presumably, in the first case, "extra votes" were the initiative of the deputies/factions themselves, who expected to receive the prime minister's support in this way. In the second case, only the beneficiary fractions of this budget voted for it, and, in this situation, the logic of maximizing benefits stimulated a minimal-winning vote.

There were two main conclusions reached from this study of parliamentary coalitions in Ukraine. First, Ukrainian parties are inclined to form minimal-winning coalitions, which allow participants to increase their own "winnings" when playing with a zero-sum game. Secondly, one can assume that some of these minimal-winning coalitions were originally conceived as MWC-light, but "narrowed" on election day due to lack of mobilization or one-sided rupture of arrangements amongst the factions. In practice, this intermediate type occurred in about one-third of all cases. Its

benefits include lowering the costs of the coalition-initiating party (most often, presidential forces) during negotiations with partners, as these partners (as opposed to the MWC model) do not have veto-player status. That is, blackmail from small factions—owners of "golden shares"—is impossible and such a coalition is more stable.

An analysis of the value aspect of coalition formation in Ukraine has shown that the traditional, binary, ideological "right—left" opposition seems to be irrelevant for the Ukrainian party system, so it is worth examining 22 "key voting" cases (starting with the one after the so-called "orange revolution") by dividing all parties into two categories of "pro-Maidan" and "anti-Maidan" blocks.

The calculations show that, in 9 out of 22 "key votes," coalitions united ideologically polar or remote parties. The most striking examples of this were: the vote of the "Regions of Ukraine" faction for Yulia Tymoshenko's government in February 2005; the vote of the "Party of Regions" faction for the government of Yuriy Yekhanurov and the actual alliance with "Our Ukraine" in September 2005; the betrayal of the "democratic coalition" on the part of Alexander Moroz and the formation of a majority in the "Party of Regions" + "Communist Party of Ukraine" + "Socialist Party of Ukraine" in 2006; the vote of the majority of the "Party of Regions" faction (!) for the first government of Arseniy Yatsenyuk in February 2014.

Elected in 2014, the 8th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada is an illustration of the "ideological pluralism" of the newest Ukrainian coalitions: for the last three years, key parliamentary elections have been possible only due to the votes of two parliamentary groups formed of "fragments" of the

"Party of Regions" faction of the 7th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2012-2014). Without the votes of the "Party of Regions" from the "Vidrozhennia" and "Volia narodu," the state budgets of 2016, 2017, 2018 would not have been adopted, and Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman also would be obliged to these groups for votes. Although, from the point of view of "value theories," the BPP and the "People's Front"—being the core of the coalition—had to pick up voices in more ideologically adjacent "Samopomich" or "Batkivshchyna" parties.

Another peculiarity of Ukrainian parliamentary coalitions is their high degree of fractionalization. This was particularly evident in the 3rd and 4th convocations of parliament (1998-2006), when the number of actors forming a coalition ranged from eight to twelve. The number of actors has since declined, but there remains, to the present day, a tendency toward the establishment of parliamentary groups and factions (often of the same names with the existing parties that did not get to parliament) for whose programs voters did not vote—for example, it characterizes the group/party "Vidrozhennia."

Regarding relations between the parliament and the president, there were rare precedents of anti-presidential coalitions in Ukraine, but often their activity paralyzed the work of the Verkhovna Rada (for example, the political crisis of 2001-2002) and did not lead to the development of alternative policy. In fact, one of the few examples of the work of an anti-presidential majority was the 5th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2006-2007), in which a coalition of the "Party of Regions," the "Communist Party of Ukraine," and the "Socialist Party of Ukraine" confronted the opposition of

"Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc" and the presidential "People's Union Our Ukraine."

In 30 of the 32 cases considered "key votes," the presidential faction was part of a parliamentary coalition. This was largely due to the presence of a large number of pressure instruments on the parliament in the presidential branch of the government, including both the "power bloc" and the option for the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada, which leads to the penetration of the legislative body by a pyramid of patronage and client networks—at the top of which is the president.

Principles of regional coalition formation in Ukraine

Within the analysis of the peculiarities of regional-level coalition formation, it is interesting to explore whether the logic reproduced at the parliamentary level remains the same. It is also important to investigate whether the parliamentary coalition influences the configuration of regional alliances and, if so, in what manner. To answer this question, we analyzed the "key votes" (for the head of the council and for the last budget) in the regional councils formed after the 2015 elections in the southeastern regions (the data for analysis were obtained from the sites of regional councils and are presented in Table 2).

The results of this analysis pointed to an interesting occurrence in the Sumy region, where, after the elections of 2015, a coalition with the core of "BPP Solidarity" and "Batkivshchyna" and with its head (Semyon Salatenko) from the party of Yulia Tymoshenko was formed. However, growing conflict

between the head of the council and Governor Mykola Klochkov led to the presidential faction initiating the resignation of Salatenko in December 2016; having received the support of "Vidrozhennia," "Lyashko's Radical Party," and "Volia Narodu," the presidential faction's candidate, Volodymyr Tokar, won the election (35 votes "for," where 33 were necessary). The new head succeeded in removing political tensions in the regional council and turning the "minimal-winning coalition" into the "broad" one—the regional budget-2018 was adopted by 52 votes (the members of all factions voted "for," except "Svoboda").

The Poltava region verified the thesis on high political fragmentation. Ten parties in Poltava immediately went to the regional council, greatly complicating the process of coalition formation at the beginning. Olexander Bilenky, a representative of "BPP Solidarity," became the head of council, after alternative candidates were nominated by "Ukrop" and "Agrarian Party." The core of the coalition was formed by "Batkivshchyna" (received the position of the first vice-chairman of council), "Vidrozhennia" (received the budget commission) and the "Party of ordinary people of Sergei Kaplin" (in exchange for the commission on gas fields). A year later, a split began in the coalition: at first, "Batkivshchyna" initiated a statement of mistrust by the council to the governor of the region, Valery Golovko, and, after a month, "BPP Solidarity" tried to remove the first vice-chairman of the council from "Batkivshchyna." However, both attempts failed without finding support from other factions. The budget for 2018 was passed almost unanimously (71 votes "for"), and it seems the hatchet has been buried and the council now

has a broad coalition. Olexander Bilenky, in a recent interview, called voting for the budget "evidence of the consolidation of the regional council."¹⁵

The high results of the "Opposition Bloc" in the elections to the Dnipropetrovsk regional council (46 mandates out of 120) could have changed the status quo of the "reign" of the party of power at the regional level, but it appeared that there was no place for the bloc in the formed coalition. "BPP Solidarity," which took the third place, signed a coalition agreement with "Vidrodzhennia," "Ukrop," "Batkivshchyna," and the "Lyashko's Radical Party" (i.e., all except the "Opposition Bloc" and "Samopomich"). The head of the council, Gleb Pigunov, was elected the representative of the presidential party. However, during voting for the regional budget in 2018, half of the "Opposition Bloc" faction supported the draft proposed by the regional administration.

In the Mykolayiv regional council, the starting model of the "all against the Opposition Bloc" coalition led to the appointment of "BPP Solidarity" representative Viktoria Moskalenko as head of the regional council, while the leader of the "Batkivshchyna" faction, Mikhail Sokolov, received the post of first vice-chairman. However, a year later, the deputies passed a vote of no-confidence in Mikhail Sokolov (39 votes "for," the main promoters being "BPP Solidarity" and the "Opposition Bloc"), and the post of the first vice-chairman went to the presidential faction. "Batkivshchyna" subsequently went into opposition. After the appointment of Oleksiy Savchenko as the head of the Mykolayiv Regional State Administration, relations between the

¹⁵ See publication of Hromadske radio on 28.02.2018 <https://hromadskeradio.org/ru/programs/hromadskeradio/golova-poltavskoyi-oblrady-rozpoviv-pro-konflikt-z-naftogazom?page=2>

"Opposition Bloc" and "BPP Solidarity" began to worsen, and the faction of "oppositionists" was divided in two: those who cooperate with the party of power and those who oppose it. The regional budget for 2018 was adopted by a minimal-winning coalition of 39 deputies ("BPP Solidarity," about half of the faction of "Opposition Bloc," "Nash Krai," "Ukrop," "Vidrozhennia").

In the Odessa region, due to the results of local elections in 2015, a broad pro-presidential coalition was formed on the principle of "all against the Opposition Bloc," and Anatoliy Urbansky, a representative of "BPP Solidarity," was elected as the head of the council. From the point of view of "ideological theories of the coalition," representatives of the "anti-Maidan camp" could successfully form their own coalition: "Opposition Bloc" + "Vidrozhennia" + "Nash Krai" + "Trust the Activities" of Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov = 51 deputies, when 43 are necessary. Mykola Skoryk, who lost the election for head of regional council, directly accused¹⁶ "Nash Krai" and "Trust the Activities" of having been sold to the authorities. Two years later, all factions (including the "Opposition Bloc," but without full internal mobilization of factions) voted for the 2018 regional budget, although Mykola Skoryk publicly continues to criticize the authorities for the region's unbalanced budget, among other things.

In the Zaporizhia region, the "Opposition Bloc" won the election in a similar manner as they did in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but Grigory Samardak ("BPP Solidarity"), the former head of the regional state

¹⁶ "Skoryk: "Trust in activities" and "Nash krai" were sold to the central authorities", http://timer-odessa.net/news/skorik_doveryay_delam_i_nash_kray_pronalis_tsentralnoy_vlasti_375.html

administration, was elected head of the regional council, and the "Opposition Bloc" received the position of the first vice-chairman. However, after the appointment of a new governor, Constantin Bryl, an alliance with the "Opposition Bloc" in the presidential team collapsed. According to the claims of the new head of the regional council,¹⁷ it is the "Opposition Bloc" (and "Samopomich") that are his main opponents in the council. Escalation of the conflict occurred in the summer of 2017, but, in November 2017, due to 14 votes of the "Opposition Bloc" (half of the faction voted "for") and 4 votes from "Samopomich," the regional budget for 2018 was adopted. This alone illustrated the fact that the opponents had the ability to negotiate. A distinctive feature of this vote was the position of the unconsolidated factions: the vote split not only the "Opposition Bloc" in half, but also "Batkivshchyna" and "Ukrop." Most likely, this indicates agreement not at the level of "head of the council – faction," but at the level of personal negotiations with individual deputies.

In the Kherson regional council, initially a pro-presidential coalition was formed, which supported the appointment of the former governor, Andriy Putilov, as the head of the council. Putilov received his votes from "Nash Krai," "Lyashko's Radical Party," as well as the "Opposition Bloc." Still, 2016 year turned out to be unsuccessful for the head of the regional council: first, as a "BPP Solidarity" candidate in additional elections to the Verkhovna Rada, he lost to Yuri Odarchenko from "Batkivshchyna," and, on September 9, the regional council passed a vote of no-confidence in Putilov. On

¹⁷ "The head of the Zaporizhzhya Regional State Administration declares the threat of destabilization in the region"
<https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/07/27/7150708/>

September 27, 2016, a minimal-winning coalition among "Batkivshchyna," "Ukrop", "Samopomich," "Lyashko's Radical Party," as well as the majority of the "Opposition Bloc" faction, appointed Volodymyr Manger, a representative of "Batkivshchyna," as the head. Moreover, due to Manger's support, problems began¹⁸ with the regional organization of "Lyashko's Radical Party"— i.e., Oleg Lyashko demanded that local parties support Putilov and not the candidate from "Batkivshchyna." Between the new head of the regional council and the head of the regional state administration, Andrei Gordeyev, a tense relationship developed. Nevertheless, the regional council approved the draft budget for 2018 proposed by the governor. The current format of a broad coalition includes all factions (without full mobilization) except "Samopomich."

In Kharkiv region, the coalition core consisted of the election winner, the party of the Mayor Gennadiy Kernes, "Vidrozhennia," and the presidential "BPP Solidarity" party. At the same time, in addition to these two factions, "Nash Krai" and the "Opposition Bloc" voted for the re-election of the head of the council, Serhiy Chernov. As in the case of the Odessa Regional Council, a "Vidrozhennia" coalition with the "Opposition Bloc" or "Nash krai" was also possible, but Gennady Kernes preferred to cooperate with the presidential forces. "Samopomich" obtained the status of main oppositional force in the regional council.

The Donetsk and Luhansk regions were not included in our study. Following the law "On military-civilian administrations," elections for

¹⁸ "Kherson "radicals" dispersed ... radically" <http://nk-online.tv/hersonskie-radikalyi-razoshlis-radikalno/>

regional councils in 2015 were not held there. Alternatively, we considered the coalitions in the city councils of Mariupol and Severodonetsk.

Due to the political position of the presidential team's local representatives, elections to the Mariupol city council in 2015 took place a month later than scheduled and were on the verge of collapsing. The city electoral commission (the majority of which consisted of representatives of the "pro-Maidan forces") refused to accept ballots, citing numerous errors as the reason. In October 2015, Pavel Zhebrivsky, the head of the Donetsk military-civilian administration, also spoke about a possible cancellation of the elections in Mariupol. Nevertheless, the elections took place, and their results showed that the fears of the presidential team were justified: "BPP Solidarity" did not overcome the 5% barrier, and 45 out of 54 seats received the "Opposition Bloc."

In Severodonetsk, the "Opposition Bloc" won the largest number of mandates as a result of the 2015 elections (16 out of 36), but the coalition was formed on the "all against the Opposition Bloc" principle. Then, eight deputies from the "democratic coalition" (representatives of various factions, including the full faction of "Lyashko's Radical Party") moved to the side of the opposition, after which the city council thrice voted no-confidence in Valentin Kozakov, the mayor of Severodonetsk. The court thrice renewed Kozakov to his post. In 2018, under the influence of people's deputy Sergei Shakhov, a pro-mayor coalition against the "Opposition Bloc" was formed again, and Elvira Marinich ("Nash Krai") was elected the new secretary of the city council.

Based on an analysis of 10 regional cases, we also tested hypotheses for "calculated" and "ideological" coalitions (see Figure 2).

In the case of regional coalitions, the average calculated value of the coalition size that voted for the head of the regional council is 64.7% of the deputy corps. Of the 11 examples (eight regional councils with two different votes in Kherson region, and two city councils), the minimal-winning coalition was formed in five cases, a MWC + 1 (one faction "insures") was formed in two cases, and a large majority was formed in three cases (in the context of a one-party majority in Mariupol, mentioning the term "coalition" is inappropriate, as in the case of the Kharkiv city council).

At the same time, the average calculated value of a coalition that adopted a regional budget for 2018 was 78.3% of the full membership of the deputy corps. In practically all the examples examined, a broad consolidation took place, which was supported by the persuasion of deputies by the head of the council and the regional administration. It is likely that not only deputies from the "core of the coalition" or direct beneficiaries of the budget (who receive "money in the district" or some resource for their enterprises) vote for the local budget, but also those wishing to demonstrate their loyalty to the governor and not lose the right "to resolve their questions" with the regional state administration.

In terms of the ideological or value aspect of coalitions, we tested the alliances in the southeast on the presence of "unnatural unions" of representatives of the "anti-Maidan" and "pro-Maidan" blocs. In all the eight regional councils considered, the election of the head of council became possible at the expense of simultaneous voting by "BPP Solidarity" and

former "Party of Regions" representatives from "Vidrozhennia" and "Nash Krai." In three cases, the "Opposition Bloc" faction also participated in this coalition, although, in the year 2015, alliances against the "Opposition Bloc" were formed. Any ideological taboo against cooperation with the "Opposition Bloc" finally disappeared closer to 2018: during the vote for the regional budget, the "opposition" faction (in full or in part, but by the majority of the faction) everywhere acted as part of the coalition.

On this basis, we can make the following important conclusion: the coalition process at the regional level is free of any ideological factors. "Right" and "left," "Party of Regions" and "Maidan" representatives, pro-government and opposition are all are united in regional councils in different configurations, despite the ideological differences of political forces. In 6 out of 8 regional councils considered in this study, the council heads were elected from the "BPP Solidarity" party, although, in only two of these six regions the presidential force won the 2015 election. Thus, conflicts between the regional state administration and the regional council in these cases are not a matter of concern.

In the Kherson region, relations between the head of the council from "Batkivshchyna" and the governor are quite tense, but they have not yet entered a critical phase. In the Kharkiv region, there is complete mutual understanding (at least publicly) between the head of the council from the party "Vidrozhennia" and the head of the regional state administration. A revealing episode occurred in the Sumy region, where a deputy from "Batkivshchyna" elected as head of the council entered into an open conflict with the governor appointed by the president; the latter won and influenced

the format of the coalition in the regional council, leading to the decision of the council to vote no-confidence in the "Batkivshchyna" representative. Thus, despite the negative attitude of voters in the southeastern regions toward "BPP Solidarity," the presidential party finds ways to remain in power in the regional councils, where, in most cases, large coalitions are formed, autonomous both from the configuration of "enemy-friends" in parliament and from the ideological concerns.

Furthermore, our analysis of regional councils demonstrated that their predominantly patronal-subordinate role and functions in relation to presidential administrations can be clearly traced. This empirical evidence illustrates Hale's concept of "patronal politics," according to which the whole political system (distinctive amongst Post-Soviet regimes) operates due to the presence of hierarchically organized "power pyramids" with a chief patron atop; the key principle of their existence and reproduction is the distribution of material rewards and punishments (Hale, 2015). The case of Ukrainian coalition formation at the regional level suggests a trend: despite the election results and different available possible coalition configurations, the "party of power" ("BPP Solidarity" at present) usually obtains the largest share of real power and ultimately becomes the key coalition player, whereas regional councils de facto function as "offices" rubberstamping the decisions of regional administrations.

Conclusions

Summarizing the results of this study, we highlight the following conclusions. At the national level, the 3rd-8th convocations of the Verkhovna

Rada (1998-2018) formed primarily "minimal-winning" or "minimal-winning with one securing faction" coalitions; the average size of coalitions was 59% of the full membership of the deputy corps. The "European Ukraine" coalition is illustrative of this. "European Ukraine" initially formed as a broad coalition at the beginning of the 8th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2014) and eventually shrunk to the "minimal winning coalition with one securing faction" format of "BPP Solidarity" + "People's Front" + "Vidrodzhennia" + "Volia narodu" + "Lyashko's Radical Party." Another distinctive feature of Ukrainian parliamentarism is the formation of coalitions "under the president." This usually occurs after presidential elections, when cardinal reconfigurations take place in the parliament of the same convocation - i.e., the coalition "under Viktor Yushchenko" in 2005, and "under Viktor Yanukovich" in 2010. Regarding "commonality of values," parties that are part of the parliamentary coalition often are forced to take into account ideological issues when creating alliances, due to the high reputational losses that result from coalition building and which are unacceptable to their voters.

The analysis of the situation at the regional level has shown that, in general, regional councils form broader coalitions than in the Verkhovna Rada (the average size of the coalition is 71% of the full membership of the deputy corps). This may be explained by several factors:

- The idea of "depoliticization of local councils," which is often expressed by the leaders of regional councils. This kind of desertion of politics opens up a broader range of options for parties in their choice of potential allies.

- The circulation of political elites at the regional level, more often, is slower than at the national level. Long-term links between local politicians who temporarily represent franchises of Ukrainian party projects allow them to negotiate without considering the actual party-coalition condition in Kyiv.

The longevity of local political elites who "survive" one presidential regime after another can be explained by the relative autonomy (*vis-à-vis* the configuration of the parliamentary majority) of the coalition process of the regional councils. The situation in the Kherson regional council, where local "radicals" supported the candidate from "Batkivshchyna" for the position of head of the council, is indicative, despite the demands of Oleg Lyashko to vote for the presidential protege. In general, all except one coalition in the regional councils are contrary to the parliamentary format (i.e., they include alliances of parties that are opponents at the central level; for example, "BPP Solidarity" and "Batkivshchyna" or "Opposition Bloc").

It is worth emphasizing that a tendency toward the gradual expansion of regional coalitions is also clearly visible. Two or three blocks are formed during the first stage of voting and during the election of the head of regional council, where the representative of one bloc wins. Later, however, the coalition winner co-opts new members—often, not at the level of factions, but at the level of deputies, which results in fracturing factions. As a result, for example, the actual size of the coalition during voting for 2018 regional budgets was substantially larger than its original format.

At the regional level, where less public attention is focused, the risk of reputational costs is significantly lower, which explains relatively large

"ideological flexibility" in the regional coalition. However, the formation of coalitions between parties that are ideologically antagonistic is typical of both levels (to a different extent, though). Nine out of 22 (41%) of the "key votes" in the parliament (for the new prime minister or for the budget) included alliances of "pro-Maidan" and "anti-Maidan" parties. In the last three years, the so-called "Democratic coalition" has functioned only through the votes of former "Party of Regions" representatives from the deputy groups "Vidrodzhennia" and "Volia Narodu."

In general, the conducted study demonstrated that the classical theories of coalitions do not take into account the specifics of neopatrimonial post-Soviet political regimes. As a result, their explanatory and prognostic efficiency is reduced, since they do not consider huge, non-competitive advantages for the presidential party of power. Representative bodies and their fractional balance of forces cannot be reflected in isolation from pressure resources (including controlled prosecutor's office, courts, Security Service of Ukraine, etc.) of the presidential vertical. At the parliamentary level, 30 of the 32 coalitions explored during the period 1998-2018 included a presidential party. Coalition formation in regional councils of southeastern Ukraine, where support for the party "BPP Solidarity" is on average less than 3%, is nevertheless based on the principle that "the BPP will be the commander of the parade." In six of the eight regional councils in the southeast, the head of the council is a representative of the presidential faction, despite the fact that "BPP Solidarity" won elections in 2015 in only two of these six regions. The authority of "BPP Solidarity" vassals in the regions is the product of consensus between local elites and

patron-client agreements with the president, but it is not supported at all by electoral legitimacy.

In terms of methodological difficulties with this analysis, it should be noted that "shadow coalitions" exist, and the lists of these coalitions are unpublished. For a parliamentary-presidential republic in which the notion of "coalition of parliamentary factions" is specified in the Constitution, this is unacceptable. Our analysis suggests that an open register of coalition members should be maintained on the Verkhovna Rada's website, thus limiting the possibilities for populist demagogues to publicly declare their opposition and de facto support the viability of the current political regime.

Furthermore, considering that the Constitution of Ukraine specifies the notion of a "coalition of parliamentary factions" and not the notion of a "coalition of deputies," it is necessary to adhere to this principle in practice; coalitions that conflict with this principle should be recognized as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. This step should reduce the level of political corruption by limiting the personal bribing of deputies (direct or indirect, through allocation of budgetary funds to the district). In this case, decisions on the entry or exit of a faction from the coalition would be made by a two-thirds vote of deputies at the faction's meetings and not by the sole mandate of its chairman.

As for the regional level, it should be necessary to make legally legible the concept of "coalition" by way of an open register of its members, as well. This would increase the reputational cost for alliances between ideologically opposed factions and bring value into local politics. Further, such innovations would help to reduce the level of political corruption in local

councils. Local councils are currently politically dependent on state administrations—a relationship that mimics the breached balance of power between the president and the parliament. At the same time, local councils have electoral legitimacy, in contrast to the heads of regional and district administrations, who are appointed by the president almost directly. We conclude that it is necessary to strengthen powers of local self-government via decentralization of power: votes of no-confidence in the heads of regional or district administrations, when adopted by two-thirds of the composition of the relevant council, should result in automatic dismissal, without the right to re-submit the candidature to the president.

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Appendix

Tables

Table 1 Budget approval and approval of the prime minister/government voting of Ukrainian coalitions in the 3rd-8th convocations of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2018)

Year	Voting	Coalition	Opposition	M
8th Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2014-...)				
2017	Budget- 2018	BPP + NF + RPL + Volia + Vid	Bat, Sam, OB	273
2016	Budget - 2017	BPP + NF + RPL + Volia + Vid	Bat, Sam, OB	274
2016 April	Groysman government	BPP + NF + Volia + Vid	RPL, Bat, Sam, OB	257
2015	Budget - 2016	BPP + NF + RPL + Volia + Vid	Bat, Sam, OB	263
2014	Budget - 2015	BPP + NF + RPL	Bat, Sam, OB, Volia, EP	233

2014 November	Yatsenyuk government №2	BPP + NF + RPL + Bat + Sam + Volia + ED	OB	390
7th Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2012-2014)				
2014 February	Yatsenyuk government №1	Bat + UDAR + Svo + SEU + ED + PR	CPU	331
2013	Budget - 2014	PR + CPU	Bat, UDAR, Svo	249
2012 December	Azarov government №2	PR + CPU	Bat, UDAR, Svo	252
6th Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2007-2012)				
2012	Budget - 2013	PR + Ref + NP	BYT, CPU, NUNS	242
2011	Budget - 2012	PR + Ref + BL	BYT, CPU, NUNS	250
2010	Budget - 2011	PR + BL + CPU	BYT, NUNS	279
2010	Budget - 2010	PR + BL + CPU	BYT, NUNS	245

April				
2010 March	Azarov government №1	PR + BL + CPU	BYT, NUNS	242
2008	Budget - 2009	BYT + BL + NUNS	PR, CPU	226
2007	Budget - 2008	BYT + NUNS	PR, CPU, BL	235
2007 December	Tymoshenko government №2	BYT + NUNS	PR, CPU, BL	226
5th Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2006-2007)				
2006	Budget - 2007	PR + SPU + CPU	BYT, NUNS	249
2006 August	Yanukovich government №2	PR + SPU + CPU	BYT, NUNS	240
4th Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (2002-2006)				
2005	Budget - 2006	NU + NP + UNP + PP + DN + SPU + RP + BL + Puh	BYT, CPU, SDPU(o), PR	226

2005 September	Yekhanurov government	NU + NP + PR + UNP + SPU + TU + PP + BY + NDP + Puh	CPU, BYT, EU, SDPU(o)	289
2005 February	Tymoshenko government №1	NU + Reg + SDPU(o) + Agr + BYT + EU + Volia + DU + Centre + DI + Union + NDP	CPU	373
2004	Budget - 2005	NU + Reg + Agr + CPU + SDPU(o) + EU + TU + Union + DI	BYT, SPU, Centre	339
2003	Budget - 2004	Reg + PP + TU + SDPU(o) + Nar + DI + Agr + NV + NDP	BYT, SPU, NU, CPU	234
2002	Budget - 2003	NU + ПП + TU + SDPU(o) + BYT + НДП + Nar + NV + Agr + DI	CPU, SPU, ЄВ	348
2002 November	Yanukovich government №1	PP + TU + SDPU(o) + Reg + EV + DI + Agr + Nar + NV	NU, BYT, CPU, SPU,	234
3rd Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2002)				
2001	Budget - 2002	TU, SDPU(o), Ruh, Per, Ednist, Yabluko, Solidarity, Dem. union, Zeleni, NDP, Bat	CPU, SPU	250

2001 May	Kinakh government	TU, SDPU(o), Dem. union, Solidarity, Reg., Zeleni, SPU, NDP, Yabluko	CPU, Bat, Ruh, RP	239
2000	Budget - 2001	TU, ViR, Bat, Solidarity, Ruh, NDP, Zeleni	CPU, SPU, Yabluko	249
2000 February	Budget - 2000	TU, ViR, Bat, Ruh, NDP, Zeleni, Gromada, RP	CPU, SPU, Sel	252
1999 December	Yushchenko government	TU, ViR, Bat, SDPU(o), NDP, Zeleni, Gromada, RP, Sel	CPU, SPU, PSPU	296
1998	Budget - 1999	NDP, Ruh, Zeleni, SDPU(o), Sel, RP	CPU, SPU Gromada, PSPU	226

List of applied abbreviations:

** only fractions are included in the table (without taking into account the non-factional deputies, who from time to time have joined different coalitions);*

*** in the table, the faction refers to a coalition if most of its deputies voted for a budget/government;*

**** M - the number of mandates in the coalition (for example, in line 2017, M stands for the number of deputies who voted in December 2017 for the budget-2018).*

**** *The list of abbreviations: BPP - "Petro Poroshenko's Block", NF - "Narodnyi Front", RPL - "Liashko's Radical Party", Volia - "Volia narodu", Vid - "Vidrodzhennia" (in 2014 the same group was called ED - "Economic Development"), UDAR - "Vitali Klitschko's Block", BYT - "Batkivshchyna", Sam - "Samopomich", OB - "Opposition Bloc", PR - "Party of Regions", CPU - "Communist Party of Ukraine", SEU - "Sovereign European Ukraine", Svo - "Svoboda", NUNS - "People's Union Our Ukraine" (before the association NU - "Our Ukraine"), Ref - "Reforms for the future", NP - "People's Party" (also called BL - "Lytvyn's Bloc"), SPU - "Socialist Party of Ukraine", Reg - "Regions of Ukraine", SDPU(o) - "Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (renewed)", UNP - "Ukrainian People's Party", PP - "Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs", DN - "People's Trust", RP - "Reforms and order", Agr - "Agrarian Party", EU - "United Ukraine", TU - "Labor Ukraine", DI - "Democratic Initiatives", Nar - "Narodovladdia", NV - "People's Choice", NDP - "People's Democratic Party", EV - "European Choice", ViR - "Revival of Regions", Bat - "Batkivshchyna", Sel - "Rural Party", PSPU - "Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine", DU - "Democratic Ukraine", VU - "Forward, Ukraine!"*

Table 2 Voting for the head of the council and for the last budget in the regional councils formed after the 2015 elections in the southeastern regions of Ukraine

Region	Seats	Fractions of head and 1st vice-chairman of council	Voted for	
			Head (2015)	Budget-2018
Dnipropetrovsk	120	BPP Vidrodzhennia	68: BPP + Vid + RPL + BYT + Ukrop	99: BPP + Vid + RPL + BYT + Ukrop + Sam + OB/2
Zaporizhia	84	BPP Opposition Bloc	62: BPP + OB + NK + RPL + NP	54: BPP + OB/2 + Sam + RPL + NP + NK + BYT /2 + УКРОП/2
Mykolaiv	64	BPP BPP	44: BPP + BYT + NK + Ukrop + Vid	39: BPP + OB/2 + NK + Ukrop + Vid
Odessa	84	BPP Batkivshchyna	55: BPP + BYT + NK + Vid + DD	70: OB + BPP + BYT + NK + Vid + DD

Poltava	84	BPP Batkivshchyna	46: BPP + BYT + Vid + Kaplin	71: BPP + BYT + Vid + Kaplin + Svo + RM + Agr + OB + Ukrop
Sumy	64	BPP BPP	35: BPP + Vid + RPL + Volia	52: BPP + BYT + РПЛ + Volia + Vid + OB + Ukrop
Kharkiv	120	Vidrodzhennia BPP	96: Vid + BPP + NK + OB	100: Vid + BPP + NK + OB
Kherson	64	Batkivshchyna RPL	2015 – 43: BPP + OB + RPL + NK; 2016 – 33: BYT + OB + Sam + Ukrop + RPL	47: BYT + BPP + OB + RPL + NK + Ukrop
Mariupol city council	54	secretary: OB	Acting coalition: 45: OB	
Severodonetsk city council	36	secretary: Nash Krai	Acting coalition: 20: HK + BPP + RPL + BYT + Sam	


List of applied abbreviations:

** voting for the head of the council is secret, but in most cases it is possible to understand who voted, from the open vote for approval of the protocol of the counting commission and the comments of the deputies;*

*** list of abbreviations: OB - "Opposition Bloc", BPP - "BPP Solidarity", BYT - "Batkivshchyna", NK - "Nash Krai", Vid - "Vidrozhennia", DD - "Trust to actions", RPL - "Lyashko's Radical Party", NP - "New Politics", Volia - "Volia narodu", Kaplin - "Party of ordinary people of Sergei Kaplin", RM - "Pidne misto", Sam - "Samopomich".*

Figures


Figure 1. Size of the winning coalitions of the 3rd-8th convocations of the Verkhovna Rada (1998-2018)



Type of majority	Budgets	Governments	Result
MWC	11 (55%)	6 (50%)	17 (53%)
MWC-light	7 (35%)	3 (25%)	10 (31%)
Broad	2 (10%)	3 (25%)	5 (16%)

* MWC - the minimal winning coalition, that is, when any faction leaves it, coalition loses the status of "winning"; under the "broad coalition" the constitutional majority (> 300 votes) is understood in calculations; the intermediate version of the MWC-light indicates cases of voting in 250-300 votes, provided that the coalition was not the minimal winning.

Figure 2. Size of winning coalitions at the regional level (regional councils formed after the 2015 elections in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine)



* Due to the different number of mandates in the regional councils, it is more correct to give data as a percentage of the full membership of the deputy corps, and not in absolute values.

Type of majority	Head	Budget	Result
MWK	5 (46%)	0	5 (24%)
MWK -light	2 (18%)	1 (10%)	3 (14%)
Broad	3 (27%)	9 (90%)	12 (57%)
One-party	1 (9%)	0	1 (5%)

* Two different coalitions (2015 and 2016) of the Kherson regional council were counted in the column "head"