CANADA’S RESPONSE TO THE UKRAINE CRISIS:
A TURN TO MIDDLEPOWERHOOD?

Maryna Rabinovych
University of Odessa, ORCid 0000-0002-6038-2472

Abstract. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and the following Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine led to the world community facing a new type of crisis. Providing its tight bilateral links with both Ukraine and Russia, the article investigates the ramifications of the Ukraine crisis on Canada’s foreign policy and its relations with the above states. The theoretical framework of the study is constituted by the concept of a “Middle Power” that has been broadly used to address Canada’s foreign policy of the Cold War era. In empirical terms the study focuses on multiple aspects of Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine and Russia before the crisis and the crisis-driven changes in these policies. Subsequently, the dynamics of Canada’s response to Ukraine crisis is compared with that of EU. The analysis demonstrates that initially Canada was one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine, actively condemning Russia’s violent actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. However, the change of government in Canada and the emergence of a ‘rapprochement’ trend in Europe led to the softening of Canada’s stance toward the crisis and its move to ‘speak to Russia’. It is argued that Canada did not pursue its unique Middle Power track with regard to the crisis, acting in convergence with the EU and USA rather than on its own. Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis was found to demonstrate the impracticability of Great Power’s rivalry in the era of ever growing mutual interdependencies and common challenges.

Keywords: Ukraine, Canada, war, crisis, middle power, Crimea, Donbas.
The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine, followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, has posed a number of challenges to the world community. First, Russia’s violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity undermines the international consensus on the territorial integrity of states\(^1\) that has contributed to the decrease in the number of interstate wars over the last fifty years\(^2\). Second, the international community’s inability to effectively respond to Russia’s “hybrid war”\(^3\)-strategy reveals crucial shortcomings within the international humanitarian legal framework. Third, the crisis demonstrates an extent to which force remains important in international relations and inhibits the global nuclear disarmament process.

Despite their seeming diversity, all the above challenges testify to the instability of the current international order and the need for a new *modus vivendi*. The Ukraine crisis has uniquely affected the foreign policies of specific states, as well as influenced several third states’ bilateral relations with Ukraine and Russia. Thus, identifying the challenges these states faced, when responding to Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, is crucial for determining the direction and focus in which modern international relations and law need to be revisited to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

\(^{1}\)The principle of “territorial integrity” of states represents a crucial part of the Westphalian State system, as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Accords and the UN 1974 Definition of Aggression. The principle is tightly interconnected with the inviolability of frontiers, the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-determination.

\(^{2}\) The decline in the number of international wars since the 1970s is associated with the end of colonial era and Cold War, as well as a growing acceptance of international law.

\(^{3}\) For a detailed review of the “hybrid war” concept, see: Lanoszka A 2016, ‘Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in Eastern Europe’, vol.92, no.1, pp.175-195.
In view of the above, this paper aims to investigate the Ukraine crisis’ implications for Canadian foreign policy and its bilateral relations with the EU and Russia. The choice for the case of Canada was determined by several factors: Foremost, Canada and Ukraine have historically developed tight bilateral links due to the size and activity of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada. As it was put by O. Naumenko (2014), “Canada is the second largest Ukrainian country outside Ukraine”\(^4\). Canada has played a significant role in upholding the rule of law and democracy in Ukraine, and has actively supported Ukraine since the outbreak of the Euromaidan Revolution. At the same time, Canada shares its Northern border with Russia, and its interests in the Arctic require comprehensive and profound bilateral relations with the Russian Federation.\(^5\) Finally, as “the relations between Ottawa and Moscow have traditionally been shaped by the developments elsewhere in the international system” (Sarty 1994, p.11), it is worth analyzing the steps Canada takes to remain a Middle Power\(^6\) in light of an ongoing crisis. The concept of a “Middle Power” is used to address Canada’s unique foreign policy that was developed as a response to the Cold War, focusing on promoting peace, multilateral solutions and the rapprochement between the conflicting parties.

The aims of the paper suggest the following framework for analyzing Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis and the resulting changes in its relations with the EU and Russia: First, an outline of Canada’s pre-crisis foreign policy with Ukraine and Russia is presented. The central part of the paper focuses on the changes in Canada’s foreign policies vis-à-vis

---

\(^4\)On the history and current state of the Canadian-Ukrainian links, please visit: [http://euromaidancanada.ca/about-euromaidan-canada/](http://euromaidancanada.ca/about-euromaidan-canada/)

\(^5\)On Canada-Russia cooperation in the Arctic, see Studin, I 2015, ‘Arctic futures and the Russia-Ukraine-West conflict’, *The Institute for 21st century questions.*

\(^6\)On different approaches to conceptualizing Middle Powers, see: David, C.P & Roussel, S 2009, “Middle Power blues”: Canadian policy and international security after the Cold War’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol.28, no 1, pp.131-156.
Russia and Ukraine, bearing in mind that the crisis is ongoing. Subsequently, the aforementioned changes are analyzed in comparison with the EU response to the Ukraine crisis within the context of the “Middle Power” concept.

**Canada’s Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Policy before the Euromaidan Revolution**

*Canadian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union: a historical view*

Analyzing modern Canada-Russia and Canada-Ukraine relations requires an insight into the major factors, shaping the traditions and peculiarities of Canada’s foreign policy toward the USSR. It may be argued that the diplomatic record of 1917 to 1991 is irrelevant at least due to the collapse of the USSR and subsequent changes in the international system. However, a historical study of the dynamics of Canada’s interests in the region and established foreign policy traditions thereto can help a researcher understand the logic of Canada’s modern foreign policy toward the former Soviet states. Thus, a historical understanding of Canadian-Soviet foreign policy is a prerequisite for understanding some concepts that still influence Canada’s policy towards the region.

Canada’s first interactions with the Soviets were far from friendly due to the fact that Canada refused to recognizing the Bolshevik government and participated in the Allied Intervention in Siberia (1918-1919), aimed at supporting the White Army against the newly formed Bolshevik government (Canada’s Siberian Expedition 2015). Convinced that the Soviet government would collapse, Canada established the Canadian Siberian Economic Commission to “develop markets for Canada’s manufactured goods” (Murby 1969, p.374). However, in 1920 the Allies withdrew their forces from Siberia, and, driven by trade interests, Canada de-facto...
recognized the Soviet government by joining the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement (Sarty 1994, p.22). Seven years later Ottawa suspended relations with the USSR due to the Moscow’s alleged intervention in British politics. After a range of reciprocal embargoes in the interwar period, the relations between Canada and the USSR started warming under the Liberal administration of Mackenzie King (1935-48). Nevertheless, the official reestablishment of bilateral relations took place in 1942, determined by the need to unite in the struggle against Nazi Germany.

Canada’s interwar opposition to Bolshevism, the postwar “communist paranoia”, and strong ties with the U.S. led to a Canadian anti-Soviet position during the Cold War. Bordering both superpowers of the bipolar world, Canada faced the challenge of being “a modest power being sandwiched between a powerful neighbor and ally to the south and a hostile Soviet Union to the north (that) produced a distinctive approach to East-West issues” (Sarty 1994, p.13). A new sense of vulnerability, stemming from the breakdown of the multipolar world, and a fear to “be relegated to the same rank as the Dominican Republic or El Salvador” urged Canada to develop a unique “Middle Power” approach to foreign policy in the postwar era (David & Roussel 2009, p.134).

Despite being used to address Canadian-Soviet relations in the Cold War era and beyond, the “Middle Power” concept remains problematic. From the standpoint of neorealism, distinguishing them between Great Powers and others, Middle Powers are viewed as “mere objects, shaped by power politics among Great Powers” (Waltz 1979, p.131). However, an empirical analysis of the role that Middle Powers play in international relations, suggests that Middle Powers are states that do not possess the resources of Great Powers, but still manage to play a significant role in the international arena (David & Roussel 2009, p. 134). The self-assertive nature of the Middle Power position and an inclination to exert impact via
group participation and international institutions are underlined in the behavioral studies of “Middle Power” diplomacy (Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993, p.7).

Based on a critical reconsideration of the above conceptual approaches and a historical study of Soviet-Canada relations, David & Roussel (2009) distinguish several important traits of “Middle-powerhood”: First, Middle Powers do not aim to change the international balance of power, but seek to play an “order-building and –sustaining role” (Hayes 1994) in the international system. In this view, Middle Powers tend to be diplomatically active and serve as the advocates of rapprochement between conflicting Great Powers. Second, Middle Powers “rely on their credibility and take advantage of their technical expertise and national resources at their disposal” (David & Roussel 2009, p.137). In other words, Middle Powers can be distinguished, based on their “technical and entrepreneurial capacities” (Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993, p.19). Last but not least, Middle Powers tend to exercise active diplomacy via coalitions comprised of international actors and multilateral organizations.

All the above patterns are manifest in Canadian Cold War foreign policy. Aiming to promote stability and reduce East-West tensions, Canada made best use of the first modest rapprochement between the Great Powers following the Geneva Summit of 1955\(^7\). However, the renewed optimism about improving East-West relations and creating a collective security system was destroyed by the Soviet suppression of a popular uprising in Hungary in 1956\(^8\) and the Suez crisis\(^9\). Following a decade of

\(^7\) The Geneva Summit of 1955 was a Cold War-era meeting of the leaders of “Big Four” (the USA, Britain, the USSR and France), concentrating on a range of issues, such as global security, disarmament, the unification of Germany and strong East-West ties. The concentration on common issues (including the opportunities to build up a new system of collective security) led to the softening of East-West tensions, commonly addressed as “a spirit of Geneva”.

\(^8\) The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was a nation-wide protest, directed against the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic, supported by the USSR. On 4 November 1956 Soviet troops
“maturation” (Waltz 1979, p.203) of the bipolar world, the weakened position of the U.S. in the international arena and a trend towards the “diversification” of Canadian foreign policy led to Canada’s next attempt to rekindle relations with the USSR. The conceptual basis for this development was Trudeau’s intention to create “a mutually acceptable code of behavior for international relations”, whereby the leading role would be played by the “compatibility of interests between the U.S and USSR” (Kinsman 2002/2003, p.115).

The warming of Canadian-Soviet relations seems paradoxical in light of a range of events in the beginning of 1980s, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet tacit support of the imposition of martial law in Poland, and the shooting down of a Korean Airlines flight by Soviet aircraft (Nossal 1994, p.28). However, the shift can be considered a desperate attempt by Canada to preserve peace and international stability in an era of revived U.S.-USSR tensions, while viewing the USSR as a key security threat. To support this, one can pay heed to the fact that Canada was one of the last Western states to adapt to the reality of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and shift the focus of its security agenda.

A brief survey of Canadian-Soviet relations demonstrates that Canada viewed conflict aversion between Great Powers as a key aim of its foreign policy, as it continuously adapted to the changing balance of U.S.-USSR

invaded Budapest and a range of other regions of the country. Following the week-long resistance, a new Soviet-installed government began operation, leading to a strengthened Soviet position in the East.

9 The Suez crisis was created by an Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, followed thereafter by France and the UK. In 1957, the joint efforts of the USA, UN and the USSR forced the belligerents withdrawal. The crisis sharpened the relations within the Western bloc, while strengthening the role of the UN in the international arena.

10 “New thinking” can be addressed as a course of action, introduced by the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev following his rise to power. The new thinking included “glasnost” (publicity), freedom of expression and press, democratic elections, transfer to the market economy. Profound internal transformation in the USSR led to the end of communist dominance in the East and, subsequently, the Cold War.
relations and often acted as conciliator and mediator. To pursue these aims, Canada positioned itself as “a loyal, but non-threatening member of the Western alliance” (Sarty 1994, p.15) and acted as a leading proponent of multilateral solutions, especially in the security sphere. While the bipolar system of international relations ceased to exist following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the question remains whether the concept of “Middle Power” still shapes Canadian foreign policy and can it be used as an analytical framework for further research. Skeptics claim that “the kind of diplomacy conducted by such classical Middle Powers as Canada arose from circumstances which no longer exist” (Hayes 1994, p.12), and argue that the “Middlepowermanship” strategy will change in the multipolar world.

At the same time, globalization, the evolution of multilateral institutions and the expansion of peacekeeping missions continue to provide a variety of opportunities for Middle Powers to promote international stability. Moreover, the growing role of international developmental aid and the promotion of fundamental democratic values provide Middle Powers avenues to apply their experience and technical expertise thereby enhancing their role in the international arena. Finally, the Middle Power concept is still topical due to the fact that both the USA and Russia remain Great Powers, and that the collapse of the USSR did not bring an end to East-West tensions. Last, but not least, the “Middle

---

11 Canada has played an active role in the UN peacekeeping missions since their emergence following the Suez crisis in 1956 (e.g., UN Emergency Force (1956-1957), UN Operation in Congo (1960-1964), UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (1973-1979) etc). Canada was one of the key founders of NATO in 1949, and has taken part in a range of UN-sanctioned operations through NATO (e.g., Kosovo Force, 1999-present).

12 NATO Eastern enlargement is a major issue, characterized with significant potential to generate East-West tensions. On the role the prospect of NATO Eastern enlargement played in the East-West relations before the 1999, see: David, C.P. & Levesque, J. 1999, Future of NATO: enlargement, Russia and European security, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston. For the comprehensive analysis of the role NATO enlargement debate may have played in
Power” concept is frequently used to describe the involvement of particular states in both regional and global contexts. In view of the above, it is important to bear in mind the Canadian Middle Power foreign policy tradition, when analyzing its policies vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine.

**Canada’s foreign policy towards Russia (1991-2013)**

The purpose of this sub-chapter is to provide an overview of Canada-Russia relations, prerequisite for the subsequent analysis of Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis. The rationale for the analysis can be formulated as follows: First, an area-by-area study of Canada-Russia relations identifies the domains of Canadian cooperation and confrontation with Russia, whose importance and relevance for Canada determine the design of the response to the Ukraine crisis. Second, the prior assessment of the Canada’s foreign policy to Russia constitutes a threshold when assessing the intensity of Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis and the applicability of the “Middle Power” concept to such response. Last, but not least, creating portfolios of Canada’s relations with Russia and Ukraine (see the following subchapter) respectively provides a context for comparing the network of relations Canada has with these countries, and finally for determining the crisis in Ukraine, see: Mearsheimer, J 2013/2014 ‘Why the Ukraine’s crisis is the West’s fault. The Liberal decision that provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs Review.


14Canada’s foreign policy to Russia is explored first, because Russia is broadly considered as the “continuator state” of the Soviet Union, whose relations with Canada are explored first in this chapter. The major arguments in favor of this approach are concerned with the transfer of the USSR property from third states to Russia; the mode of transfer of the Red Army parts, stationed abroad, as well as the Russia’s taking over the seat of the USSR in the UN and its Security Council (Boczek, 2005, p.131).
developing a comprehensive picture of the Canadian response to the Ukraine crisis.

The areas of Canada-Russia relations to be analyzed include political dialogue and security, trade and investment, development policy, as well as Northern development.

*Political dialogue and security*

Canada and Russia work together in multilateral and bilateral terms. The multilateral cooperation takes place within the framework of international organizations, such as the UN, G8, G20 and the NATO-Russia Council. High-level meetings between Russian and Canadian leaders also occur on a regular basis, especially at G8 summits. Important bilateral cooperation topics include the struggle against global security threats, such as terrorism and the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The above data substantiates Canada’s continuing preference for the multilateral solutions (usual for Middle Powers), as it is also underlined in secondary sources (Keating, 2002) (Lui, 2012, p.129).

The first decade of the new millennium was marked by intense contact between foreign affairs and defense ministers of both countries, allowing Canada and Russia to facilitate bilateral cooperation and address global threats. In 2000, the parties signed an agreement, enabling and facilitating interregional cooperation (the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada 2014). In 2008, political dialogue between the parties was impeded by the hostilities of the Russo-Georgian War and Russia’s “encroachment of Georgia’s territorial integrity” (the Government of Canada, 2008)

*Trade and investment*

Cooperation in the field of trade and investment represents the cornerstone of bilateral relations.
According to the Canada-Russia Agreement on economic cooperation, the major sectors of cooperation include energy (including safety issues related to nuclear power), agriculture, conversion of defense industry, mining and metallurgy, aerospace industry, construction, environmental protection etc. (The Government of Canada 2014a). Importantly, the agreement provides for the institutionalization of cooperation by launching a Canadian-Russian Intergovernmental Economic Commission (IEC) that includes a range of sector-specific groups.

From 1992 to 2012 the volume of Canada-Russia trade demonstrated significant growth (despite decreases in 2002, 2007 and 2009) (Gauthier 2013). In 2012 Russia was Canada’s 18th largest export destination, while Canada ranked 43rd for Russia in terms of export value. While Canadian foreign direct investment in Russia grew rapidly between 2009 and 2012, Russian FDI to Canada remained insignificant (Gauthier 2013).

**Development policy**

The beginning of the 1990s was characterized by the intense donor involvement in the democratization of the former Communist bloc countries, including Russia (Henderson 2003, pp.3-5). Major Canadian institutions that implemented development policy in Russia include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canada-Russia Partnership Fund. Both focused on promoting security and stability in Russia by supporting democracy, good governance and adherence to international norms, and the transition to a market economy. In the 2000s a highly limited number of Canadian development projects in Russia dealt with supporting select local initiatives (Global Affairs Canada 2012).

**Northern development**
The history of Canadian Arctic policy dates back to 1880, when Great Britain, Canada’s former colonial power, ceded the Arctic islands to Canada (Dolata-Kreutzkamp 2009, p.2). While during the Cold War Canada and the U.S. were intensely cooperating in the Arctic to prevent a potential Soviet military intervention, the 1990s were marked by the emergence of truly multilateral cooperation in the Arctic\(^\text{15}\).

The legal framework for Canada-Russia bilateral cooperation in the Arctic is manifested by the Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North (1992), the Joint Russian-Canadian Statement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North (2000), as well as a number of sectorial agreements (2007)\(^\text{16}\). In institutional terms, the cooperation is facilitated through the Intergovernmental Economic Commission (Sergunin\&Konyshev 2015, p.101). From 2006 to 2009 the Canadian International Development Agency implemented a range of development projects in the Russian North, dedicated to institution building and the empowerment of Aboriginal people (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada 2015). Moreover, Canada-Russia joint efforts in the Arctic include the implementation of investments\(^\text{17}\), as well as scientific and technological cooperation projects.

While Arctic and Northern development represents a domain of unlimited developmental cooperation opportunities for Canada and Russia, as well as multilateral solutions, unresolved territorial disputes (aggravated by the oil-richness of the region)\(^\text{18}\) serve as a source of confrontation.

\(^{15}\)The crucial step in the formation of multilateral Northern cooperation was the signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), leading to the adoption of the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, establishing the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states to cooperate and coordinate their activities.

\(^{16}\)The agreements concerned the use of atomic energy, agriculture, fishery, veterinary and phytosanitary control etc.

\(^{17}\)On the most ambitious Canada-Russia joint investment projects in the Arctic, see Sergunin\&Konyshev 2015, p.99.

\(^{18}\)The major Canada-Russia unresolved territorial disputes deal with the Lomonosov Ridge, located in the Arctic Ocean.
Canadian confrontation with other Arctic states (including Russia) became especially visible under the Harper administration, promoting the “Arctic is Ours” policy (Dolata-Kreutzkamp 2009).

**Canada’s foreign policy to Ukraine (1991-2013)**

The following sub-chapter aims to analyze the pre-crisis state of Canada-Ukraine relations. As it was mentioned, developing a portfolio of Canada’s relations with the countries involved in the Ukraine crisis is needed to understand the rationale for Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis, as well as the intensity of such response. Drawing parallels between Canada-Russia and Canada-Ukraine relations prior to the crisis appears especially useful, especially when conceptualizing the whole picture of Canada’s crisis response.

To start, Canada was the first Western state to establish diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Unlike the case with Russia, the strong Ukrainian-Canadian community significantly influences Canada’s foreign policy towards Ukraine. The major areas of Canada-Ukraine cooperation include political dialogue, security cooperation, trade and investment, development, as well as education, and cultural exchange programs.

*Political dialogue*

The Joint Declaration on Special Partnership, signed in Kyiv in 1994, constitutes the key legal framework for Canada-Ukraine relations. From 1994-2013 a range of high-level and ministerial meetings between Ukrainian and Canadian officials took place (the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada 2015). The bilateral links between Canada and Ukraine became especially strong following the success of the Orange Revolution and the launch of multiple Western democratization projects in Ukraine (Ukraine Weekly, 2005).
Security and defense cooperation

According to the Roadmap “Priorities for Canada-Ukraine Relations”, security is a crucial domain for Canada-Ukraine cooperation (the Government of Canada 2009). Special emphasis is made on supporting Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The framework for cooperation is constituted by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine of 2009 and the Annual National Program of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, which encompass a broad range of political, economic and defense-related reforms (the Government of Canada 2009).

Importantly, the process of NATO expansion has been viewed as a crucial security concern in Russia since the end of the Cold War\(^\text{19}\). Therefore Canada’s outspoken support for Ukraine-NATO cooperation contains an important potential for conflict with Russia – a Russia that seems determined to “reclaim its old sphere of influence” (Merand et al. 2013, p.1)

Trade and investment

The legal basis for economic relations between Canada and Ukraine is constituted by the Declaration on Special Partnership (2004), the Agreement on economic cooperation (1994) and the Agreement on promotion and protection of investments.

In 2011 Ukraine was Canada’s 63rd most important export destination and the 82nd most important source of imported goods. From 1993 to 2006 the value of both exports and imports between Canada and Ukraine demonstrated a steady growth. However, since 2006 respective rates have been continually declining. The volume of trade in services and foreign direct investment were insignificant before 1993 and 2013. It is broadly recognized that there is considerable room for the expansion of Canada-Ukraine economic relations, especially with regard to food import

\(^{19}\)See fn 12.
and export, exchange in services, and FDI (the Government of Canada 2016).

Development policy

Ukraine is one of the 25 states that receive Canadian development assistance. From 2000 to 2012 the CIDA implemented a range of projects in Ukraine, dedicated to the promotion of liberal-democratic governance, capacity-building in governmental institutions and the electoral system, as well as countering corruption. Apart from tackling governance-related issues, the CIDA also promoted sector development and the assistance to vulnerable population groups. The Canada Fund for Local Initiatives supports the development of civil society and grassroots democratic initiatives.

People-to-people ties

Canada and Ukraine enjoy viable cooperation in such fields as education, culture and people-to-people relations. Courses in Ukrainian studies are available at a range of universities across Canada (Ottawa, Toronto, Alberta etc.). Ukrainian students are also eligible for a range of scholarships at Canadian universities. Cultural exchange programs between Canada and Ukraine and warm people-to-people ties are facilitated by numerous NGOs (e.g, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Canada-Ukraine Foundation and the Canadian Ethnocultural Council)

Summary

The logic of Canada's pre-crisis relations with modern Russia and Ukraine is to a significant extent determined by historical factors and Canada’s foreign policy traditions.
During the first decade of the new millennium Canada managed to significantly advance its level of cooperation with the Russian Federation in a range of domains, such as political dialogue and security, trade and investment, and Northern development. The state of Canada-Russia relations in the sectors of security and Northern development is characterized by an emphasis on multilateral solutions and technical expertise. Despite successful Canada-Russia cooperation in many sectors, a range of potential areas of conflict significantly impeded the dynamics of Canada-Russia relations prior to the Ukraine crisis. Amongst others, the Canadian governmental support for NATO’s Eastern enlargement (David & Levesque 1999, pp.119-120) and upgrading Ukraine-NATO relations, as well as unresolved territorial disputes in the Arctic are of mention.

In contrast, Canada-Ukraine relations were found to be oriented on promoting people-to-people links, the democratization of Ukraine, and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, rather than economic and strategic cooperation.

To sum it up, the Ukraine crisis presented Canada with the dilemma of supporting its important ideational partner in face of a military aggression – a the risk of conflict with Russia - on the one hand, and sustaining promising Canada-Russia private sector cooperation and playing a constructive role in Russia’s integration into the world community, on the other.

The Ukraine Crisis and the Changing Security Landscape

The following chapter is directed to developing an understanding of the major security concerns, associated with the Ukraine crisis and exerting
significant impact on the design of the Euro-Atlantic community’s and Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis.

The “Revolution of Dignity”, followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow’ subsequent attempts to destabilize the situation in Eastern Ukraine has significantly changed the existing balance of power in the region, and brought new challenges to the surface.

Unlike a variety of regional and local crises of the new millennium, the events in Ukraine did not allow the West to ignore the obvious: the “Westphalian order” can no longer serve as an effective foundation of world security matters (Nichols 2014; Boyle, 2016). In other words, the West faced the need to influence a state that committed numerous breaches of the basic principles of international law (e.g., peaceful settlement of disputes, inviolability of frontiers etc.)\(^\text{20}\). In turn, such a need reflects a number of security concerns.

Foremost, Russia’s attempt to destabilize Eastern Ukraine “made Poland and the Baltic countries very nervous and prompted calls for NATO to station combat forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states “(Larrabee et al 2015, p.viii). The NATO Reassurance Measure, led by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), was conducted to demonstrate the commitment of the Alliance to security in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in June 2015 NATO announced a plan to increase its current rapid response force in Europe tenfold to reach 40,000 individuals (Meilhan & Almasy 2015).

Second, the annexation of Crimea significantly increased Russian maritime power and sharpened the conflict of interests in the Black Sea region (Blockmans 2015, p.187). Major geostrategic concerns in this regard relate to the security of Moldova (especially, given the realm of the Transnistrian conflict), a possible toughening of the historical rivalry

\(^{20}\text{On the breaches of international law, committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, see: Zadorozhny, O 2014, Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and international law, K.I.S, Kyiv.}\)
between Russia and Turkey, as well as Russia’s increased capacity to influence events in the Western Balkans and the Middle East. (Larrabee et al 2015, p. vii).

Third, an important challenge is represented by the Russian “hybrid war” strategy that is seen by the West “as a threatening precedent – even a likely model – for future conflicts in Russia’s periphery” (Kofman & Royanski 2015, p.1). Hybrid war combines a range of conventional strategies, such as irregular combat operations, economic retaliatory measures, and massive information campaigns in the shadow of conventional warfare. According to Lanoszka (2016), former Soviet states are vulnerable to the application of the “hybrid war”-model due to a number of reasons. Foremost, the ethnic heterogeneity and political complexity of the region “offer opportunities for the Kremlin to foment local discord to its advantage”, especially by sponsoring secessionist movements and positioning itself as “a guarantor of the political rights of self-identifying Russians or Russian-speaking people” (pp.182-183). Furthermore, historical grievances and related symbols may serve as useful means to “divide et impera”. Finally, the weakness of civil society as a barrier against dividing impacts makes it easier for Russia to exploit political misunderstandings as a source of conflict (Lanoszka 2016, p.185).

Fourth, the pattern of Russian annexation of Crimea revived the West's fear of a Russian capture of the Arctic, a fear substantiated by Russia's latest military exercises there (Dolata-Kreutzkamp 2009, pp.2-6).

As the West’s inability to prevent further escalation of the crisis in Ukraine made the above security threats ever more real, the former employed a range of political, economic and defense measures to support Ukraine. As a result, some scholarly and media sources started to address the Ukraine crisis and the West’s response to it as an opening chapter of a
“Cold War II” stand-off\textsuperscript{21} between the West and Russia, taking place despite a multipolar world order.\textsuperscript{22}

In this view, the Euro-Atlantic community faces an important dilemma with regard to designing its further response to Ukraine crisis. On the one hand, a continued strong stance in relation to Russia’s breaches of international law is a necessary prerequisite for reviving the legitimacy of the post-1991 European order. However, this approach evidently sharpens East-West tensions, prevents parties from intensifying economic cooperation, and still does not guarantee the prevention of future “Crimea scenarios” in former post-Soviet states. On the other hand, weakening the international pressure on Russia equates to acknowledging the West’s inability to protect the principles of international order. Specific suggestions include pursuing “dual-track diplomacy” to combine “a tough credible response to Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine” and engagement with Russia as regards broader issues of shared interests (House of Lords 2015, p.80).

The alleged resumption of the Great Powers’ rivalry and articulated suggestions for long-term East-West rapprochement make it especially interesting to investigate the dynamics of Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis for two reasons. First, such an investigation allows for a retesting of the traditional Middle Power concept under the current East-West tensions, and contributes to the debate about the role of Middle Powers in the post-Cold War world. Second, an in-depth consideration of the Canadian response to the Ukraine crisis (with a special emphasis on the dynamics)


provides for evaluating the prospects of Canada’s exercising “double-track policy” with relation to Russia.

Canada’s Response to the Ukraine Crisis

The following chapter provides insight into Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis in diplomatic, economic, defense and development cooperation terms. It is argued that the dynamics of the response were significantly influenced by the Canadian 2015 federal elections23, changing from an extremely strong stance against Russia’s annexation of Crimea and violence in Eastern Ukraine to a rather moderate position, one inspired by the Cold War experience of “Middlepowerhood”.

Diplomatic measures

Over the period from November 2013 to November 2015, Canadian officials made a number of important political statements:

On 30 November 2013 Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird stated that “Canada strongly condemns the deplorable use of force today by Ukrainian authorities against peaceful protesters ...” (Global Affairs Canada 2013).

- On 5 December 2013 John Baird “urged Ukrainian authorities to respect the massive protests gripping the country against the government’s decision to freeze ties with the EU and turn to Moscow instead” (CBC 2013).

- In February 2014 Mr. Baird “congratulated the new government and emphasized the need to honor the 1994 Budapest Declaration’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial

23 The Canadian federal election took place on October, 19th 2015 to elect members of the House of Commons of the 42nd Parliament of Canada. As a result of the election the Liberals won 184 seats in the Parliament, where 170 seats constitute the majority.
sovereignty and national unity at this critical time” (the Government of Canada 2014b).

- On 1 March 2014 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper acknowledged “the importance of unity within the international community in support of international law, and the future of Ukraine and its democracy” (the White House 2014). He condemned Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and urged Vladimir Putin “to immediately withdraw his forces to their bases” (the Canadian Press 2014). In the same statement the Prime Minister announced that Canada was recalling its ambassador from Moscow and refused to participate in the preparations for the 40th G8 Summit, chaired by the Russian Federation (Ibid).

- On 4 March 2014 Mr. Harper announced that Canada would immediately suspend all military activities with Russia, calling the seizure of Crimea an “invasion and occupation” (Chase 2014a).

- On 18 March 2014 Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird issued a statement, highlighting Canada’s refusal to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and characterizing the treaty signed to annex Crimea as “an illegitimate and deliberate violation of the Constitution of the people of Ukraine” (Jarrin 2014).

Continuing to take an active stance in light of Russian attempts to invade Eastern Ukraine, Stephen Harper told Vladimir Putin “to get out of Ukraine” during the G20-Summit in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014 (Chase 2014b). Commenting on the presence of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, John Baird addressed Russia’s actions as “unacceptable,
irresponsible and absolutely reckless”, labeling them an “invasion” (Wingrove 2014). In 2015 Stephen Harper remained one of the world’s most vocal supporters of Ukraine, pushing Canada’s allies towards a more intense diplomatic response to the crisis and tougher sanctions on Russia (Blanchfield 2016).

In 2014 the majority of Canadians supported the government’s approach in handling the crisis in Ukraine, one marked by a combination of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions on Russia (Angus Reid Global 2015, p.3). While Canadians certainly prefer diplomatic and economic measures to military ones, Canadians (along with Poles) were found to be the most vocal supporters of NATO’s military aid to Ukraine among NATO countries (Poushter 2015). However, there were also voices equating Harper’s support for Ukraine with “compromising Canada’s international standing for the sake of a few votes at home” or seeing “building bridges with Russia” as a way to resolve a conflict (Carment 2015). Given the debate about a “Diaspora-driven” policy as well as the foundational differences between Conservatives’ and Liberals’ approaches to foreign policy, it was suggested that the new Liberal government would take a less active position with regards to the conflict in Ukraine.

The new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion have repeatedly reaffirmed continued Canadian support for Ukraine in its conflict with the Russian Federation (Blanchfield 2016). However, in January 2016 Dion stated that it was time to continue to work with Russia in areas of “common interests”, such as in the Arctic.

24 On the Liberals’ attitudes to Conservatives’ “Hard Power Canada” stance, see Bondy M 2015 ‘Liberal Back in ‘Canadian Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy, 21 October.
25 The 2015 Canadian Federal elections took place on 19 October 2015 and resulted in the victory of the Liberal Party (that won 184 seats out of 338 seats in the House of Commons of the Parliament of Canada).
26 Stephane Dion’s willingness to strengthen Canada-Russia cooperation in the Arctic is a response to Russia expanding its military presence in the Arctic in 2015. On this topic, see:
Explaining his position, Stephane Dion claimed that not talking to Russia would not help Ukraine and referred to the example of other allies, who continued normal diplomatic relations with Russia despite the Ukraine crisis (Zimonjic 2016). Most importantly, Stephen Dion drew a parallel between current East-West tensions and the Cold War, emphasizing Canada’s “experience as a mediator” and the need to share it (Ibid).

Thus, the narrative, manifested in the 2016 statements of Canadian leaders, provides for distinguishing the shift from an unambiguously strong support for Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia to a less proactive position, founded on the repercussions of Canada’s Cold War experience of “Middlepowerhood”.

**Support to Ukraine’s defense sector**

Canada contributed support to Ukraine's defense both in multilateral and bilateral terms. First, Canada deployed military personnel and material in Central and Eastern Europe in order to contribute to the NATO Reassurance operation. Moreover, since summer 2015 Canada has been deploying around 200 Canadian Armed Forces members in the framework of the Multinational Joint Commission’s training mission in Ukraine (National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces 2016). These troops provide the Ukrainian army opportunities for capacity-building and professional development under the bilaterally agreed Military Training and Cooperation Program.

Canada reacted to the Russian military intervention in the East of Ukraine by providing non-lethal military aid. The first supplies were sent to Ukraine in August 2014. In November and December 2014 Canada offered Kyiv further supplies and also sent Canadian military police personnel to conduct training courses for their colleagues in Ukraine (Chase 2014c).

In February 2015 it was agreed that Canada would send Ukraine financial aid and provide radio satellite images. At the same time, the idea of sending lethal military aid to Ukraine was first discussed at the highest formal level between Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, fearing an escalation of the conflict, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to a diplomatic solution. Importantly, in June 2015 the Canadian Defense Minister proclaimed Canada’s readiness to send lethal weapons to Ukraine, but said that the supplies were ultimately contingent upon similar support from other NATO allies (Johnson 2015). In view of the fragile ceasefire in Ukraine and the Liberals’ much softer stance on the Ukraine conflict, Canada claims “not being involved in any direct talks with the Ukrainian government on a possible provision of lethal aid to Kyiv” (Levchenko 2016) and “not having the right weapons to help Ukraine” (McKinnon 2015). Instead, Canada’s technical assistance capacities and mediation experience are underlined in defense terms.

**Economic sanctions**

Along with diplomatic pressure, Canadian citizens view economic sanctions against Russian individuals and entities as a crucial element in Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis (Angus Reid Global 2014, p3). An initial package of sanctions related to Russia was imposed by the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations of 17 March 2014 as a response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The scope of the regulations is manifested by the asset freeze and dealings prohibition with designated individuals and entities, as well as tackling specific sectors and goods (Justice Laws Website 2016a).

In response to the Russian annexation of Crimea Canada also introduced Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations, providing for assets freezing and dealings prohibition for implicated Ukrainian persons.
The regulations also contain a range of import prohibitions with regard to annexed Crimea (Global Affairs Canada 2016). The Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Ukraine) Regulations applies to 18 Ukrainians who were politically exposed for their affiliation with the regime of Victor Yanukovych (Justice Laws Website 2016b).

Despite a call for starting “to talk with Russia”, Canada did not lift sanctions and instead introduced an amendment to its Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, in commemoration of the second anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. In addition, Canada’s membership in the Russian-Canadian Intergovernmental Economic Commission has remained suspended since March 2014. As it can be seen from figures illustrating Canada-Russia trade and investment activities, the volume and value of such activities have significantly decreased between 2013 and 2015 (Tremblay 2015).

At the same time, Canada has demonstrated an intention to intensify its economic cooperation with Ukraine by introducing the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) that was signed by both parties on 11 July 2016. Apart from addressing tariff barriers to trade, CUFTA includes provisions in the areas of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, environment, competition, labor, intellectual property and electronic commerce amongst others. Importantly, CUFTA enables companies to benefit from preferential access to procurement opportunities at the central level in both countries (Global Affairs Canada 2015b). Due to its ambitious scope, CUFTA is perceived an important step forward in Canada-Ukraine bilateral relations, as well as a means to demonstrate Canada’s strong commitment to supporting Ukraine’s integration into the world community.

*Enhanced development cooperation with Ukraine*
Following the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine Canada has significantly intensified its development cooperation with Ukraine. The development projects, currently implemented by Canada in Ukraine, can be divided into two major groups, such as providing emergency assistance in the short term, and aiming at promoting economic development and democracy in a long-term perspective. The emergency assistance projects merely involve medical assistance in conflict areas, emergency shelter and essential relief items (Global Affairs Canada 2015a).

The economic development-related projects (tackling both public and private sectors) include (but are not limited to):

- “Evidence-based economic development”
- “Engaging the Private Sector for Small and Medium-Sized Farm Business Development”
- “Strengthening Public Financial Management”

As it can be seen from the official list of the Canadian international development projects in Ukraine, the number of operational projects has increased over the period from 2013 to 2015, while the thematic scope of the long-term assistance projects have literally remained the same. Along with the Canada’s emphasis on mediation and technical assistance, manifested in both diplomatic support and defense-related statements, the intensified Canada-Ukraine development cooperation testifies to Canada’s ambition towards the role of a Middle Power in the Ukraine crisis.

**Strengthening people-to-people ties**

The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) and a range of other Canadian-Ukrainian civil society organizations have expressed emphatic support for the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. The UCC launched the Euromaidan Canada as a part of its Toronto branch. Initially, Euromaidan Canada aimed at spreading information about the “Revolution of Dignity”.

Since 2013 the branch has organized 80 events, such as protests, educational sessions and fundraising actions.

The Foundation Canada-Ukraine also implements a range of important projects to support Ukraine, such as:

- “Ukraine Rebuilding Fund”
- “CUF Medical Mission”
- “Ambulances for Ukraine”

Both organizations are active in social networks and attract attention not only from Canada and Ukraine, but also from far beyond.

**Summary**

Canada's response to the Ukraine crisis caused significant changes in Canada-Russia and Canada-Ukraine relations. First, Canada's initial strong stance as regards the conflict (including Canada's support for the NATO Reassurance operation) led to a pronounced standoff between Canada and Russia. One of the crucial catalysts for the strained relations was the Russian “Arctic arms race” in the summer of 2015. Canada-Russia political cooperation, trade and investment, as well as common Northern development strategies significantly suffered as well from Canada's exertion of diplomatic pressure on Russia and the introduction of economic sanctions.

Explicit referrals to Cold War experiences in the political statements of Canada's leadership following the 2015 elections, the lack of forthcoming initiatives to support Ukraine's defense sector, as well as an emphasis on development cooperation in Ukraine are major factors that testify to Canada's political turn to a Middle Power stance in context of the Ukraine crisis. While continuing to develop its bilateral relations with Ukraine (especially, in trade, development cooperation and people-to-
people ties domains), the Liberal Government has also sought to “reboot” Canada-Russia relations by “speaking with Russia”. Resembling its Middle Power-style inclination to multilateral solutions, Canada is looking forward by relying on “a myriad of agencies” to re-engage with Russia, such as the Arctic Council, the NATO-Russia Council, and the OSCE (Westdal, 2016).

Despite the evolution of the post-Cold War narrative in relation to the crisis in Ukraine27, the evident multi-polar state of the international order, the spirit of the recent USA-Russia consultations on the Donbas settlement in Kaliningrad (Garanich 2016), as well as ongoing discussions on EU-Russia and EU-Eurasian Economic Union cooperation make it difficult to claim that the geopolitical preconditions surrounding Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis clearly resemble those from the Cold War. However, the presence of multiple features of Middle Power diplomacy in Canada’s post-election response to the crisis in Ukraine (e.g., emphasis on mediation, technical assistance and developmental cooperation), as well as the proven applicability of the Middle Power concept to states’ post-Cold War foreign policies28, legitimize the application of this concept to the case study of the Canadian Ukraine crisis response.

The Convergence of Canadian and EU Responses to the Ukraine Crisis

The aim of this chapter is to compare the dynamics of Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis with that of EU in order to see whether the intent to “re-engage” with Russia, currently manifested in Canada’s foreign policy, can be also traced in the dynamics of the EU’s crisis response.

---

27 See fn. 21.
28 See fn.13.
Given the scale of the Ukraine crisis and its multiple security implications, the EU has been significantly involved in attempting to resolve the crisis since the beginning.

Evidently, the EU welcomed the Euromaidan Revolution in Kyiv, triggered by the former President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. For instance, on 26th November 2013 the EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle stated that he was happy that

“[d]emocracy in Ukraine has reached the moment, where the people are free to assemble and express their opinion, particularly on the issue which is so relevant for their own future, the future of Ukraine” (Beketov 2013).

Since 2014, the EU has been employing a range of diplomatic counter measures in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. These measures included inter alia:

- issuance of multiple political statements

- suspending the negotiations concerning Russia’s membership in the OECD and International Energy Agency

- canceling the 2014 EU-Russia Summit and the Member States’ planned bilateral meetings with Russia

- France and Germany’s significant contribution to the arrangement of and conduct in the Minsk process and monitoring the fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements.

---

29 For instance, see: European Union Delegation to the UN 2014, EU Council condemns the illegal referendum in Crimea; European Union External Action Service 2015, Statement by the Spokesperson on the recent escalation of fighting in eastern Ukraine.

30 On the 5 September 2014 the representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, as well as the Lugansk People Republic and Donetsk People Republic signed the Mink Protocol, aimed to halt the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Following the collapse of the ceasefire in January 2015, an
Addressing the EU’s economic sanctions in relation to Russia, it is necessary to mention that the EU visa bans and asset freezes affect 147 individuals and entities, involved with the annexation of Crimea and the following pro-Russian unrest in Eastern Ukraine. Similar to Canada, the EU also introduced substantial restrictions on economic exchange with Crimea and measures targeting EU-Russian private sector cooperation (in financial, energy and defense sectors) (European Union Newsroom 2016). The EU also did not lift sanctions in 2016, extending their enforcement until January 2017 (Robins, 2016).

Similar to Canada, the EU dedicated significant attention to enhancing its bilateral cooperation with Ukraine. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement\(^{31}\), which included the new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, was signed on 27 June 2014. In 2014 the EU launched its first Special Measure in favor of Ukraine, aimed to finance the State Building Contract Project and the Ukraine Civil Society Support Program (European Commission 2014). In 2015 the Second Special Measure was introduced to support private sector development in Ukraine (European Commission 2015).

The EU also promoted the development of Ukraine’s defensive capabilities by launching the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. In December 2015 the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and the European Defense Agency entered into an agreement providing for EU-Ukraine cooperation in the field of defense. However, the EU played only a limited role in NATO’s Reassurance operation and protested against the permanent deployment of NATO troops in Poland, additional package of measures (Minsk II) was agreed upon by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France at the Minsk Summit in February 2015.

\(^{31}\)On the overview of the distinctive traits of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, see: Van der Loo, G 2016 *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: a new legal instrument for EU integration without membership.* BRILL, Leiden.
claiming that such deployment would violate the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act (Speck 2015).

From the overview above, it is clear that the EU has done a lot to respond to Ukraine's crisis, emphasizing a diplomatic solution to the crisis. However, since the Russian annexation of Crimea it has been increasingly difficult for the EU Member States to agree on the scope of economic sanctions to be imposed on Russia and the perspective for EU-Russia dialogue. For instance, both Hungary and Austria, who have long-standing political and economic links with Russia, have repeatedly pushed for the EU to soften its sanctions policy against Russia. Evident pro-Russian sentiments were also expressed by strong nationalist political forces in other member nations, such as National Front in France, Greece's far-right Golden Dawn and the Lega Nord in Italy (Waterfield & Freeman 2014) (Sannikov 2014). Alongside the pressure from internal proponents of EU-Russian re-engagement, a range of important factors started to bring the EU closer to acknowledging the need to elaborate a strategy to increase cooperation with Russia, despite the continued occupation of Crimea and the fragile nature of the ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine. These factors include the fear of a “full-blown” Cold War and regional spillovers of the conflict, the economic impact of sanctions, and a demand for Russia's cooperation on global issues. In light of the above, first calls for a re-engagement with Russia appeared.

In its Report of 10 February 2015 the British House of Lords stated that the “Member States have to live with Russia as a neighbor, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, and as a regional power” (House of Lords 80). The major spheres for reinforcing EU-Russian cooperation, underlined by the House, include collective security, common economic space, as well as cultural and educational exchanges. Irrespective of the way the Ukraine crisis will continue influencing EU-
Russia economic and security relations, it is suggested that “an ongoing cooperation with Russia in the fields of education, culture and science “shall not be sacrificed” (Ibid). Finally, it is claimed that

“it would be a failure of imagination and diplomacy if the crisis in Ukraine were to result in a long-lasting era of colder relations and cooperation not only on the political, but also cultural level” (House of Lords 82).

Aiming to suggest ways to prevent a “new Cold War”, a range of scholars from both the EU and beyond emphasize the need to rebuild trust via a new “long-term strategic perspective” (Forsberg&Haukkala 2016, p. 14). According to Lukyanov (2016), the key aspects of cooperation need to include energy, the movement of people (that is especially topical in light of the massive influx of refugees into the EU) and cross-border cooperation (p.18). It is also recommended to consider perspectives for cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Union (Korosteleva 2016, p.44). In its policy brief “Eastern Partnership after a deep rethinking” the European Parliament also discusses the prospect of creating a EU-Russia common economic space in order to prevent long-lasting EU-Russia confrontation (Gromadzki&Pasos 2015, p.38). Importantly, the nearly all of authors of the above suggestions recognize the impossibility of rebuilding EU-Russia trust in the short-term, and emphasize the importance of combining short-term crisis response measures with the prerequisites for creating substantial long-term partnership.

The above analyses of the Canadian and EU response to the Ukrainian crisis allow for stating that Canada and the European Union’s positions toward the crisis in Ukraine are to great extent convergent with each other. In general terms, both parties combined diplomatic measures and economic sanctions to counter Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the use of “hybrid war”-strategies in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, both the EU
and Canada have strengthened their development efforts in Ukraine, focusing on economic development and the promotion of democracy. While Canada made a larger contribution in the domains of defense and military, the allies agreed on the need to elaborate a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

Importantly, in 2015 the policy discourses in both the EU and Canada experienced a change. Reaffirming their commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine, European and Canadian policy-makers started to discuss avenues to avoid a “new Cold War” by strengthening the cooperation with Russia in medium- and long-term perspectives in the spheres of common interest. The reasons for such a move doubtlessly include trade and investment, as well as the need to unite efforts against common threats (House of Lords 2015, p.35; 79-80). As for the EU, energy supplies remain an important concern in EU-Russia relations. Both the EU Arctic states (Denmark, Norway) and Canada seek to advance multifaceted cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.

To sum up, a comparison of the dynamics in Canada and the EU’s responses to the crisis in Ukraine shows that both Canada and the EU made a first step to ‘re-engage’ with Russia in the diplomatic domain. At the same time, both emphasized the importance of traditional Middle Power instruments (mediation, multilateralism, development cooperation, technical assistance) to continue supporting Ukraine in an ongoing crisis.

Concluding Remarks

The examination of Canada’s response to the Ukrainian crisis allows for formulating the following concluding remarks.

1. A dichotomy of conflict and cooperation has been characterizing Canada-Russia relations since the Cold War, whereby Canada took an active “Middle
Power” stance. Prior to the crisis in Ukraine, Canada’s support for NATO Eastern enlargement, the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relations, and unresolved territorial disputes in the Arctic were the major areas of potential disagreement between Canada and Russia. Canada has also enjoyed tight bilateral links with Ukraine, strengthened by active people-to-people ties.

2. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and initiation of unrest in Eastern Ukraine forced the world community face a range of important security concerns, stemming from the obvious crisis of the post-1991 European order. The major identified threats include regional spillovers of the conflict (especially, to Poland and Baltic states), Russia’s continued application of “hybrid war” strategies and an aggravation of existing tensions in the Arctic. In light of the above security threats and rekindled rivalry between Great Powers, the Euro-Atlantic community faced the challenge of developing a dynamic crisis response, both protecting the foundations of existing international law and allowing for the alleviation of the above security threats.

3. Following the outbreak of the conflict, Canada actively opposed Russia’s breaches of international law by combining diplomatic and economic means. It was also one of the most active supporters of Ukraine in the defense domain. Canada’s response to crisis from 2014 to mid-2015 was found to be fully convergent with that of the EU.

4. Later on Canada started to look for opportunities for rapprochement with Russia, despite reaffirming its previous commitment to supporting the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. While this trend largely stems from the Canadian change of government in autumn 2015, it also goes in line with the current debate on avoiding a “new Cold War” and redesigning EU-Russia relations with a long-term perspective, taking place at both EU level and that of the particular Member States. The reasons for
rapprochement range from trade and investment opportunities to the need for enhanced cooperation in the Arctic. Therefore, both the EU and Canada seem to pursue a double-track policy, aiming to both support Ukraine and create conditions for substantial long-term partnership with Russia.

5. The presence of the key features of Middle Power diplomacy in Canada’s response to the Ukraine crisis makes it possible to claim that the new Liberal Government of Canada seeks to play a Middle Power role in the crisis resolution. The experience of applying the Middle Power concept to post-Cold War research in the field of international relations makes it possible to use the Middle Power diplomatic approach, despite the evidently different shape of the international order.

6. In a long-term perspective, the crisis in Ukraine can be viewed as a turning point in East-West relations, demonstrating the impracticability of a rivalry between Great Powers in an era of multi-polarity, ever growing international interdependencies and common challenges, as well as the need for new multilateral solutions. Similar to the post-World War II European Coal and Steel Community project, creating a common economic space between the EU and EEU can be seen as an important basis for enhanced cooperation in political and security domains.

7. In Chinese, the hieroglyph “crisis” combines “a problem” and “an opportunity”. The crisis and the West’s response to it provided Ukraine with a range of novel opportunities for development and multifaceted integration to European and Euro-Atlantic community. Entering into an ambitious Association Agreement with the EU, joining free trade areas with the EU and Canada, and multiple democracy promotion initiatives can bring a quality change to the internal situation in Ukraine and its role in the international area.
Bibliography


Blockmanns, S 2015, ‘Crimea and the quest for energy and military hegemony in the Black Sea region: governance gap in a contested geostrategic zone’, *Southeast European and Black sea Studies*, vol.15, no.2, pp.179-189


David, C.P & Roussel, S 2009, ‘“Middle Power blues”: Canadian policy and international security after the Cold War’, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol.28, no 1, pp.131-156


Dolata-Kreutzkamp, P 2009, ‘“The Arctic is ours”: Canada’s Arctic policy between sovereignty and climate change’, *FokusKanada*, no.2, pp.1-6


European Commission 2015, *Commission implementing decision of 29.4.2014 on a Special Measure for private Sector Development and Approximation in favour of Ukraine to be financed from the general budget of the European Union*. Available from:


Forsberg, T, Haukkala, H 2016, ‘Could it have been different? The evolution of Russia-Ukraine conflict and its alternatives’, in *Avoiding a new ‘Cold War’ The future of EU-Russia relations in the context of the Ukraine crisis*, ed. C.Nitoiu, LSE Ideas, London, pp.8-15


Hayes, G 1994. ‘Middle Powers in the new world order’, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto.


Kofman, M. & Rojansky, M 2015, ‘A closer look at Russia’s hybrid war’. Kennan Cable, no 7, pp.1-8

Korosteleva, E 2016, ‘EU-Russia relations in the context of Eastern Neighborhood’, in Avoiding a new ‘Cold War’ The future of EU-Russia
relations in the context of the Ukraine crisis, ed. C.Nitoiu, LSE Ideas, London, pp.40-46


Mearsheimer, J 2013/2014, ‘Why the Ukraine’s crisis is the West’s fault. The Liberal decision that provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs Review.


Merand, F., Contessi, N., Cornut, J. & Kunertova, D 2013, Options for Canada’s future in Euroatlantic organizations, CIPSS, Montreal


Öniz, Z., Kulay, M, 2016, ‘The dynamics of emerging Middle Power influence in regional and global governance: the paradoxical case of Turkey’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*


Speck, U 2015, *German power and the Ukraine conflict*, Carnegie Centre Europe, Brussels

Studin, I 2015, ‘Arctic futures and the Russia-Ukraine-West conflict’, *The Institute for 21st century questions*, 3 July. Available from:


The Embassy of Ukraine in Canada 2015, *Political relations between Ukraine and Canada.* Available from: <http://canada.mfa.gov.ua/ua/ukraine-%D1%81%D0%B0/diplomacy> [23 March 2016]


