Understanding the “Ukrainian Crisis.”

Metaphors used by Ukrainian, German, and British Leaders in 2014-16.

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Abstract. This research challenges a widespread belief that the Euromaidan uprisings and the subsequent Russian-instigated crisis in Ukraine has brought about a leap forward in Ukraine’s long-held aspirations of European integration. Signing the Association Agreement and the wide-ranging reformation process is indeed a great achievement in the context of the country’s rapprochement with the EU. However, as highlighted in this article, failure of numerous Ukrainian attempts to join European structures as well as regular setbacks in the country’s democratic transformation are largely the result of a lack of shared long-term goals between Ukrainian and Western political elites. Based on metaphor-oriented critical discourse analysis, this article examines Ukrainian and key European leaders’ official discourses in the post-Euromaidan era in order to reveal and compare their perspectives on EU-Ukraine relations as well as their view on Russia in this context. The result of the analysis shows that it is thus far too early to speak about a breakthrough in Ukraine’s European integration. The leaders analyzed possess substantially different visions on prospective relations in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle, and, as at earlier stages of EU-Ukraine relations, the main priority for Ukraine – EU membership – runs into resistance from the EU.

Keywords: Europeanization, “Ukrainian crisis,” leadership discourse, cognitive linguistics, metaphor, political speech
Introduction

The great speed of the EU enlargement, initially perceived as an enormous success of the European project, was reassessed when reached the fifth wave. The collocation "enlargement fatigue," which appeared first in media discourse, started gaining increasing popularity in the EU political vocabulary in the aftermath of the "constitutional crisis" of 2005, and the economic crisis faced by EU member states in the following years. From the descriptive collocation, "enlargement fatigue" turned into "determinative part of enlargement policies" and significantly slowed down the course of "widening" and "deepening" the European Union.

Ten years after the decline of the Constitutional Treaty, the "enlargement fatigue" expression is still of remarkable relevance. In light of the recent referendum on Ukraine, a Dutch politician Joram van Klaveren mentioned: "We need to dismantle the EU. Saying No to this agreement is a great first step of stopping the EU train." This quote demonstrates that although the referendum in the Netherlands was about signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine with no connection to the country's candidacy to membership in the EU, Dutch voters perceived it as a chance to express their opinion on EU-related issues, including the enlargement issue.

The current internal stance of the EU is complicated by the raise of Eurosceptic parties, Britain's withdrawal, Grexit debate, and the unprecedented flow of refugees. The latter is often described as "refugee crisis" in popular discourse, but is defined by academics as rather a "representational crisis" or a "legitimacy crisis," when it comes to the EU's internal affairs. These internal issues are highly intertwined with external challenges, among those, the emergence of ISIS and the "Ukrainian crisis." The latter is

3 Dimitris Christopoulos, "A Crisis within the Crisis: The Refugee Situation in Greece" (Humanity in Action International Conference, Athens, Greece, 2016).
purposefully put in quotation marks. Although triggered by a local event, the Euromaidan or the “Revolution of Dignity” for Ukrainians, who massively protested against the suspension of the Association Agreement with the EU, the “Ukrainian crisis” is much more than a local, or even a regional issue.

Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and subsequent hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine east contravened the fundamental principles of the international law, outlined in the Charter of the United Nations. The latter, alongside the Helsinki Accords and the Charter of Paris, which Russia signed and then disregarded, constitute the pillars of the European security architecture. The Budapest memorandum, which turned Ukraine into a non-nuclear-weapon state and was supposed to guarantee its territorial integrity in exchange, was brutally neglected as well. Thereby, the “Ukrainian crisis” threatens the foundations of seventy years of peace in Europe as well as questions the post-Cold War international order, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ironically, the collocation “Ukrainian crisis,” on the one hand, puts Ukraine in the center of attention and moves the focus away from Russia, which is the catalyst of the crisis. On the other, Western democracies conceptualize the crisis based on a rather outdated 20th century framework of “spheres of influence” and Cold War-style confrontation between Soviet-like Russia and the democratic West. Acting accordingly in their response to the challenge, leaders of the democratic camp focus on Russia and sideline Ukraine in their attempt to find a solution to the “Ukrainian crisis.”

The Minsk ceasefire agreements vividly exemplify the irony of the aforementioned discursive framing. On the one hand, Russia was a signatory of the Minsk accords but not an official conflict party; on the other, its demand for Ukrainian

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constitutional changes in exchange for ceasefire was tolerated by France and Germany – the European members of the Normandy Four. Obviously, such a measure, which gives Moscow a green light to determine Ukraine’s internal issues, provoked a harsh split within the Ukrainian government and even led to violence on the streets of Kyiv. As a result, the decentralization bill did not gain the constitutional majority needed for it to take effect.

Advocates of constitutional reform explain their support as a step, which need to be taken to demonstrate Ukrainian reliability to European leaders. However, gaining the trust of EU leaders is an uphill struggle for the current Kyiv elites. The country’s political turbulence, inability to set long-term foreign-policy priorities, and a sequence of democratic backlashes over the last decades led to “perennial credibility gap”7 in the European camp. The lack of trust to the Ukrainian leaders prevented the EU from any serious talks about the country’s membership perspective. This, in turn, contributed to the lack of consensus within Ukrainian elites and to subsequent chaotic decision-making. This cyclical process, in the words of Andreas Umland, poses a chicken and egg causality dilemma in light of EU-Ukraine relations.8

The Dutch politician Joram van Klaveren’s demand to stop the “EU train” will perhaps be satisfied through the outcome of the recent British referendum, but not through the one held in his country. Despite the clear “No” of the Dutch referendum result, the parliament voted for proceeding with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Nevertheless, the direction of the “EU train” towards the Eastern Neighborhood continues to be doubtful. It is also clear that Ukraine will not be granted membership in the European Union in the foreseeable future. At the same time, signing the AA has been achieved at too high human, economic, and political cost to have no implications. The “Ukrainian crisis”-related events led to a new phase in the EU-Ukraine relations.

And the quality of this phase depends on the ability of both sides to elaborate a shared vision of future cooperation.

This article aims to reveal the European and Ukrainian political elites’ perspectives on the development of the EU-Ukraine relations. More specifically, it takes an analytical look at EU leaders’ perception of Ukraine and Russia vis-à-vis the crisis as well as Ukrainian perception of the EU and Russia vis-à-vis the crisis in the post-Euromaidan political configuration. For this purpose, the analysis focuses on discursive metaphorical framing of the “Ukrainian crisis”-related issues in Ukrainian, German, and British leadership discourses.

The first part of the article covers the theoretical and methodological background of the analysis as well as explains the selection of cases. The second part traces the EU-Ukraine relations over the last decades, focusing on the issues that complicated closer cooperation and rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union. The final part is devoted to the analysis of metaphoric conceptualizations of the Ukrainian, German, and British leaders on issues related to the “Ukrainian crisis.”

1. Theoretical and Methodological Background

From the poststructuralist perspective, understanding international politics is first of all about analyzing the language deployed. Language constitutes social reality by providing objects and events with meaning. As Fierke puts it, "The reality, including how material resources would be put to use and the identity of the parties involved, was given meaning in language, which was a prior and constitutive condition for action." At the same time, the ability of an individual to rationally and autonomously impose or change meanings is limited, since, according to poststructuralists, an individual is

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always situated in a particular discursive context. Thus, international politics is seen as a discursive and intersubjective struggle over meaning, which is permanently contested and in a continuous slow change.

Approaching language, poststructuralist scholars distinguish between “text” and “subtext.” The former refers to what is explicitly addressed, whereas the latter relates to value-laden, ideologically or culturally loaded connotations. Subtext is covert, and, from the poststructuralist viewpoint, it can only be accessed through deconstruction. Deconstruction can be understood as separating the argumentative foreground from the rhetorical background. One of the deconstruction techniques focuses on the analysis of rhetorical devices used in a text, namely on metaphors.

The focus on metaphor has not occurred incidentally. Cognitive linguistics view on metaphor, started mainly from Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor (CMT), challenged the traditional perception of metaphor as a decorative element of speech. Lakoff and Johnson revolutionized understanding of metaphor by demonstrating that metaphor is not as much a matter of language as of thought. Human abstract thinking is conditioned by a set of mappings from concrete conceptual domains onto abstract ones. Human conceptual system is thus metaphorical in nature.

Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory gave rise to a whole set of metaphor studies, which supplemented, modified or even challenged CMT. Nevertheless, the central CMT claim that metaphor is a conceptual mechanism has been accepted by a wide range of scholars well beyond cognitive linguists. Since metaphors “resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at the unconscious level,” and in this way link discourse and conceptual structures, political science and IR scholars absorbed metaphor analysis as a discourse analysis tool.

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1.1 Metaphor in Discourse

Rainer Hülsse, one of the first scholars to recognize the potential of metaphor analysis within the IR field, argues that CMT is a godsend to constructivist scholars. In spite of being widely accepted within IR, the core argument of constructivism that social reality is constructed lacks an explanation of this process. According to Hülsse, cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor fills this gap, as it allows radical constructivist scholars to set a more comprehensible causal relationship between language usage and social phenomena.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, analyzing metaphors from the IR perspective contributes to better understanding of how global events, policies, and order are constructed and legitimized.

Since the classic CMT cannot fully serve this purpose due to its focus merely on individual conceptual system and neglect of a social dimension, a discursive approach to metaphor has emerged. It draws from the assumption that cognition is always socially mediated.\textsuperscript{13} Metaphor as a reflection of cognition is therefore embedded in a broader intersubjective context. Without rejecting its cognitive nature, political science and IR scholars treat metaphor not as an individual, but as discursive property. Vereza describes such modification of CMT as a movement “from thought back to language, but now, language seen as discourse.”\textsuperscript{14}

Metaphor performs multi-layered discursive functions. Above all, any metaphorization leads to perspectivisation, as it highlights some features of a discursive object and darkens other. Using CMT terminology, through metaphorization, only some aspects of a source concept are utilized to be mapped onto a target concept. The explanation of this is to be found in the invariance principle, according to which metaphor maps only those elements of source domain that are not in conflict with

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
target and its context. Thereby, metaphor deployed in relation to a certain concept inevitably emphasizes some elements of a concept, while other aspects remain out of focus.  

Also because of perspectivisation, metaphor functions as a coherence-giving and framing device in discourse. As a coherence-giving tool, metaphor connects various texts within a discourse. Cameron points out that "Systematic metaphors 'distilled' from the discourse events may thus provide insights into how the speakers foreground certain aspects of topic while backgrounding other aspects, and how they construct coherent explanations and narratives around the topic." Furthermore, metaphor can integrate discourses, which vary historically and substantially. As Drulak mentions, metaphors "can help us link and compare areas, which are otherwise seen as incommensurable," like scholarly, political, and public discourses. Metaphor thus enables both intratextual and intertextual coherence.

Metaphor is an extremely powerful framing device. Notably, it can trigger a wide spectrum of framing scenarios within a discourse. Depending on the sets of metaphors used, the same issue can be constructed as vague or concrete, alien or natural. Drawing on Jeffery Mio, Johnatan Charteris-Black notes that the functions of metaphor in the political sphere are to “simplify and make issues intelligible, to resonate with underlying symbolic representations, to stir emotions and bridge the gap between the logical and the emotional.” Metaphorical framing reflects, on the one hand, and shapes, on the other, the attitudinal and evaluative perception of a certain issue.

20 Mio, “Metaphor and Politics.”
In this manner, metaphorization is closely linked to persuasion and can influence decision-making in political process. Although there is no direct link between a metaphor deployed and consequent political action, through metaphorization some action scenarios seem natural and some, contrariwise, are presented as inappropriate. Actors, “embracing a certain metaphor are better prepared to understand and practice policies consistent with that metaphor and are likely to perceive other policies as less natural and less logical.”

Hence, metaphors do not directly cause certain policies, but rather justify and enable some policy choices in expense of others.

Various functions of metaphor described above demonstrate the role it plays in construction of social reality. Notably, constructivist notion of construction of social reality is a metaphor itself. Due to its ubiquity in language, thought, and discourse the presence and influence of metaphor often goes unnoticed for both recipients and producers of metaphorized articulations. Discursive struggle over meaning involves not just the level of arguments, but the cognitive unconscious level as well. Focus on metaphors in discourse analysis is thus a way to “look behind explicit utterances to find conceptual structures that the users themselves may not be aware of.”

In other words, metaphoric language is a clue to subtext. Metaphor reflects authentic beliefs and ideology that underlies those beliefs.

What do the European Union leaders think about post-Euromaidan Ukraine? What is the EU for the current Ukrainian political elite? How is Russia perceived with regard to the “Ukrainian crisis”? The analysis of metaphors in European and Ukrainian leadership discourses is a tool to answer these sub-questions in order to provide the

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answer to the central research question of this article: What are the European and Ukrainian political leaders’ perspectives on the future of the EU-Ukraine relations?

1.2 An Overview of Existing Research

The research sub-questions indicated above are purposefully formulated broadly and in a simple way. Although these issues touch upon various discursive fields, metaphors integrate them as well as reduce their complexity. Thereby, the network of metaphors distilled from European and Ukrainian leaders’ discursive performance will reveal simplified representation of the complex interplay between the EU/EU-members, Ukraine, and Russia. Existing empirical research on metaphor in discourse illustrates this effect.

Hülsse, for example, shows that through widespread metaphorical conceptualization of the European Union as a HOUSE, discourses of “widening” and “deepening” the EU get merged. Articulating the European Union in this way removes contradictions between two different policies and portrays them as naturally connected, since “widening” refers to building a bigger HOUSE and “deepening” refers to bolstering it. Furthermore, EU IS A HOUSE metaphor used alongside with EU IS A FAMILY metaphor leads to differentiation between “insiders” and “outsiders,” or between “self” and “other.” As a result, enlargement of the European Union becomes a matter of identity.25

Andreas Musolff, another prominent contributor to the development of metaphor analysis within the field of IR, illustrates the simplifying function of metaphor. In one of his works, Musolff examines manifestations of EU IS A FAMILY metaphor in British and German media discourse. He discovers that COURTSHIP, MARRIED LIFE, and FAMILY-BUILDING metaphor scenarios (mininarratives) prevail in portraying relations within the EU as well as between EU and non-EU countries. As follows, representation of internal

25 Ibid., 211–246.
and external interactions of the EU in terms of familiar everyday life experiences reduces the complexity of these issues and makes them understandable for everyone.26

Empirical research of Jonathan Charteris-Black provides valuable insight into how metaphor works in political communication. For instance, on the basis of a multitude of British and US leaders’ speeches, Charteris-Black demonstrates that metaphor plays the central role in the creation of political myth. Metaphor ensures simplification of political issues, helps to draw a line between “good” and “evil,” and in this way legitimizes a particular ideology. According to Charteris-Black, metaphors from the domain of JOURNEY as well as personification metaphors are the most frequent and successful examples of communicating leadership.27

Although Hülsse, Musolff, and Charteris-Black differ in methodological orientation, their research significantly contributes to the analysis of metaphoricity in European and Ukrainian leadership discourses. Firstly, the EU-focused empirical research conducted by Hülsse and Musolff offers a set of EU-related metaphorization patterns, which are to be incorporated in the following analysis. Secondly, since metaphor interpretation is always contested terrain, existing developments provide interpretation guidance and thus reduce subjectivity of the analysis. Finally, Charteris-Black’s analysis of metaphor in political speech provides a valuable toolkit for dealing with complex metaphoricity. As far as the “Ukrainian crisis” is first of all about Ukraine, coverage of the related issues in the Ukrainian leadership discourse is remarkably wider than in European leaders’ discourses. Thereby, political speech metaphorization patterns (or “metaphor keywords,” in terms of the author) revealed by Charteris-Black facilitate the analysis of a wide range of metaphor clusters in leadership communication in the Ukrainian case.

It is worthy of notice that the “Ukrainian crisis” has provoked a wave of scholarly interest, and Ukraine gained attention from metaphor scholars as well. Oleksii Polegkyi

analyzes metaphorical representation of EU-Ukraine relations in Ukrainian media discourse. According to his findings, integration of Ukraine in the EU is often metaphorized as a JOURNEY, whereas the EU is conceptualized as a BUILDING/FORTRESS. Oleksandr Kapranov undertakes research on Ukraine-related metaphors in the British foreign secretary's Twitter discourse. Similarly as in the analysis of Polegkyi, Ukraine's membership in the EU is framed as a JOURNEY. The UK is most frequently metaphorized as a PARENT and the EU as a FAMILY in Twitter discourse of the British foreign secretary.

As indicated earlier, this article aims to examine metaphoric representation of the EU, Ukraine, and Russia in the context of the "Ukrainian crisis" in the discourse of Ukrainian and European leaders. Germany and the UK are the European countries chosen for this purpose.

1.3 Justification of the Case Selection

The EU enlargement policy as well as foreign policy is to a large extent driven by the "Big Three" – Germany, France, and the UK. Based on the premise that contrasting positions on the issues under scrutiny reveals a more balanced pattern of metaphorical representations, the cases of the UK and Germany were selected for the analysis.

First of all, although both countries are among the strongest European players, the Germany and the UK have notably distinct perception of the European Union. For Germany, the CEE and then the EU became an empowering environment, which enabled its transformation into remarkably influential European actor. In contrast to Germany, participation in the European project was not of a vital importance for Britain, given its strength in the post-war decades and close ties with the US. The EU has been perceived as rather constraining framework by Brits, whose euroskepticism culminated in the recent Brexit referendum.

Secondly, Germany and the UK differ in their geographical and political proximity to Eastern Europe and Russia. In comparison with other EU-members, Germany has the closest relationship with Russia, rooted in famous Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. For the UK, Russia has never been a strategic priority in the post-Cold War international environment, and British-Russian relations can be described as rather cold. Consequently, British elites are more enthusiastic in bringing the Eastern Partnership countries into the EU orbit than their German counterparts.

Thirdly, the UK and Germany have played different roles in the “Ukrainian crisis.” Whereas Germany has been in the forefront in shaping the European Union’s response to Russian incursions into Ukrainian territory, the United Kingdom has increasingly distanced itself from EU affairs, and performed less actively in managing the crisis. Notably, the UK is not involved in the Normandy Group, created for mediation and management of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Considering all mentioned above, it is assumed that German and British leaders see the future of relations between the EU and Ukraine differently. In light of the recent decision of British citizens to leave the European Union, the significance of examining the vision of the UK regarding the EU-Ukraine relations might be questioned. The following arguments advocate for suitability of the case of UK for the current research.

First of all, it is so far unclear what implications Brexit referendum will actually have. The opposition from Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as a visible impact on the British economy in the aftermath of the referendum led to a resurrection of the Brexit debate. At the same time, if Britain actually withdraws from the EU, the reconfiguration of the latter will be a protracted process. Yet, Britain is a member of NATO, UN Security Council, G7 and G20. In the EU or not, it remains a powerful European player member capable of influencing European politics in many ways.

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Secondly, the consequences of Brexit for Ukraine in particular are not apparent. Prevailing opinion among Ukrainians is that Brexit deprives them of their strongest supporter in the EU and in this way spells the death for their European dream. Scholarly opinion is less determinative. For example, Chatham House expert Keir Giles argues that outside the multilateral framework of the EU Britain might put higher pressure on Russia, which would benefit Ukraine.\(^{31}\)

Thirdly and relatedly, the UK is the only European country who is a signatory of the Budapest memorandum. The memorandum was supposed to guarantee the security of Ukrainian borders after Ukraine gave up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal in 1994. In light of the annexation of Crimea, this document was brought up and the debate regarding its legal effect emerged. Despite the claim that the Budapest memorandum is rather a declaration than a binding treaty\(^ {32}\) and that it doesn't specify the consequences of violation,\(^ {33}\) the document has diplomatic and symbolic value. Therefore, as it is stated in the report of the House of Lords, the United Kingdom has a "particular responsibility" for dealing with the crisis.\(^ {34}\)

Thus, although the Brexit is likely to affect the distribution of power within the EU, the UK is an important player in Europe and well beyond. The case of the UK is also appropriate to be considered as a representative of the European Union in the current research, because the latter examines British leadership discourse in the pre-Brexit political configuration, when the UK is \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} a member of the European Union.

As follows, the research focus is on political discourses of the former British Prime Minister David Cameron, German chancellor Angela Merkel, and the president of

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34 "The EU and Russia:before and beyond the Crisis in Ukraine," 60.
Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. Despite the different titles, these officials are believed to be the most influential political figures in the states they represent. The leaders’ metaphorical language use is examined based on political speeches and interviews from 7 June 2014 (the beginning of Poroshenko’s presidential term) till 13 July 2016 (resignation of David Cameron).

1.4 CMT and CDA

When the cognitive-linguistic view on metaphor gained attention from discourse analysts, the question emerged – how to use the potential of CMT in critical discourse analysis? CDA unites various multidisciplinary approaches, which involve distinct methodologies but are united by the aim to analyze discourse critically. “Critically,” in words of Wodak, implies “not taking things for granted, opening up complexity.” Recognition of metaphor as a perfect tool for this task led to development of approaches under CDA umbrella with a particular focus on metaphor. Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) initiated by Charteris-Black and “discourse model of metaphor” developed by Maalej offer methodological background for the current research.

Both approaches offer the similar logic that metaphors in text should be identified, interpreted and then explained. Within the CMA, however, greater attention is devoted to the broader context in which a discursive unit under scrutiny is situated. At the same time, the “discourse model of metaphor” provides a broader toolkit for identification of metaphors. Drawing on Raymond Gibbs, Maalej distinguishes between “processing metaphors” and “metaphoric processing.” “Processing metaphors” implies that in a human mind linguistic metaphor gets linked to a conceptual metaphor. “Metaphoric processing” relates to the situation when an articulation does not

necessarily include metaphors, but is nevertheless cognized metaphorically. The approach of Maalej thus includes the analysis that metaphors are not only cross-domain mappings, but also analogy-based metaphors (as structure-mapping).\textsuperscript{38} Taking this advantage into account, Maalej’s strategy is considered to be more appropriate for identifying and interpreting metaphors in the current research.

Due to the disproportional coverage of issues related to the "Ukrainian crisis" in the discourses being analyzed, they are approached differently. In the case of Ukrainian leadership discourse, metaphor analysis is processed as follows: firstly, linguistic cross-domain mapping metaphors are identified in Poroshenko’s speeches; secondly, context-relevant linguistic metaphors are linked with conceptual metaphors and interpreted; thirdly, analogy-based metaphors are identified and interpreted; finally, the resulting data is situated in a broader context and explained.

To enable comparison with the Ukrainian case, cross-domain mapping metaphors in German and British leadership discourses are processed in a reversed fashion. Conceptual metaphors, which are previously found in Poroshenko’s speeches, are identified in the official discourses of Merkel and Cameron. Based on the Musolff’s observation that the same metaphors can be used for different or even contradictory argumentative purposes,\textsuperscript{39} the explanation of conceptual metaphors in German and British leadership discourses is conducted through uncovering arguments in relation to the "Ukrainian crisis" and the future of the EU-Ukraine relations.

2. Ukraine and the EU: “Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma”

Less than a year after Ukraine (re)appeared on the map as an independent state, the Harvard Review published an article on Ukrainian security matters. It reads: “Ukraine

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{39} Musolff, Metaphor and Political Discourse.
must pursue the classic small European state security strategy, relying on a combination of political linkages and conventional forces. In this scenario, a Russian invasion would be resisted by conventional forces hoping to retard and maximize the cost of an assault. At the same time, Ukraine would hope for sympathy and support from abroad.”^{40} Ukraine had a quarter of a century to cope with establishing links with the democratic world before Russia annexed Crimea. Given that Ukraine has received more sympathy than support, the weakness of its ties with the West is apparent. With the twenty-five years at its disposal, Ukraine did not do its “homework.”^{41}

Building a relationship of trust between Ukraine and the West has been vital not only for Ukrainian security, though. Already in 1996, Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized that Ukraine played “critical role in post-Soviet space” through, on the one hand, safeguarding Poland, Romania, and Turkey from Russia, and, on the other, transforming Russia itself.^{42} The geopolitical importance of Ukraine increased with the EU enlargement eastwards. As Gwendolyn Sasse notes, “the EU’s enlargement of 2004 turned Ukraine into the most important eastern neighbor.”^{43} In other words, ensuring security and stability of Ukraine has become a matter of security and stability of Europe overall. And Europe also did not do its “homework.”

This part aims to spread some light on the reasons behind failure of Ukraine to engage with the EU effectively. It outlines the main EU instruments of cooperation with Ukraine as well as crucial aspects of Ukrainian internal affairs over the last decades.

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2.1 The EU: Policy of the “Half-Open Door”

Ukraine was the first post-Soviet state, which formalized relations with the European Union through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Signed in 1994, and ratified by the EU member-states in 1998, the PCA was a leap forward in the EU-Ukraine dialogue. However, by the time of ratification of the EU-Ukraine PCA, the Central Eastern European states left Ukraine far behind in approximation to the EU standards. In the early 2000s, when the accession of progressed CEE countries was already on the agenda, the EU demanded more advanced mode of cooperation with the surrounding of the bigger EU.

The strategy for cooperation with the new neighbors was shaped in line with two objectives. On the one hand, for the sake of its own stability and prosperity, the EU required a peaceful neighborhood with stable democratic and economic institutions. Encouraging transformation of the neighboring countries in conformity with the EU principles and values was thus a straightforward priority. On the other, in light of the eastern enlargement, the EU “absorbing capacity” was reassessed. That is why policy towards the new neighbors was designed without considering membership in the EU as a final goal.

The new EU’s approach towards its neighbors manifested itself in the Eastern Neighborhood Policy (ENP), introduced for the first time in 2003. In words of Sasse, the ENP and action plans as its main instrument “have merged the substance of the PCAs with the rhetoric of the Common Strategies, the language of ‘integration’ and a stronger focus on security issues.” Although the ENP involved Eastern and Southern EU neighbors, designing the ENP as such was largely driven by the need to engage with Ukraine circumventing membership demands of the latter.

In scholarly literature, the ENP overall as well as the ENP with regard to Ukraine, is assessed as overwhelmingly ineffective. European External Action Service defines the

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44 Ibid., 306.
ENP action plan to “set out the partner country’s agenda for political and economic reforms, with short and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years; reflect the country’s needs and capacities, as well as its and the EU’s interests.” According to Karen E. Smith, however, the action plans often contain paragraphs that are clearly more beneficial to the EU, than for a partner country. Observing an action plan for Ukraine, she argues that paragraphs on readmission or airlines-related issues “reflect a rather ample dose of EU self-interest.”

Another shortage of the ENP is a mismatch between, on the one hand, a long list of obligations, which a partner country should fulfill, and, on the other, ambiguously formulated EU’s role in this process. Quoting Smith, “the benefits on offer from the ENP are only vaguely summarized at the start of the action plans, and they are not directly connected to fulfillment of the huge number of objectives or even the most important priorities. It is hard to see how these action plans provide a ‘real incentive for reform’. Moreover, as Sasse points out, almost one-sided commitment enshrined in action plans makes implementing reforms dependent rather on a mood of a partner country’s government than on the EU. This aspect allows “domestic actors in ENP countries to politically marginalize or de-legitimize the beginning of an EU-oriented politics.”

The most striking aspect of the ENP is lack of a clear reward for implementing effort-demanding reforms. In this regard, Sasse describes the ENP framework as ‘conditionality-lite’ for non-candidate countries, namely “conditionality without clear commitments and reward.” Transformation of the CEE countries and their approximation to the EU standards was achieved through the policy of “carrots and sticks.” In that case, a “carrot” – prospective membership – was unambiguously at stake. In contrast, the ENP implied neither the possibility of membership nor any other clearly formulated alternative. With regard to the case of Ukraine, James M. Goldgeier and

48 Ibid., 764.
50 Ibid., 301.
Steven Weber wonder: “Unless Ukraine gets a clearer signal from [NATO or] the EU regarding its membership prospects, why should the Ukrainian government choose difficult reform over populist measures in advance of the next elections or even the ones after that?”

A lack of a "carrot" in form of accession perspective can also be found in the very configuration of the ENP. Bringing in the same policy framework European states and countries as Morocco or Jordan, which are geographically non-eligible for membership, undermined the symbolic meaning of the ENP. In this regard, Rokas Grajauskas and Vytautas Sirijos Gira mention that “the very fact that European countries like Ukraine have to participate in the same policy framework as African countries devalues the structural effect this framework can have on Ukraine’s transformation.”

Mykhailo Minakov emphasizes one more flaw of the ENP that led to its inefficiency, namely lack of attention to Russia and its role in the Eastern neighborhood. At the moment of launching the ENP, Russian elites did not express much concern on the issue. However, Russia’s close ties and direct interests in the region make EU-Russia competition unavoidable. The EU’s “Eastern neighborhood” is Russia’s “near abroad,” which is the priority of foreign policy of the latter. As follows, negative reaction from Russia on revision of the ENP in 2008 was hardly surprising.

Revised ENP drew a distinction between the Eastern and Southern partners acknowledging different strategic goals of the EU in the two regions. As an outcome of a Polish-Swedish proposal, the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) was introduced. The EaP aimed to improve the ENP in order to deepen cooperation with the Eastern partners.

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and was described by many observers as a “daring”\textsuperscript{54} or even “bold”\textsuperscript{55} initiative. In comparison with the previous policy, the EaP indeed acquired new quality.

First of all, the EaP introduced a framework for intense multilateral cooperation within a number of “thematic platforms” in order to enhance cooperation not only between the Eastern partners and the EU, but among the EaP countries as well. Secondly, the initiative recognized the importance of civil society for the democratic transformation. It created a framework to “support the further development of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and to establish an EaP Civil Society Forum to promote contacts among CSOs and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities.”\textsuperscript{56} Thirdly, in the context of increasing mobility, the issue of visa liberalization was clearly articulated in the EaP. Finally, the new framework of cooperation opened a possibility for the Eastern partners to develop Association Agreements with the EU.

Despite the visible “added value” to the ENP, the Eastern Partnership Initiative has not substantially affected the (in)effectiveness of the previous policy framework. In words of Grajauskas and Gira, “the new policy [the EaP] should be taken with a pinch of salt, primarily because it largely fails to address the major conceptual drawbacks of the ENP.”\textsuperscript{57}

The main drawback is, again, the lack of the prospect of EU membership as a final goal of the process of approximation to the EU. Heinz Timmerman describes the ENP as the “policy of the half-open door.”\textsuperscript{58} Launching the EaP indeed had a symbolic meaning, but did not open the “door” for the Eastern neighbors any wider.

Notably, this has not been clearly understood in Ukraine. As Minakov argues, the ENP and its subsequent revision led to incorrect estimation of the EU cooperation

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Jakub Wodka, “Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership Geopolitical Interests or Complementary Concepts?,” \textit{Turkish Policy Quarterly} 9, no. 3 (2010): 147–156.
\textsuperscript{57} Grajauskas and Gira, “Is the Eastern Partnership a Significant Improvement of the ENP?”
agenda that triggered emergence of unrealistic expectations of EU membership in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Hypothetically, naïve belief in the accession to the EU might reinforce the transformative processes in these countries. In the case of Ukraine, however, the result was rather the opposite. European aspirations became a convenient source to be used “for gaining power and later discrediting the EU regarding the (lack of) results.”

The wave of “pro-European mood” also contributed to growing discontent in the Kremlin. Already in 2009, the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov “expresses concern” that “someone [Brussels] does not mind putting invited for participation in the Eastern Partnership countries to a choice - either you are with Russia, or - with the European Union.” Deepening cooperation with the Eastern neighbors to some extent was motivated by the preceding Russian intervention in Georgia. In this regard, the EaP can be seen as a tool for counterbalancing Moscow’s influence in the region. At the same time, the role of Russia and the Eurasian Union in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood was not specified. Consequently, the Eurasian Union and the European Union turned into an “either-or” matter in the eyes of Russian elites.

To summarize, neither ENP nor EaP can be considered as an effective policy framework to ensure transformation of the post-Soviet European states. The main shortage of the ENP/EaP lies in the vaguely-formulated incentives for deep structural transformation and approximation to the EU. The following part outlines the specifics of Ukrainian domestic and external affairs to clarify why the policy of “half-open door” let nascent Ukrainian transformation stop half way.

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60 Ibid.
2.2. Ukraine: “No-Man’s Land”

In his recently published article, polish journalist and ambassador to Ukraine Jan Pieklo suggests a fairytale-version of the Ukraine-EU relationship: “Once upon a time, just after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians had a great chance to reform their country and join the community of European democracies, but the EU and the Western political leadership successfully missed an opportunity to include Ukraine in the European integration process.”63 Expectedly, in reality the story is longer and much more complicated. Its nuances are easier to observe through tracing some aspects of the foreign and domestic policies of the three Ukrainian presidents: Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), Viktor Yushchenko (2004-2010), and Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2013).

Under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine can be described as a “semi-authoritarian blackmail state.”64 The “presidentialized” semi-presidential regime allowed Kuchma to take a control over the other authority institutions in the country.65 The first term of his presidency gave birth to oligarchy and to “blackmailing”-style of decision-making mainly through informal channels. Leonid Kuchma’s second presidential term resembled democratic transformation even less. Corruption, suppression of press, and numerous human rights abuses culminated in the “Cassette scandal” also known as “Kuchmagate”, which implicated the president’s involvement in murder of a journalist.

In terms of foreign policy, Leonid Kuchma adopted a “multivector” strategy trying to engage Russia and the West simultaneously. In 2003, he signed an agreement on forming the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and later the same year expressed a desire to eventually bring Ukraine in the EU.66 Although  

Kuchma’s policy of balancing proved to be ineffective, he continued to adhere to this course. Notably, in his book titled “Ukraine is not Russia” he writes: “What does it mean ‘going to Europe together [with Russia]? It is not a slogan and not a spell; it is a statement of fact in its most general form. The fact that Ukraine and Russia clearly acknowledged: their European choice is the same.”

The presidency of Viktor Yushchenko has marked a new phase in Ukrainian democratic transformation. Yushchenko became president through repetition of a run-off election in the aftermath of the Orange revolution. At the same time, his presidency was possible also due to a compromise between conflicting political forces, which was “negotiated at round-tables brokered by the European Union.” The compromise implied constraining presidential powers and removed Yushchenko’s control of the executive branch. Consequently, since 2006, his presidency was marked by a harsh confrontation with the government (appointed by the parliament) and, hence, complicated decision-making process. This state of affairs also negatively affected the implementation of reforms. According to Kudelia, “the ensuing confrontation between the Presidential Administration on one hand and the government and the parliamentary majority on the other, paralyzed the reform process and kept their attention focused on internal power struggles.”

In contrast to Kuchma’s “multivectorness,” Yushchenko’s foreign policy was clearly oriented on the West, namely towards integration into the NATO and the EU. The European Union leaders’ response to the change of political configuration and strategic priorities of Ukraine is a subject for debate. On the one hand, the EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative Javier Solana offered the “Ten Points plan” to Ukraine, which provided better access to funding and deeper cooperation in mobility, energy, and trade areas. On the other, it did not add any substantially new

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67 Leonid Kuchma, *Ukrajina ne Rossija [Ukraine is not Russia]* (Vremia, 2004).
69 Kudelia, “Ukraine’s Credibility Gap as a Perennial Foreign Policy Problem.”
70 Christoph Saurenbach and Schneider Eberhard, “Kiev’s EU Ambitions,” *SWP Comments*, March 2005.
provisions to the ENP action plan. According to Sasse “the ‘Ten Points’ are best understood as a ‘goodwill gesture’ on the part of the EU and a mean to prevent an embarrassing deadlock at a time when Ukraine’s claim to membership gained a powerful momentum.”

At the same time, Ukrainian leaders slowly began losing “credit of trust” from the West. Confrontation between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, who ruled the Cabinet of Ministry from 2006, contributed to Ukraine’s alienation from NATO. When the Alliance was ready to offer the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine in 2006, Yanukovych rejected the idea referring to a lack of consensus on the issue within Ukrainian society. When Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (Ukrainian prime minister from 2007 to 2010) asked for the MAP later in 2008, it was rejected by NATO members using Yanukovych’s argument. Notably, Yushchenko-Tymoshenko relations gradually shifted from unity to mutual criticism. This led to a new wave of instability in the country and ultimately resulted in a slowdown of the dialogue with both NATO and the EU.

Poor performance of the "Orange coalition" not only discredited its members, but also contributed to the disappointment in the pro-Western course overall. This paved the path to the presidency of Yanukovych and made it easier for him to resurrect Kuchma-like balancing between Russia and the West. He extended the contract, which allowed Russian fleet to locate in Sevastopol. Also, the long-aspired course on the integration into NATO was canceled by announcement of the non-aligned status of Ukraine. Simultaneously, Yanukovych continued negotiations on closer cooperation with the EU and formalized the Association Agreement. Ironically, the latter became possible due to eliminating constitutional changes of the Orange revolution (Yanukovych announced those changes illegal), which turned Ukraine into a semi-presidential republic again. The trustworthy relations with the EU, however, were impeded by the imprisonment of the opposition leader and former minister Tymoshenko.

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72 Kudelia, "Ukraine’s Credibility Gap as a Perennial Foreign Policy Problem."
73 Ibid.
Consequently, despite the integration rhetoric, Ukraine moved back to its condition of the early nineties, which Angela Stent wittily described as a “no-man’s land” in Europe.\textsuperscript{74}

The democratic drawback and widespread corruption under Yanukovych’s rule led to mass violent protests known as Euromaidan. Although triggered by suspension of the AA with the European Union, the revolution was driven by overall dissatisfaction with the domestic developments and largely mirrored, in words of Minakov, “the struggle between the state and the country.”\textsuperscript{75} The concept of a country-state struggle largely explains why political development of Ukraine since the very independence followed a zigzag course.

Ukraine is culturally and ethnically heterogeneous. Citizens of its eastern and western parts share different collective memories and distinct ressentiment. According to Minakov’s definition, ressentiment is “a component of collective memory, a sort of pain of remembrance, whose cause is articulated in terms of some actual, inescapably but unjustly co-present Other.”\textsuperscript{76} The country-state struggle in case of Ukraine implies that political elites monopolize and constantly reinforce ressentiment through linguistic dichotomies (East-West, Russia-EU etc.) and use it to justify and secure conservatism. In this context, conservatism is understood as a sort of order, which aims to “protect traditional values, customs, and institutions against change.”\textsuperscript{77} As follows, the country becomes an arena of competition between two “conservatisms.”

Ressentiment of the Ukrainian West was reinforced through an outdated concept of nationalism and used by Yushchenko’s political team. Ukraine under the rule of Yanukovych is an example of another type of Ukrainian “conservatism,” which draws its strength from the trauma of loss of former USSR glory, typical for the Ukrainian East.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 46.
Minakov concludes that “instead of increasingly complex political communication conditioned by ideological competition and by an evolving political logic, we have seen ideological simplification, diverse forms of political reasoning and worldviews reduced to a single semantic field.”78 As follows, the conservative language of dichotomies serves the preservation of the “state” in expense of the “country,” as far as it excludes a possibility of consensus and compromises between citizens.

In regard to Ukrainian relations with the EU, the “clash of conservatisms” was not taken into account by the EU leaders in their approach to Ukraine. Communicating mainly with Ukrainian top officials, the EU excluded non-governmental actors from the EU-Ukraine dialog. As Pieklo notices, “often even the staff of Ukrainian governmental agencies didn’t know that part of their budget came from ENPI funds.”79 Although the focus on civil society in the EaP improved the situation to some extent, this measure was not enough to increase the awareness on the EU as an organization and as a concept among the Ukrainian public. As a result, instead of becoming an agent of change, the EU contributed to reinforcement of both versions of Ukrainian “conservatisms.”

In one of his article, Umland raises up a question: “Is the recent political rollback in Kiev, the reason or [somehow] already the result of decelerating rapprochement with Brussels?”80 Answering this question, in words of the author, brings up a chicken-and-egg dilemma. The overview of EU-Ukraine relations over the last decades shows that neither the Ukrainian performance nor the EU’s response were adequate to add substance to the EU-Ukraine integration rhetoric.

78 Ibid., 47.
79 Pieklo “Ukraine’s Unrequited Passion for Europe.”
80 Umland, “Berlin, Kijev, Moskva i Novyje Podvodnyje Gazoprovody: Niemetskaja Geoekonomika v Labirinte Rossijsko-Ukrainskih Otnoshenij.”
3. Breaking a Vicious Circle?

The annexation of Crimea and subsequent Russian-backed “hybrid war” added one more tragic page to Ukrainian history. At the same time, it is widely believed that these tragic events can trigger a breakthrough in Ukrainian democratic self-determination and a leap towards integration within the Western political, economic and value system. As demonstrated earlier in this work, Ukrainian rapprochement with the West is not possible without well-designed and consequential policies from both sides. But first and foremost the mutual long-term goals should be defined and clearly articulated.

The current Ukrainian leadership is characterized by a strong pro-Western orientation, which is largely supported by European leaders. Nevertheless, it is naïve to believe that the end of the policy of “multivectorness” in Ukraine solves the problem of Russian influence on EU-Ukrainian relations. By military intervention Moscow reminded the West that its interests must be taken into account. Consequently, the more unambiguous Ukraine becomes with its pro-Western orientation, the more “balancing” between partnership relations with Russia, on the one hand, and “Europeanization” of Ukraine, on the other, is required from the European leaders.

In order to shed some light on how this “balancing” is understood by Ukrainian, German, and British leaders since the emergence of the “Ukrainian crisis,” the following parts present the result of the analysis of metaphorical representation of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle by Petro Poroshenko, Angela Merkel, and David Cameron.

3.1 Poroshenko: Reviving Dichotomization

If Jan Pieklo undertook an analysis of metaphor scenarios in Poroshenko’s speeches, his fairytale about Ukraine would sound like this: “Once upon a time, Ukraine escaped from the Kingdom of Evil, ruled by an insane Tsar. The Tsar injures her and wants her dead, but she is strong enough to run away. Away to the western lands, where there is a
magic Castle of Harmony and Prosperity. Indeed, a long journey is ahead and she has to learn a lot on her way. But Ukraine keeps going, since she knows for sure: her true family is waiting for her.”

Metaphors in political discourse open a possibility to reason about complex political issues based on, as Musolff defines it, “folk-theoretic knowledge.”81 With the help of metaphor and scenarios it suggests, events of any complexity become easy to understand and evaluate through appeals to common sense. The fairytale about Ukraine is not fully fiction. It has been (re)constructed from metaphors, distilled from 124 political speeches by the president of Ukraine, produced throughout the two years of his presidency. An analytical look on the “fairytale” – the combination of metaphoric scenarios uncovered in Poroshenko’s discourse – reveals the very base of the political reality, which is consciously or unconsciously articulated (and in this way constructed) through his speech.

This part aims to demonstrate that the “fairytale” about Ukraine is more a reality than a fantasy. It highlights some aspects of metaphorization of Russia and the EU as well as Ukraine in relation to both political entities. With reference to the metaphoric concepts, it uncovers the main metaphoric storylines that frame reasoning about the entities under scrutiny, including relations between them. Additionally, excerpts of Poroshenko’s speeches are provided in order to exemplify the linguistic manifestations of conceptual metaphors in discursive units. Finally, it is shown how Poroshenko’s metaphoric reasoning shapes Ukrainian post-Euromaidan identity.

Poroshenko’s political communication is highly ornamental. It is saturated with idiomatic expressions as well as a wide range of sedimented and novel metaphors, if to follow metaphor classification used by Petr Drulak.82 In Poroshenko’s speeches, Russia gains a particular attention in terms of the variety of linguistic metaphors. To illustrate

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81 Musolff, *Metaphor and Political Discourse*.
this, linguistic metaphors and idiomatic expressions in relation to Russia and Russian aggression identified in Poroshenko’s discourse are summarized below (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>thief, powerful enemy, beats up USSR, brings enslavement, Totalitarian empire, wild and insatiable empire, USSR, Nazi Germany, totalitarian, betrayer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Putin/the Kremlin</td>
<td>imperial psychosis, bloody hands, Hitler, imperial itch, unhealthy geopolitical ambitions, imperial megalomania, chauvinist ambitions to conquer the world, threw noose on the neck of Ukraine, will knock on the gates of hell, pathological revanchist-imperial ambitions, drunk, mass production of terror, ruthless tyrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian soldiers</td>
<td>Stalin’s grandsons, Nazi, aliens, uninvited guests, armed to the teeth, horde, green men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of Russia/DNR-LNR</td>
<td>puppets, puppet republics, goblins, fifth column, terrorists, ducks, demagogues, provocateurs and political speculators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet legacy</td>
<td>garbage, disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s aim in relation to</td>
<td>strangle, kill, burn, shatter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Metaphorical representation of Russia in official speeches of Petro Poroshenko

Analogy-based metaphors (uncovered through inferences made from structure-mapping) are presented in italics. It should also be noted that it is often impossible to clearly identify a metaphorized object, due to metonymical relation between the objects and events presented in the table. For example, referring to the Kremlin, the speaker
can mean Putin as a leader, political power of Russia in general, or Russia as a whole country. Thus, the list of metaphorized objects is quite relational.

Political speech is traditionally governed by two main conceptual metaphors, namely NATION IS A PERSON/BODY and PATH/MOVEMENT/JOURNEY. The latter is governed by the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image-schema, which, according to Lakoff and Johnson, stems from the bodily experience of purposeful movement from one destination to another. In a political speech, it can also be translated into INITIAL STATE-STEPS-DESIRED STATE – a purposeful transition from one state of affairs to another through undertaking a number of steps by a BODY, who initiated this transition.83 Again, in political discourse, a BODY/PERSON metaphor is often applied to a nation/a state, a group of states, and an organization. In this way, these conceptual metaphors are closely related and contribute to interpretation of linguistic metaphors and idiomatic expressions in relation to Russia, identified in Poroshenko's speeches (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE (INITIAL STATE)</th>
<th>PATH (STEPS)</th>
<th>GOAL (DESIRE STATE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>imperial psychosis, imperial itch,</td>
<td>caused excruciating pain</td>
<td>strangle, kill, burn, shatter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unhealthy geopolitical ambitions,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imperial megalomania,</td>
<td>threw a noose on the neck of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pathological revanchist-imperial ambitions</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENTAL ILLNESS</td>
<td>PHYSICAL ABUSE</td>
<td>DEATH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Linguistic metaphors structured by SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema

Russia is portrayed as a mentally unhealthy PERSON:

(1) "Imperial megalomania is a very dangerous diagnosis. Some [people] are sick, but others pay for a treatment, and do that with their lives." 84

Russian policy/aggression towards Ukraine is metaphorized as physical abuse:

(2) "But we do know the enemy is not going to end the war and hybrid warfare - something what the world faced a year ago is in full swing. Because it incorporates not only military aggression but also an economic stranglehold, which the aggressor thought he wrapped around the neck of Ukraine to destroy her economically." 85

The aim of Russian policy/aggression is metaphorized as killing Ukraine as a PERSON:

(3) "The enemy has set an aim not only to revise the borders. The goal is different. Nobody needs Donetsk, Luhansk or the Donbas. We clearly know that the purpose was to shatter the country or completely wipe it off the map. To destroy us as great European people." 86

Thus, structuring the data in correspondence with INITIAL STATE-STEPS-DESired STATE schema allows to conclude that in Poroshenko’s speeches Russia is metaphorically constructed as a “mentally sick (INITIAL STATE) PERSON, who by means of physical harm (STEPS) tries to kill (DESired STATE) Ukraine as a PERSON.” The issue of mental illness is also found in analogy-based metaphors, with the help of which Poroshenko equates Putin to Hitler. The past historical event – the Austrian Anschluss – serves as a frame (source event), the elements of which get projected onto another historical event, namely the annexation of Crimea (target event). Reasoning about the


annexation of Crimea and surrounding events in terms of the Austrian Anschluss creates a system of correspondences between the two events, in which Putin is categorized as equal to Hitler:

(1) “Nazism and Communism, anti-Semitism and ethnic hatreds, propaganda and torture—all stand in the same row of crimes from which the major atrocities of the Twentieth Century originated; Crimes, which despite the cruelest lessons learned, are committed today, in the twenty-first century, in aggression against my country—Ukraine. Astonishingly, we again see an attempt to appease the aggressor.”  

(2) “That were you, who made it impossible for the enemy to go deep in Ukraine, [the enemy], which in addition to the Anschluss of the Crimea and Sevastopol, aimed, tried, and planned to annex at least another eight Ukrainian regions as part of the so-called ‘New Russia’ project.”  

(3) The crisis of the global and European security system and attempts to again resort to historically bankrupt policy of appeasement.  

(4) “If Moscow does not reconsider its position, individual sanctions against those involved in the Anschluss of Crimea and the occupation of areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions will be extended this fall. Similarly, sector sanctions will be extended in early January next year.”

As follows, analogy-based metaphoric reasoning supplements the negative image of Russia created by metaphors in Poroshenko’s political communication. Through contrasting Russia (and metonymically-related Eurasian Union) with the West/European Union, the negative image of the former contributes to construction of the positive

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89 Poroshenko, “Pozacherhove Posiannya Prezydenta Ukrayiny Do Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny.”  
image of the latter. Contrasting Russia with the West through metaphorization is exemplified below (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>perceives democracy as poison</td>
<td>perceives democracy as value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seeks power</td>
<td>seeks harmony to preserve and thrive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>believes that there are no rules</td>
<td>plays by the rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barbarian</td>
<td>civilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wars, chaos, and suffering</td>
<td>peace, security, and human rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Metaphorical contrasting Russia with the West in official speeches of Petro Poroshenko**

In the discourse under scrutiny, the aforementioned contrasting is structured by DOWN/UP image-schema, which connects spatial experience with evaluation of objects. Positive evaluations are UP, negative evaluations are DOWN. In “Metaphors we live by,” Lakoff and Johnson show that, for example, GOOD IS UP, HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP, VIRTUE IS UP, whereas BAD IS DOWN, SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN, DEPRAVITY IS DOWN. Through conceptualizing Russia as being DOWN and the West as being UP, Poroshenko constructs negative (BAD, SICK, DEPRAVED) image of Russia/Eurasian Union and positive (GOOD, HEALTHY, VIRTUOUS) image of the EU. With regard to this, Ukraine is conceptualized as a PERSON, who climbs from DOWN to UP:

(1) “One leg we hung over the abyss [...] But just like experienced climbers, we gathered forces, kept our balance, and continue climbing to the top.”

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(2) “We will not ask to let us back to bazaar, where there is only economic aggression, political blackmail and imperial insecurities. We will profit from European and other free markets around the world. We will raise Ukrainian industry.”

With a reference to SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, Ukraine is thus constructed as a PERSON who is on her way from Moscow to Brussels. Particularly, integration into the West is a metaphoric concept of PATH/MOVEMENT/JOURNEY.

(1) “This unique international legal instrument guarantees irreversibility of our strategic course towards Europe. No demonic power will ever be able to turn the country back! About vector to Moscow, where we were dragged for several decades, now no one even breathes a word, and this toponym on the map is marked only as a main source of military threat to Ukraine.”

(2) “Vast horizons and vast prospects open the Association Agreement with the EU, because, I am sure, it is our important first step toward the acquisition of Ukraine’s future membership in the European Union.”

Notably, to begin her JOURNEY to Europe, Ukraine as a PERSON must first to be reborn (source domain of LIFE/REBIRTH):

(1) “Let me remind you that the EU flag was sealed with Ukrainian blood. That is how new Ukraine was born”

Alternative metaphorization suggests that Ukraine is a MACHINE, which is to be “rebooted,” “reloaded,” “restarted,” or “renewed.” In Poroshenko’s speech, Ukraine as a

MACHINE is related to the current reform process and conceptualized as a stage of the JOURNEY to the EU. Linguistic manifestations of conceptual metaphors show that implementing reforms in Ukraine is imagined as a “marathon” that should be run “with the highest speed.”

In relation to Europe, Ukraine is found to be conceptualized as a FORTRESS of Europe:

(1) “No wonder it happened again, when, as in ancient Cossack times, Ukraine became a protective wall on the eastern border of Europe.” 97

(2) “I think it is clear that an independent democratic Ukraine anchored into the system of European values is a cornerstone to security and stability in Europe and in the whole world. Once this cornerstone is undermined, the European and global security foundations are shattered.” 98

At the same time, Europe with regard to Ukraine is predominantly articulated in Poroshenko’s discourse through the concepts of a FAMILY and a HOUSE. Hülsse argues that the FAMILY metaphor constructs European identity on a basis of natural belonging, whereas PATH and HOUSE metaphors shape rather a civic European identity. 99 In Poroshenko’s discourse, Ukraine as a FORTRESS of Europe constructs the former as an essential part of the latter in terms of geography and culture (1, 2). Ukraine as a PERSON, however, is still outside the European FAMILY in terms of political development. Combining FAMILY metaphors with PATH metaphors serves a purpose to overcome the gap between geographical and civic identity, since it frames Ukraine’s political belonging to Europe as just a matter of time (3, 4):


98 Poroshenko, “Vystup Prezydenta Ukrayiny Petra Poroshenka Na 12-Y Shchorichniy Zustrichi Yaltyn's'koyi Yevropeys'koyi Stratehiy (YES).”

“A year ago Ukrainians showed the world that they are worthy of their ancestors and their history, they are a European nation - co-creator of European history, culture and spiritual ideals.”

“Ukraine today is fighting for our common Europe.”

“I am convinced that we will stand united efforts in the fight against the aggressor, and will firmly change the country, and pave her way into the family of developed democratic nations.”

“Today you and I are restoring historical justice, and finally open the monument to Sheptytsky in Lviv. And the best monument to the Lord is independent Ukraine that makes steps toward the family of European nations.”

A HOUSE metaphor refers to the institutional dimension of Europe. Referring to the EU as the HOUSE appears in Poroshenko’s speeches predominantly in relation to Ukraine. In the metaphoric scenario, Ukraine as a PERSON knocks at the door of the HOUSE, which signifies that Ukraine’s strategic course is set to full integration with the EU. In response, the EU member-states as metaphorical owners of the HOUSE open the door, which signifies that they consider Ukraine as a future EU-member. In this way, the Ukraine’s accession to the EU is metaphorically constructed as an achievable and ultimate goal of rapprochement with the EU:

“Good news: the EU doors are open for us. I’m absolutely sure. The voices about the open door in Europe are louder and louder. [...] I am sure that the events in Kyiv and Brussels have given us a firm hope, even confidence that we will soon gain the...”

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101 Ibid.


prospect of EU membership. Yes, we have a right to knock on the door. Brought up people, even when the lock is there, knock on the door and do not come in without an invitation.”

(2) [...] “but also to emphasize by their presence that the door to the European Union is open to Ukraine.”

Representing the EU as a HOUSE also contributes to shaping the civic identity of a "reborn" Ukraine as European. In the words of Hülsse, "by stepping through the [EU's] door, candidates enter the house and at this moment become part of the [European] self.” It is also worth noticing that European states (and metonymically related European leaders) are metaphorically presented as FRIENDS. As FRIENDS, European states “fight for Ukraine,” “lend a helping hand,” “give advice.” This way of metaphorization, on the one hand, contributes to constructing Ukraine as equal to the European nations; on the other, European nations are FRIENDS in contrast to Russia, which is an ENEMY:

(1) “This is our common position with the European Union, as well as in the issue of sanctions against Russia. The European Union continues side by side with us to protect our Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.”

In the words of Taras Kuzio, “the construction of a national identity requires the existence of contrasting 'Others' because the creation of bounded in-groups requires


106 Hülsse, "Imagine the EU," 416.

there to be a perceived sense of difference to other out-groups.” Predictably, in Petro Poroshenko’s official discourse, Russia is prominently articulated as Ukraine’s “Other.” Kuzio also makes an observation that construction of the Ukrainian identity “is being undertaken by contrasting itself to the Russian, former Soviet and Eurasian ‘Other’.” The result of metaphor analysis presented above shows that Russia as the “Other” is constructed not through comparison with the Ukrainian “Self,” but through, on the one hand, contrasting Russia with the West, and, on the other, identifying with the West the Ukrainian “Self.”

3.2 Merkel and Cameron: “Greater Europe” vs. Atlanticism

As demonstrated above, in the political communication of the president of Ukraine, Europe appears to be an antidote to Russia and is described through metaphors from conceptual fields with positive associations. In this regard, the question arises: what is Europe? In Poroshenko’s discourse, Europe “as a political concept” is represented by the European Union, while geographical Europe is basically the same entity but supplemented with Ukraine. In discourses of Poroshenko’s European counterparts, the idea of Europe is much less unambiguous.

Metaphor analysis of Merkel’s and Cameron’s political speeches reveals that the leader’s conceptualization of Europe – as well as the role of Russia and Ukraine in it – differs in all countries under scrutiny. The following part at first highlights the discrepancy between the metaphors and metaphoric storylines of Petro Poroshenko and Angela Merkel. Then, it presents thematic-related metaphoric discourse of David Cameron in juxtaposition with Angela Merkel’s discourse. Finally, it suggests the explanation of the analyzed data.

109 Ibid., 344.
Europe as a political concept is often cognized with the help of an ontological metaphor: a CONTAINER, and articulated with the help of metaphors like a BODY or a HOUSE, among others. Accordingly, it is implied that Europe as a concept is relatively homogeneous and it has its shape and borders. At the same time, its borders do not necessarily coincide with the borders of geographical Europe. The analysis of German discourse shows that Angela Merkel articulates Ukraine as part of a geographical Europe (1), but does not include it in Europe as a concept (2, 3):

1. "It is in this context, fellow members of this House, first in Georgia back in 2008 and now in the heart of Europe, in Ukraine, that we are witnessing a conflict about spheres of influence and territorial claims, such as those we know from the 19th and 20th century but thought we had put behind us."  

2. "Wenn wir auf die Grenzen Europas sehen – am Mittelmeer oder die polnisch-ukrainische Grenze –, wenn wir sehen, wie der syrische Bürgerkrieg tobt und Hunderttausende von Opfern fordert, dann spüren wir doch, welchen Herausforderungen wir begegnen." [When we look at the borders of Europe - the Mediterranean and the Polish-Ukrainian border - when we see how the Syrian civil war rages and calls for hundreds of thousands of victims, then we feel what challenges we encounter.]

3. "Wir sehen uns derzeit konfrontiert mit einer aggressiven Auseinandersetzung in der Ukraine, die von Russland ausgeht. [...] Wir müssen aber lernen, dass dafür immer wieder gekämpft werden muss. Der Blick auch über Europa hinaus auf die Welt zeigt uns das sehr schnell." [We currently see ourselves dealing with an aggressive confrontation in Ukraine, which emanates from Russia. [...] But we must learn

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that [peace and freedom] must be fought for again and again. The view beyond Europe to the world shows us this very quickly.]

In view of Poroshenko, reform process is a part of the JOURNEY of Ukraine into the European HOUSE (GOAL/DESIRED STATE), the DOOR of which is OPEN. Merkel, in contrast, makes it clear that by “Annäherung” (a sedimented metaphor, which literally can be interpreted as “getting closer”) she implies the reform process in Ukraine to be a final GOAL/DESIRED STATE (1). In relation to Ukraine, metaphor of an “open door” appeared in Merkel’s discourse only with regard to the signing of the AA by the former Ukrainian government in the context of Euromaidan (2, 3):

(1) Ich gehöre zu den Menschen, die versuchen, keine falschen Erwartungen zu wecken. Deshalb, glaube ich, sind wir jetzt erst einmal bei der Umsetzung des EU-Assoziierungsabkommens mit der Ukraine. Die Frage der Beitrittsperspektive steht im Augenblick nicht auf der Tagesordnung, aber die Frage der Annäherung der Ukraine an die Standards der Europäischen Union.114 [I am one of those people who try to avoid false expectations. Therefore, I believe we are now [talking about] first of all the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine. The question of the prospect of accession is currently not on the agenda, but the question of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the standards of the European Union.]

(2) “Wir stehen insgesamt, und das haben wir immer wieder gesagt, dazu, dass die Tür für die Unterschrift unter dieses Assoziierungsabkommen offen ist.” 115 [We are united and have repeatedly said in this regard that the door for the signature of this Association Agreement is open.]


(3) Wir haben weiterhin festgestellt: Die Tür zur Unterzeichnung des Assoziierungsabkommens ist weiter offen.  

[We continue claiming: The door to the signing of the Association Agreement is still open.]

Thereby, Ukrainian membership in the EU neither explicitly nor implicitly appears to be a considerable possibility in Merkel's speech. Furthermore, in contrast to the current Ukrainian president's belief that cooperation and rapprochement with the European Union is an alternative to cooperation with Russia, in Merkel's view, Ukraine's cooperation with both political entities is not mutually exclusive. German chancellor has not only repeatedly emphasized that signing the AA does not undermine Ukraine-Russian relations (1), but also claimed that it goes in line with the interests of the both countries. Using the language of conceptual metaphors, Ukraine and Russia, in Merkel's view, have been following the same PATH towards rapprochement with the EU (2):

(1) Ich will noch einmal sagen: Das Assoziierungsabkommen und das darin enthaltene Freihandelsabkommen ist nicht gegen irgendetjemanden gerichtet. Es ist eine Öffnung der ukrainischen Märkte in Richtung der Europäischen Union, aber es ist nicht gegen Russland gerichtet. Das sollte unsere Diskussion auch bestimmen. [I want to reiterate: The Association Agreement and the free trade agreements contained therein is not directed against anyone. It is an opening of the Ukrainian market in the direction of the European Union, but it is not directed against Russia. This should also guide our discussion.]  

(2) "Es ist ein vernünftiger Gedanke, näher zusammenzurücken und das aufzunehmen, was immer schon einmal in Rede stand, nämlich den Gedanken einer gemeinsamen Wirtschaftszone zwischen Wladiwostok und Lissabon. Umso schwerer ist es zu


It can thus be concluded that the idea of “change through rapprochement” – a cornerstone of German policy towards Russia since Ostpolitik – is alive in Merkel’s discourse, despite the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Although the Russian breach of international law is claimed to be unacceptable for Germany and the whole international community, cooperation with Russia in economic and security areas is articulated to be back on the agenda as soon as peace in Ukraine is restored.

Germany’s special approach to Moscow is also seen in the carefully selected rhetoric of Angela Merkel. In relation to the “Ukrainian crisis,” sedimented and highly conventional metaphors prevail in the discourse of German chancellor. This contrasts not only with overwhelmed with idioms and novel linguistic metaphors speech of the Ukrainian president, but also with emotion-laden straightforward discourse of David Cameron. Merkel’s expressions on Russia and Ukraine are more diplomatically cautious than expressions of Ukrainian and British leaders.

The opinion of Merkel and Cameron coincide in condemnation of Russia’s intervention in Ukrainian territory. Both leaders figuratively describe the Kremlin’s behavior as guided by “might is right” principle (1, 2), which endangers the very basics of the post-Cold War European order (3, 4):

(1) "We should not need reminding of the consequences of letting the doctrine of ‘might is right’ prevail. We should not need to be reminded of the lessons of European history."¹¹⁹

(2) "Denn was Russland der Ukraine zumutet, ist ein Verstoß gegen unsere europäische Friedens- und Freiheitsordnung. Hinter dem Versuch, das Recht des Stärkeren gegen die Stärke des Rechts zu setzen, steht das alte Denkmuster, demnach in Nachbarstaaten Einflussphären und keine Partnerländer zu sehen sind."¹²⁰ [Because what Russia demands from Ukraine, is a violation of our European order of peace and freedom. Behind an attempt to set the law of the strongest against the strength of the law, is the old paradigm, according to which neighboring states are seen as spheres of influence not as partner countries.]

(3) "To the east, Russia has ripped up the rulebook with its illegal, self-declared annexation of Crimea and its troops on Ukrainian soil threatening and undermining a sovereign nation state."¹²¹

(4) "Doch im Ukraine-Konflikt erleben wir, wie die Grundpfeiler unserer europäischen Friedensordnung infrage gestellt werden."¹²² [But in the Ukrainian conflict we experience that the cornerstone of our peaceful European order is questioned.]

At the same time, their understandings of implications that follow from the crisis substantially differ. Conceptual metaphors behind Merkel’s speech contribute to constructing Russia’s MOVEMENT towards rapprochement with the EU as being only temporarily halted. Sanctions against Russia are articulated as a measure, which


Western democracies have to undertake in order to return Russia to the PATH it had been initially following:

(1) "Wir haben einen sehr harten Weg gewählt - ich meine, das haben wir mit den Rats-Entscheidungen am Mittwoch und den Sanktionen gegen Russland auch gezeigt -, und wir müssen diesen Weg auch noch weitergehen. Trotzdem bleibe ich dabei, dass es für die Europäische Union und für uns alle gut wäre, wenn wir mittelfristig und langfristig wieder zu einem besseren Miteinander kommen könnten."123 [We have chosen a very difficult way - I mean, we have also shown that through the Council decisions on Wednesday and the sanctions against Russia - and we need to go further on this path. Nevertheless, I maintain that it would be good for the European Union and all of us if we could return to a better coexistence over the medium and long term.]

(2) "Für den Fall, dass Russland nicht bereit ist, auf den Weg der Zusammenarbeit und des Rechts zurückzukehren, für den Fall, dass Russland unverändert nicht bereit ist, zur Entspannung beizutragen, haben die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union bei ihrem Treffen in der letzten Woche in Brüssel drei Stufen für ihr weiteres Vorgehen festgelegt. "124 [In case, if Russia is not ready to return to the path of cooperation and justice, in case if Russia is not prepared to contribute to detente, then last week at their meeting in Brussels the leaders of the European Union established the three stages [of sanctions] for future action.]

Restoration of pre-“Ukrainian crisis” international order is thus a short-term priority for Angela Merkel. This is to be done through focusing on Russia in line with traditional Ostpolitik and with regard to the principles of “civilian power.” In the long-term, cooperation between Russia and the EU is embedded in broader EU’s policy

towards Eastern neighbors. In other words, in terms of cooperation with the European Union, Russia is claimed to be treated on an equal basis with the ENP countries.

David Cameron, however, does not share Angela Merkel’s belief in a Moscow’s course on rapprochement with the European Union. He portrays Russia as opposing democratic values, and, like the Ukrainian president, contrasts it with the EU. Russia in Cameron’s discourse appears to be more of a European “other” than a “partner” in Merkel’s sense. As follows, the ENP countries’ rapprochement with the European Union is verbalized as an alternative to closer engagement with Russia (1). In this regard, “Europeanization” of Ukraine is framed as a measure, which is necessary for defending democratic values, and thus, protecting Europe as a political concept (2, 3, 4):

(1) And on the Eastern Partnership we agreed that countries which look towards Europe for support – such as Ukraine - should be free to enter into agreement with us while of course continuing to insist on proper standards of governance and justice that such a relationship should entail.125

(2) “But the best rebuke to Russia is a strong and successful Ukraine, free to make its own choices about its own future. [...] So this morning we took a formal step to closer relations between the EU and Ukraine, with the signature of a landmark agreement between us both.”126

(3) “I think that’s absolutely vital to make sure that we have a successful Ukraine and that we see a de-escalation of that problem.”127

(4) So today we’ve agreed action to stabilize Ukraine in these difficult circumstances, to support the Ukrainian government, and to build closer ties between the EU and Ukraine. In the long run, Ukrainian success will be one of the most powerful answers

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to Russian aggression. This is the vital contribution that Europe can make to help the Ukrainian people in their hour of need, and we are determined to deliver it.\textsuperscript{128}

Thereby, a return to pre-“Ukrainian crisis” political order in Europe is not possible in Cameron’s view. Structuring Cameron’s expressions through SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, the events surrounded the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (SOURCE) have marked the country’s pro-democratic orientation (PATH) towards Europe. In contrast to Merkel, who describes Ukrainian revolution in the vague terms of self-determination (1, 2), Cameron clearly articulates its significance for the European PATH of Ukraine (3, 4):

(1) \textit{Unser Ziel ist vollkommen klar: Wir unterstützen eine Ukraine, die in Frieden und eigener Selbstbestimmung über ihr eigenes Schicksal entscheiden kann, im Übrigen in guter Nachbarschaft mit Russland}\textsuperscript{129} [Our goal is very clear: We support Ukraine, which in peace and its own self-determination can decide on its own destiny, furthermore, on good neighborly relations with Russia.]

(2) \textit{“Das Ziel unseres Handelns ist eine souveräne und territorial unversehrte Ukraine, die über ihre Zukunft – nicht mehr und nicht weniger – selbst entscheiden kann.”}\textsuperscript{130} [The aim of our behavior is sovereign and territorially intact Ukraine, which – not more and not less – can decide for itself its own future.]

(3) \textit{The repeal of restrictions on fundamental freedoms was a step in the right direction, and we urge President Yanukovych to respect his people’s wishes and put his country back on the path to a more stable and secure European future.}\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128} Cameron, “European Council March 2014: David Cameron’s Press Conference.”
(4) “We backed the aspiration of the Ukrainian people for a democratic and European future, while being clear that their leader should stand up for those people’s aspirations.”¹³²

Despite the congruence between the British prime minister’s conceptualization of the Ukrainian PATH to Europe with the view of Ukrainian president, in contrast to the latter, Cameron does not imply that the Ukrainian PATH leads to membership in the EU. Although Cameron articulates “Europeanization” of Ukraine as an alternative to its engagement with Russia, in his view, rapprochement of Ukraine with the EU is a final GOAL/DESIRE STATE. In this regard, British leader’s understanding coincides with the view of Angela Merkel.

As indicated above, conceptualization of Europe is structured by the CONTAINER schema. The divergent image of a post-“Ukrainian crisis” international order in German and British leadership discourse can be additionally found in the deployment of BRIDGE metaphor in relation to conceptualization of Europe as a CONTAINER. In Merkel’s discourse, metaphor of building a BRIDGE is used to describe establishment of cooperation between Europe (CONTAINER) and the rest of the world. In this way, Russia and Ukraine are external entities, BRIDGES to which are currently on the different stages of development (1). In Cameron’s speech, Europe (CONTAINER) is an antidote to Russia/Eurasian Union (also conceptualized as a CONTAINER). In such configuration Ukraine is seen as beyond the both entities and it acquires a role of a BRIDGE between them (2):

(1) “Yet the conflict in Ukraine has shown us that even in the 21st century, peace and freedom cannot be taken for granted and that we must therefore continue to fight for them. That is why we say that it remains vital to maintain bridges and build new

ones - through dialogue and diplomacy. That is the aim of our European Neighborhood Policy.”

(2) Ukraine should be able to choose its own future and act as a bridge between Russia and Europe.

To sum-up, deconstruction of political speeches of Angela Merkel and David Cameron with a help of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and CONTAINER schemas shows that German and British leaders similarly conceptualize Europe, but see its development in relation to Ukraine and Russia in a fundamentally different way. Merkel allows for a possibility of cooperation and rapprochement with the both countries in a long run. Cameron, in contrast, excludes a possibility of rapprochement with Russia and thus sees democratization of Ukraine as a defensive measure, vital for preservation of Europe in its current shape. Neither Merkel nor Cameron is talking about enlargement as regards the growth of the European Union.

According to Richard Sakwa, the “European project” in its present form has become inherently “Atlanticist” and monopolized the idea of Europe, eclipsing an alternative vision of unification of the continent. Thereby, EU's norms and values, initially supposed to serve the reconciliation and transformation, have become a matter of geopolitics, which resulted in growth of antagonism in the region. As an alternative to the “EU-centered Europe,” Sakwa invokes the idea of “greater Europe,” which would tolerate a multitude of traditions and value-sets united by a common European economic and security umbrella.

Divergence between German and British visions of Europe’s future development can be explained by referring to the concepts of united Europe. While Cameron’s

rhetoric largely reinforces the “Atlanticist” European identity, Merkel, contrarily, aims to mitigate it through the reference to the idea of “greater Europe,” which can potentially prevent wider polarization on the continent. Ukrainian membership in the EU, declared by Poroshenko, does not fit any of these perspectives.

As argued earlier in this work, breaking a vicious circle in the EU-Ukraine relations requires a shared understanding of the long-term goals of cooperation and rapprochement, including the common view on the role of Russia in this process. So far, the Ukrainian, German, and British leaders’ visions on these matters are considerably divergent. Despite the efforts of the latter and high post-Euromaidan expectations, the long-standing inertia in EU-Ukraine relations is likely to continue. The Russian fable “Swan, Pike, and Crawfish” would be a great source for a folk-theoretic framing of the results of the research undertaken in this work. The fable says: “Yet Crawfish scrambled backwards, Swan strained up skywards, Pike pulled toward the sea. Who’s guilty here and who is right is not for us to say. But anyway the cart is still there today.”

Conclusion

Ukraine, the no-man’s land in the post-Cold War political configuration of the European continent, has been making repeated attempts to integrate into Western structures. Although pursued for decades, there has been little substantial progress in integration. The insight into the EU-Ukraine relations since Ukraine’s independence reveals a tangle of miscalculations and setbacks from both sides that prevented effective cooperation. A closer look reveals that Ukraine’s failure to overcome integration gaps adheres to discernible regularities.

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The European Union’s policy towards Ukraine turned out to be inadequate to incite a genuine democratic transformation. The policies have consisted of multiple unilateral demands, which required significant and consistent efforts from Ukrainian government(s), but lacked tangible rewards, which would have stimulated these efforts. Apart from that, the EU’s approach to Ukraine has been embedded in the broad European Neighborhood Policy framework, and has not taken the country’s specific circumstances into account. Relatedly, close ties of Ukraine with Russia, including the traditional influences and interests of the latter in the shared neighborhood, have been fudged. Additionally, the EU’s focus on elites in promoting reforms sidelined the role of non-governmental groups in this process. This led to the Ukrainian government’s monopoly on information, and, in turn, resulted in a lack of unbiased awareness of the EU within regions and society groups.

The cumulative adverse effect of these factors has reinforced the inability of Ukraine’s government to establish and maintain consistent policies on adding substance to the European integration rhetoric. Instead, the latter was repeatedly used as an instrument for winning a domestic power struggle (and became neglected as soon as that aim was achieved), or, contrarily, continuous power struggles appeared to be detrimental for any attempts to actually bring Ukraine closer to EU’s orbit. Furthermore, the state-backed discursive dichotomization between East and West, Russia and the EU, has constantly reinforced largely artificial divisions between eastern and western parts of Ukraine, contributing to the internal struggle of two “conservatisms.”

In this context, the Europeanization rhetoric has been utilized by Ukraine’s western-type “conservatism.” As a result, instead of triggering a democratic transformation of Ukraine, it led to the growth of internal antagonism, which undermined the possibility of finding common ground, and, in turn, made genuine democratization impossible. Successive Ukrainian governments’ wavering back and forth from de facto “Russia first” to West-oriented policies has been both the cause and result of the “clash of conservatisms.” The notorious “multivectorness” policy pursued by Kuchma and Yanukovych served not to solve but to rather mute the internal
antagonisms. Masking inaction, it led to nothing but stagnation, democratic setbacks, and eventually, waves of protests.

The first one, known as the Orange revolution, peacefully enabled a clearly pro-Western president to come to power. This, however, did not trigger a substantial shift in Ukraine-EU relations. In contrast, it made miscommunication and the chronic mismatch of mutual expectations and capabilities especially tangible. On the one hand, poor decision-making under a divided government throughout the Yushchenko’s presidency made smooth implementation of reforms impossible, and led to mistrust from the EU side. On the other, the inability of the latter to respond properly to the rise of pro-European mood in Ukraine resulted in decline of credibility of the European Union that, in turn, contributed to the growth of anti-Western political forces in the country.

Ukraine’s obsessive desire to receive a membership perspective stumbled onto not less obsessive fear of the EU to offer it. No observable progress in integration became a weapon not only against the Orange political camp, but against Europeanization overall. As a result, the pro-European course was easily replaced by vague “multivectorness,” which unraveled preceding achievements and shortly resurrected the well-known pattern of democratic breakdown. For the umpteenth time, the lack of clearly defined and mutually shared objectives of enhancing cooperation recreated a vicious cycle in EU-Ukraine relations.

The second wave of protests, the peaceful Euromaidan uprising, turned into bloodshed and resulted into what is known as the “Ukrainian crisis.” The loss of Crimea and the war in the east have seriously harmed the country. At the same time, these tragic events led to reinforcement of the Ukrainian so-called “European choice,” the launch of a wide-ranging reform process, and resurrection of the integration rhetoric in Ukraine and the West. The EU has made a step towards closer cooperation through signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine. But does this mean the actual inclusion of Ukraine in European integration process? Did the “Ukrainian crisis”-related events bring an end to the decades-long walking round in circles?
This article answers these questions through deconstruction of Ukrainian and European leader’s rhetoric in poststructuralist fashion, namely through the analysis of metaphor deployed in speech. Analyzing metaphoricity in discourse allows digging deeper than the surface language and shedding some light on meanings, consciously or subconsciously held but hidden by speakers. Hence, uncovering metaphors and metaphoric scenarios in the “Ukrainian crisis”-related political communication of Petro Poroshenko, Angela Merkel, and David Cameron clarified the visions of the aforementioned leaders on the future development of relations between the EU and Ukraine, as well as their view on Russia in this regard.

The analysis demonstrates that despite the unanimous condemnation of the Kremlin’s policy and support of Ukraine’s European aspirations by German and British leaders, their understanding of prospective relations in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle differs substantially. Moscow’s breach of the international law did not erase the idea of “greater Europe” from the German leadership discourse. In line with this idea, which implies a common economic and security space “from Vladivostok to Lisbon,” Angela Merkel’s attitude towards Moscow is traditionally cooperative, and sanctions against Russia are framed as a provisional measure. In contrast, David Cameron’s view largely mirrors “Atlanticist” concept of Europe. Russia is not only excluded from the process of unification of Europe, but is perceived as an alien or even antagonistic entity.

Merkel sees Europeanization of Ukraine as a process, which is inextricably linked to transformation of the whole EU’s eastern neighborhood, including Russia. This approach aims to mitigate divisions on the continent, and from such considerations, Ukraine’s integration in the European Union in a form of membership is off the table. For Cameron, who excludes a possibility of Russian transformation and rapprochement, bringing Ukraine closer to the EU’s orbit is regarded as an essential defensive measure. Strong democratic Ukraine is expected to act as both a protective shield and as a mediator between Russia and the EU, two substantially divergent political entities in terms of values and development. Yet, to perform this function, Ukraine has to remain outside the European Union.
Neither the German nor British perspective reflects where Petro Poroshenko stands on the issue. Sharply opposed to Russia, Poroshenko identifies Ukraine with European democracies, whereas the Kremlin, in line with western-type “conservatism,” is framed as the cause of all Ukrainian failures. For the president of Ukraine, the country’s development is clearly oriented on the integration with the Western structures, which is possible only through breaking bonds with Russia. With regard to the rapprochement with the EU, Poroshenko not only unambiguously expresses the aim for a full-fledged membership in the European Union, but also frames it as a natural outcome of Ukraine’s reformation and approximation to the EU norms and standards.

The “Ukrainian crisis”-related events made the “no-man’s land” believe that the long-aspired European dream is closer than ever. This Ukrainian conviction has not as of yet been echoed by European leadership circles. It can thus be concluded that the two years of post-Euromaidan efforts have not narrowed the gap between Ukraine’s expectations and EU leaders’ commitment, and, as earlier, the unclear issue of Ukraine’s eventual membership remains the key stumbling block. This gap not only slows down the process of Ukraine-EU rapprochement, but also, as it is seen from history, empowers anti-Western political forces in Ukraine, thereby increasing the probability of another painful setback to democracy in the country.
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